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INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP 
 
CHAPTER 4 (2d) 
COMPETITION POLICY AND THE PATENT SYSTEM 
 
WALKER PROCESS EQUIP., INC. V. FOOD MACH. & CHEM. 
CORP. 
382 U.S. 172 (1965) 
Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question before us is whether the maintenance and enforcement of a 
patent obtained by fraud on the Patent Office may be the basis of an action 
under § 2 of the Sherman Act, and therefore subject to a treble damage 
claim by an injured party under § 4 of the Clayton Act. The respondent, 
Food Machinery, & Chemical Corp. (hereafter Food Machinery), filed this 
suit for infringement of its patent No. 2,328,655 covering knee-action swing 
diffusers used in aeration equipment for sewage treatment systems. 
Petitioner, Walker Process Equipment, Inc. (hereafter Walker), denied the 
infringement and counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the patent 
was invalid. After discovery, Food Machinery moved to dismiss its 
complaint with prejudice because the patent had expired. Walker then 
amended its counterclaim to charge that Food Machinery had ‘illegally 
monopolized interstate and foreign commerce by fraudulently and in bad 
faith obtaining and maintaining its patent well knowing that it had no basis 
for a patent.’ It alleged fraud on the basis that Food Machinery had sworn 
before the Patent Office that it neither knew nor believed that its invention 
had been in public use in the United States for more than one year prior to 
filing its patent application when, in fact, Food Machinery was a party to 
prior use within such time. The counterclaim further asserted that the 
existence of the patent had deprived Walker of business that it would have 
otherwise enjoyed. Walker prayed that Food Machinery's conduct be 
declared a violation of the antitrust laws and sought recovery of treble 
damages. 
 
…  We have concluded that the enforcement of a patent procured by 
fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of §2 of the Sherman Act 
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provided the other elements necessary to a § 2 case are present. In such 
event the treble damage provisions of § 4 of the Clayton Act would be 
available to an injured party. 
 
As the case reaches us, the allegations of the counterclaim, as to the 
fraud practiced upon the Government by Food Machinery as well as the 
resulting damage suffered by Walker are taken as true. We, therefore, move 
immediately to a consideration of the legal issues presented. 
 
Both Walker and the United States, which appears as amicus curiae, 
argue that if Food Machinery obtained its patent by fraud and thereafter 
used the patent to exclude Walker from the market through ‘threats of suit’ 
and prosecution of this infringement suit, such proof would establish a 
prima facie violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. On the other hand, Food 
Machinery says that a patent monopoly and Sherman Act monopolization 
cannot be equated; the removal of the protection of a patent grant because 
of fraudulent procurement does not automatically result in a § 2 offense. 
Both lower courts seem to have concluded that proof of fraudulent 
procurement may be used to bar recovery for infringement, Precision 
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 
806 (1945), but not to establish invalidity. As the Court of Appeals 
expressed the proposition, ‘only the government may ‘annul or set aside’ a 
patent,' citing Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 434 (1872). It went on to state 
that no case had ‘decided, or hinted that fraud on the Patent Office may be 
turned to use in an original affirmative action, instead of as an equitable 
defense.  Since Walker admits that its anti-trust theory depends on its ability 
to prove fraud on the Patent Office, it follows that Walker's second 
amended counterclaim failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. 
 
We have concluded, first, that Walker's action is not barred by the rule 
that only the United States may sue to cancel or annul a patent. It is true that 
there is no statutory authority for a private annulment suit and the 
invocation of the equitable powers of the court might often subject a 
patentee ‘to innumerable vexatious suits to set aside his patent.’ Mowry, 81 
U.S. at 441. But neither reason applies here. Walker counterclaimed under 
the Clayton Act, not the patent laws. While one of its elements is the 
fraudulent procurement of a patent, the action does not directly seek the 
patent's annulment. The gist of Walker's claim is that since Food Machinery 
obtained its patent by fraud it cannot enjoy the limited exception to the 
prohibitions of § 2 of the Sherman Act, but must answer under that section 
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and § 4 of the Clayton Act in treble damages to those injured by any 
monopolistic action taken under the fraudulent patent claim. Nor can the 
interest in protecting patentees from ‘innumerable vexatious suits' be used 
to frustrate the assertion of rights conferred by the antitrust laws. It must be 
remembered that we deal only with a special class of patents, i.e., those 
procured by intentional fraud. 
 
Under the decisions of this Court a person sued for infringement may 
challenge the validity of the patent on various grounds, including fraudulent 
procurement. E.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive 
Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945); Hazel-Atlas Co. v. 
Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944); Keystone Driller Co. v. General 
Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933). In fact, one need not await the filing of 
a threatened suit by the patentee; the validity of the patent may be tested 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964 ed.).  At the 
same time, we have recognized that an injured party may attack the misuse 
of patent rights. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 
320 U.S. 661 (1944). To permit recovery of treble damages for the 
fraudulent procurement of the patent coupled with violations of § 2 accords 
with these long-recognized procedures. It would also promote the purposes 
so well expressed in Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 816: 
 
‘A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. ]It] is an 
exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to 
access to a free and open market. The far-reaching social and economic 
consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest 
in seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from 
fraud or other inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept 
within their legitimate scope.’ 
 
Walker's counterclaim alleged that Food Machinery obtained the patent 
by knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts to the Patent Office. Proof 
of this assertion would be sufficient to strip Food Machinery of its 
exemption from the antitrust laws.
 
By the same token, Food Machinery's 
good faith would furnish a complete defense. This includes an honest 
mistake as to the effect of prior installation upon patentability-so-called 
‘technical fraud.’ 
 
To establish monopolization or attempt to monopolize a part of trade or 
commerce under § 2 of the Sherman Act, it would then be necessary to 
appraise the exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms of the 
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relevant market for the product involved. Without a definition of that 
market, there is no way to measure Food Machinery's ability to lessen or 
destroy competition. It may be that the device-knee-action swing diffusers -
used in sewage treatment systems does not comprise a relevant market. 
There may be effective substitutes for the device, which do not infringe the 
patent. This is a matter of proof, as is the amount of damages suffered by 
Walker. 
 
As respondent points out, Walker has not clearly articulated its claim. It 
appears to be based on a concept of per se illegality under § 2 of the 
Sherman Act. But in these circumstances, the issue is premature. As the 
Court summarized in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 
(1963), the area of per se illegality is carefully limited. We are reluctant to 
extend it on the bare pleadings and absent examination of market effect and 
economic consequences. 
 
However, even though the per se claim fails at this stage of litigation, we 
believe that the case should be remanded for Walker to clarify the asserted 
violations of § 2 and to offer proof thereon. The trial court dismissed its suit 
not because Walker failed to allege the relevant market, the dominance of 
the patented device therein, and the injurious consequences to Walker of the 
patent's enforcement, but rather on the ground that the United States alone 
may ‘annul or set aside’ a patent for fraud in procurement. The trial court 
has not analyzed any economic data. Indeed, no such proof has yet been 
offered because of the disposition below. In view of these considerations, as 
well as the novelty of the claim asserted and the paucity of guidelines 
available in the decided cases, this deficiency cannot be deemed crucial. 
Fairness requires that on remand Walker have the opportunity to make its § 
2 claims more specific, to prove the alleged fraud, and to establish the 
necessary elements of the asserted § 2 violation. 
 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  Consider the pre-trial events that transpired in Walker Process. 
Originally, Food Machinery filed suit for infringement of its patent against 
Walker Process, who in turn denied infringement and counterclaimed for a 
declaratory judgment that the patent was invalid. Once Food Machinery 
discovered its patent had expired, it moved to dismiss its complaint against 
Walker Process with prejudice. A dismissal with prejudice means that Food 
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Machinery would not again be able to claim Walker Process infringed on 
this specific patent. Moreover, since Food Machinery’s patent had expired, 
Walker Process was able to use the patent’s technology free of charge. If 
Food Machinery was in fact estopped from bringing any additional 
infringement claims for this patent, why would Walker Process continue 
with its inequitable conduct coutnerclaim suit? Was Walker Process 
actually trying to invalidate the expired patent because it believe Food 
Machinery had ‘illegally monopolized interstate and foreign commerce by 
fraudulently and in bad faith obtaining and maintaining its patent well 
knowing that it had no basis for a patent,’ or do you think there was some 
other motive behind the suit 
 
2.  In order to make out an antitrust claim for monopolization by seeking to 
enforce a bad patent one must also meet the structural requirements for the 
monopolization or attempt to monopolize offense under §2 of the Sherman 
Act – namely, market power and proof that the conduct, if likely to run its 
course, would maintain or create durable monopoly.  Is that likely to happen 
when the patent has expired?  Of course, “success” occurs when the fraud is 
not discovered, something that is much more likely to occur when the defect 
in the patent does not appear on the record.  Patents that are invalid because 
they are anticipated by prior art that the patent applicant neglected to 
include in the application present one kind of problem  Some prior art 
consists of earlier patents, and these are readily available to both a patent 
examiner and also to third parties.  Other prior art may be much more 
difficult to locate – such as publications in obscure journals written in 
foreign languages.  Much more threatening are omissions that are not on the 
public record at all.  For example, the “on sale” bar at issue in both Walker 
Process and the Dippin’ Dots case, infra, provides that “A person shall be 
entitled to a patent unless (b)  the invention was … on sale in this country, 
more than one year prior to the date of the application.”  35 U.S.C. § 102.  
The problem with prior sales is that they typically do not appear on the 
patent application record at all, may be known only to the applicant, and are 
discovered by third parties only by luck. 
 
3.  In most cases the antitrust challenge to an infringement action is 
presented as a counterclaim to the infringement suit itself. If such 
counterclaims are classified as “compulsory” they must be brought as 
counterclaims or will be barred by principles of res judicata. If, however, 
the antitrust counterclaim is permissive, then failure to bring it will not 
preclude a subsequent and independent antitrust challenge to the 
infringement action.  See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a): 
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A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim 
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader 
has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of 
the opposing party's claim and does not require for its 
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom 
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. 
Most courts find Walker Process style counterclaims to be 
compulsory.  The Second Circuit’s decision in Critical-Vac 
Filtration Corp. v. Minuteman Intl., Inc., 233 F.3d 697 (2d Cir. 
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1019 (2001), distinguished 
between antitrust counterclaims to the infringement suit, which 
should be treated as compulsory, from claims and defenses of 
patent misuse (see Ch. 7), which might be treated as permissive. 
The Supreme Court's controversial decision in Mercoid Corp. v. 
Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944), had treated the 
latter as permissive, and the Second Circuit felt obliged to 
reconcile it with emergent doctrine holding that antitrust 
counterclaims to infringement actions are best regarded as 
compulsory. The second circuit reasoned: 
Antitrust claims based on patent misuse, such as the 
counterclaims in Mercoid, are likely to involve factual 
issues distinct from those involved in patent infringement 
litigation between the same parties….In contrast, 
antitrust claims based on patent invalidity, such as C-
Vac's claims in the instant case, will generally involve 
the same factual issues as those involved in patent 
infringement litigation between the same parties…. 
Is this persuasive? Some misuse claims raise precisely the same issues as 
those that arise in an antitrust claim and all necessary facts are known to the 
infringement defendant at the time of the infringement suit. For example, 
perhaps the infringement plaintiff requires the defendant to use tied, staple 
commodities with the patent, and its failure to do so forms the basis for the 
infringement claim. In such cases there is no reason not to make the 
antitrust counterclaim compulsory. In other cases—such as when the patent 
is procured by fraud but the facts are not revealed until after the 
infringement suit has run its course—justice is poorly served by a rule that 
prevents a subsequent antitrust challenge. 
When the facts supporting the antitrust counterclaim are the same as 
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those supporting the infringement defense, a compulsory counterclaim rule 
economizes on judicial resources and tends toward the efficient resolution 
of disputes. For example, if the defense is that the theory of infringement is 
legally frivolous, the patent is clearly invalid or has expired, or the 
defendant's technology is obviously not infringing, then many of the facts 
necessary to support the antitrust counterclaim are implicit in the defense 
itself. Other facts, such as market power or the dangerous probability of 
success in achieving it can be developed through discovery. 
Making antitrust counterclaims compulsory is less sensible, 
however, when the facts needed to support the counterclaim are not 
sufficiently known at the time the infringement action is brought. In such 
cases a compulsory counterclaim rule requires the infringement defendant 
to bring an antitrust claim that would be treated as unfounded or even 
frivolous if brought through the usual process. The outcome is particularly 
serious if the facts needed to support the antitrust counterclaim are not 
known until after the filing deadline for counterclaims has passed or, worse 
yet, after the trial is over.  Evidence about prior sales, as in Walker Process, 
is not on the record and might be discovered only after the infringement suit 
is complete. 
 
4.  Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which antedates Walker Process, 
"[a] party who petitions the government for redress generally is immune 
from antitrust liability." Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 
122 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 871 (1999). The petitioner is immune 
from liability even if there is an improper purpose or motive. See E.R.R. 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 
(1961) (even if the petitioner's sole purpose was to destroy its competition 
through passage of legislation, petitioner would be immune); Prof'l Real 
Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56 
(1993). Noerr-Pennington immunity applies to actions, which might 
otherwise violate the Sherman Act under the reasoning that "the federal 
antitrust laws do not regulate the conduct of private individuals in seeking 
anticompetitive action from the government." Omni, 499 U.S. at 379-80. 
Specifically, the antitrust laws are designed for the business world and "are 
not at all appropriate for application in the political arena." Noerr, 365 U.S. 
at 141.  
 
In Walker Process, however, the Supreme Court held that the 
enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the PTO may strip the patent 
holder of its normal Noerr-Pennington defense to an antitrust counterclaim. 
What impact do you think this decision had on business planning? 
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Specifically, how would you advice clients seeking to petition the 
government for redress after Walker Process was decided? Suppose A is 
your client and B is A’s competitor. A holds a very valuable patent that 
essentially is the reason his company is doing so well. However, B is 
engaging highly anticompetitive conduct that is threatening the success of 
your client’s company in addition to running him out of business. If A came 
to you, asking whether or not to petition the government for redress, what 
advice would you give him? Would your advice change if he discloses the 
fact that he had sold his patented product prior to one year before his patent 
was issued?  
 
DIPPIN’ DOTS, INC. V. MOSEY 
476 F.3d 1337 (C.A. Fed 2007) 
GAJARSA, Circuit Judge. 
This is a patent infringement and antitrust case dealing with a unique ice 
cream product. Plaintiffs Dippin' Dots, Inc. and Curt D. Jones (collectively 
“DDI”) appeal from the district court's claim construction and summary 
judgment of noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,126,156 (“the ′156 
patent”) and from the judgment following jury trial that all claims of that 
patent are obvious, that the patent is unenforceable due to inequitable 
conduct during prosecution, and that DDI violated the antitrust laws by 
asserting a patent that had been procured through fraud on the Patent Office. 
We affirm the judgments of noninfringement, obviousness, and 
unenforceability, but reverse as to the antitrust counterclaim. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The ′156 patent, covering subject matter invented by plaintiff Jones and 
exclusively licensed to plaintiff Dippin' Dots, is directed to a process for 
making a form of cryogenically prepared novelty ice cream product. Claim 
1, the only independent claim, reads: 
 
A method of preparing and storing a free-flowing, frozen alimentary 
dairy product, comprising the steps of: 
 
[ (1) ] preparing an alimentary composition for freezing; 
 
[ (2) ] dripping said alimentary composition into a 
freezing chamber; 
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[ (3) ] freezing said dripping alimentary composition into 
beads; 
 
[ (4) ] storing said beads at a temperature at least as low 
as -20° F. so as to maintain said beads free-flowing for an 
extended period of time; 
 
[ (5) ] bringing said beads to a temperature between 
substantially -10° F. and -20° F. prior to serving; and 
 
[ (6) ] serving said beads for consumption at a 
temperature between substantially -10° F. and -20° F. so that 
said beads are free flowing when served. 
 
′156 patent col.6 ll.41-57 (numbering added for reference). DDI has 
commercialized this process. The ice cream it produces, sold under the 
Dippin' Dots brand, is known to patrons of amusement parks, stadiums, 
shopping malls, and the like…. 
Much of the debate in this case centers on the import of sales made at the 
Festival Market mall in Lexington, Kentucky, more than a year before DDI 
filed its patent application. Sales made more than one year before the 
patent's priority date implicate the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). For the 
′156 patent, this critical date is March 6, 1988. Starting on July 24, 1987, 
Jones sold cryogenically-prepared, largely beaded ice cream at the Festival 
Market. During Jones's time at Festival Market, which lasted at least until 
July 29th, over 800 customers purchased his beaded ice cream and others 
received free samples. The customers were permitted to leave with the 
product and were not restricted by any kind of confidentiality agreement. 
Jones later testified that his main goal at the Festival Market was to “get ... 
test-marketing information” and not to further develop technical aspects of 
his product such as particular temperature ranges for storage and service. 
 
It is undisputed that the Festival Market sales were never disclosed to the 
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) during prosecution of the ′156 patent. 
The declaration of commercial success which ultimately persuaded the 
examiner to grant the patent contained a sworn statement by Jones that 
“[t]he initial sales were in March of 1988,” which was on or after the 
critical date. 
 
Jones testified that at Festival Market he only practiced the first three 
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steps of the claimed method, not the storing, bringing, or serving steps. He 
testified that he considered the evidence of what had happened at Festival 
Market to be irrelevant to patentability. The attorney who prosecuted the ′ 
156 patent, Warren Schickli, testified that he considered the sales to have 
been experimental since the process as practiced at Festival Market could 
not be feasibly commercially exploited. He also testified that the Festival 
Market ice cream was not sold for “direct consumption” under the meaning 
of Claim 1, because the ice cream was too cold to eat comfortably when 
initially given to the consumer. 
 
The controversy in this case began when several of DDI's distributors 
severed their relationship, found alternative manufacturing sources, and 
entered into competition against DDI. DDI initiated a series of patent 
infringement lawsuits against its new competitors in various judicial 
districts. In this appeal, the defendants fall into two primary categories: the 
“manufacturing parties” who make the competing ice cream product and the 
“distributing parties” who sell it to consumers. The defendants 
counterclaimed for violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act due to DDI's 
allegation of patent infringement based on a fraudulently acquired patent. 
This type of antitrust claim has become known as a “ Walker Process ” 
claim, named for the Supreme Court's decision in Walker Process 
Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 
(1965). The various suits were consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multi-
District Litigation for pretrial proceedings before the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Georgia. That court adopted in large part 
an earlier-recommended claim construction by a special master. In re 
Dippin' Dots Patent Litig., 249 F.Supp.2d 1346 (N.D.Ga.2003). It issued 
summary judgment of noninfringement both literally, id. at 1368, and via 
the doctrine of equivalents, id. at 1370-71. It refused to grant summary 
judgment to any party on invalidity, id. at 1362, 1364, or on inequitable 
conduct, id. at 1365. 
 
After the pretrial proceedings in the Northern District of Georgia were 
completed, the case was remanded to the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Texas…. That court conducted a jury trial on the 
issues of invalidity, unenforceability, and antitrust violations by DDI. By 
special verdict, the jury found that the sales by Jones prior to March 1988 
could be asserted against the patent as prior art and that all claims of the 
′156 patent were invalid as obvious. The jury also found that both Jones and 
Schickli had, with intent to deceive, made material misrepresentations or 
omissions in violation of the duty of candor to the PTO. It also determined 
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that defendants Mini Melts, Inc. and Frosty Bites Distribution had proven 
all required elements of their antitrust counterclaim, including the requisite 
fraud on the PTO. However, it found no antitrust damages, granting the 
counterclaim plaintiffs zero dollars in damages on their Sherman Act 
counterclaim….. In its final judgment dated February 28, 2005, it awarded 
attorney fees under the Clayton Act to defendant Frosty Bites Distribution 
(“FBD”) in the amount of $676,675.46…. 
 
In its amended brief, DDI appeals the claim construction and summary 
judgment of noninfringement, the refusal to overturn the jury verdict of 
obviousness and liability under the antitrust laws, the finding of inequitable 
conduct, and the award of attorneys' fees under the Clayton Act granted to 
FBD. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 
 
We have stated that “[a] patent may be rendered unenforceable for 
inequitable conduct if an applicant, with intent to mislead or deceive the 
examiner, fails to disclose material information or submits materially false 
information to the PTO during prosecution.” Digital Control Inc. v. The 
Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2006). The party 
urging unenforceability must show by clear and convincing evidence that 
the applicant met “thresholds of both materiality and intent.” Molins PLC v. 
Textron, 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed.Cir.1995). Where, as here, those factual 
findings were made by the district court, we review them for clear error. Id. 
The ultimate determination of inequitable conduct is committed to the 
sound discretion of the trial court. We review for abuse of that discretion. 
Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684, 693-94 
(Fed.Cir.2001). 
 
The first prong of the inequitable conduct test, materiality, is clearly met 
here. As discussed, the Festival Market sales render the ′ 156 patent invalid 
for obviousness. Had those sales been disclosed to the PTO, the patent may 
or may not have issued. At the very least, the existence of such sales prior to 
the critical date is a matter that “a reasonable examiner would have 
considered ... important in deciding whether to allow the ... application.” 
Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1363 
(Fed.Cir.2003); see also Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1316 (holding that 
“reasonable examiner” standard remains sufficient ground for inequitable 
conduct materiality even after 1992 amendment of 37 C.F.R. § 1.56). 
 
The question of deceptive intent is a more difficult one, but we find no 
clear error in the district court's determination on this point. “ ‘Smoking 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY                                Ch. 4, Page 13 
Hovenkamp                                                                                       August 2013  
 
gun’ evidence is not required in order to establish an intent to deceive.... 
Rather, this element of inequitable conduct[ ] must generally be inferred 
from the facts and circumstances surrounding the applicant's overall 
conduct.” Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs. Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 
1189 (Fed.Cir.1993). We have noted that omission of sales made before the 
critical date is especially problematic: 
 
Absent explanation, the evidence of a knowing failure to 
disclose sales that bear all the earmarks of commercialization 
reasonably supports an inference that the inventor's attorney 
intended to mislead the PTO. The concealment of sales information 
can be particularly egregious because, unlike the applicant's failure 
to disclose, for example, a material patent reference, the examiner 
has no way of securing the information on his own. 
 
Id. at 1193. While DDI wholly neglected to disclose the Festival Market 
sales to the PTO, it enthusiastically touted sales made after the critical date 
as evidence of the commercial appeal of its process. That combination of 
action and omission permits an inference of the minimum, threshold level 
of intent required for inequitable conduct. The evidence to support a finding 
of intent may not be particularly strong here. However, the district court 
was permitted to balance the relatively weak evidence of intent together 
with the strong evidence that DDI's omission was highly material to the 
issuance of the ′156 patent and to find that on balance, inequitable conduct 
had occurred.
 
Such a finding, as an exercise of the district court's equitable 
powers, is within its discretion. See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1178 (“Once 
threshold findings of materiality and intent are established, the court must 
weigh them to determine whether the equities warrant a conclusion that 
inequitable conduct occurred.”). We perceive no abuse of discretion here. 
The district court's inequitable conduct finding is correct. 
 
The defendants in this case counterclaimed against DDI for violation of 
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, and the same jury that found the patent obvious 
found DDI liable on that counterclaim. Proof that a patentee has “obtained 
the patent by knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts to the Patent 
Office ... [is] sufficient to strip [the patentee] of its exemption from the 
antitrust laws.” Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 
382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965). A party who asserts such a fraudulently obtained 
patent may be subject to an antitrust claim. If a patentee asserts a patent 
claim and the defendant can demonstrate the required fraud on the PTO, as 
well as show that “the other elements necessary to a § 2 case are present,” 
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the defendant-counterclaimant is entitled to treble damages under the 
antitrust laws. Id. at 175. 
 
The first barrier for a Walker Process claimant to clear is the 
requirement that the patent be obtained through actual fraud upon the PTO. 
This question is governed by Federal Circuit law. Nobelpharma AB v. 
Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed.Cir.1998) ( en banc in 
relevant part). A finding of inequitable conduct does not by itself suffice to 
support a finding of Walker Process fraud, because “inequitable conduct is 
a broader, more inclusive concept than the common law fraud needed to 
support a Walker Process counterclaim.” Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1069. 
To demonstrate Walker Process fraud, a claimant must make higher 
threshold showings of both materiality and intent than are required to show 
inequitable conduct. Id. at 1070-71; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 
F.3d 1340, 1364 (Fed.Cir.1998) ( Walker Process  claimant “must make a 
greater showing of scienter and materiality than when seeking 
unenforceability based on conduct before the Patent Office”). Furthermore, 
a finding of Walker Process fraud cannot result from an equitable balancing 
between the two factors; a strong showing of one cannot make up for a 
deficiency in the other. Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071. The difference in 
breadth between inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud admits the 
possibility of a close case whose facts reach the level of inequitable 
conduct, but not of fraud before the PTO. This is such a case. 
 
The heightened standard of materiality in a Walker Process case requires 
that the patent would not have issued but for the patent examiner's 
justifiable reliance on the patentee's misrepresentation or omission. C.R. 
Bard, 157 F.3d at 1364. The defendants have established materiality even 
under this strict threshold, since the evidence supports a finding that the 
patent would not have issued if DDI had disclosed the Festival Market sales 
to the PTO. The difficulty comes in establishing that the omission of those 
sales was done with fraudulent intent. DDI did make certain statements to 
the PTO that would have been more completely accurate had it included 
information about the Festival Market sales. For instance, it suggested that 
its method was “the first method to allow serving of a completely free 
flowing frozen alimentary dairy product for direct consumption by 
consumers.” That statement would have been more helpful to the PTO if it 
had also disclosed that the first free-flowing sales had arguably happened at 
Festival Market, but the statement was not actually false. Likewise, DDI 
argued against obviousness by pointing out that none of the cited references 
taught free-flowing service. Again, this statement would have better 
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informed the PTO if it had clarified that elsewhere in the prior art, such 
service arguably existed, but again, the statement was true. The problem 
was not with its falsity but with its incompleteness. 
 
Ultimately, the defendants' fraud case here is built only upon DDI's 
omission of the Festival Market sales from the prosecution record. While 
Walker Process intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of a 
case, “[a] mere failure to cite a reference to the PTO will not suffice.” 
Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071. This is not to say that an omission always 
reduces to “mere failure to cite.” We acknowledged in Nobelpharma “that 
omissions, as well as misrepresentations, may in limited circumstances 
support a finding of Walker Process fraud ... because a fraudulent omission 
can be just as reprehensible as a fraudulent misrepresentation.” 141 F.3d at 
1070. We believe, though, that to find a prosecution omission fraudulent 
there must be evidence of intent separable from the simple fact of the 
omission. A false or clearly misleading prosecution statement may permit 
an inference that the statement was made with deceptive intent. For 
instance, evidence may establish that a patent applicant knew one fact and 
presented another, thus allowing the fact finder to conclude that the 
applicant intended by the misrepresentation to deceive the examiner. That is 
not the case with an omission, which could happen for any number of 
nonfraudulent reasons-the applicant could have had a good-faith belief that 
disclosure was not necessary, or simply have forgotten to make the required 
disclosure. In this case, DDI argues that it did not disclose the Festival 
Market sales to the PTO because it believed that the product there was made 
without practicing the “storing,” “bringing,” or “serving” steps of the claim 
within the specified temperature ranges, and that therefore the Festival 
Market sales were merely cumulative to other prior art references which 
also lacked those three steps. The jury was of course allowed to disbelieve 
or discount evidence tending to support this claim. However, the defendants 
submitted no evidence of their own-aside from the absence of the Festival 
Market sales from the prosecution record-which affirmatively shows DDI's 
fraudulent intent. That intent cannot be shown merely from the absence of 
evidence, which would come about from the jury's discounting DDI's 
explanation. 
 
Nobelpharma serves as a good example of the sort of facts that do prove 
Walker Process fraud by omission. In that case, the inventors had 
transmitted to their Swedish patent agent a draft patent application which 
included a citation to a book written by the patentee in 1977. Nobelpharma, 
141 F.3d at 1062. That book was eventually held to anticipate the patent. Id. 
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at 1072. The agent “deleted all reference to the 1977 Book from the patent 
application that was ultimately filed in Sweden” and then also failed to 
mention the book in the U.S. application that led to the patent at issue. Id. at 
1062. When pressed on the issue at trial, the agent “could not explain, even 
in retrospect, why he deleted all reference to the 1977 Book.” Id. at 1072. 
We found that the evidence of actual deletion by the patent agent gave the 
jury reasonable ground to find intent to defraud by the patentees. 
 
There is no similarly strong evidence that the omission in this case was 
fraudulent. It might be argued that because the omitted reference was so 
important to patentability, DDI must have known of its importance and 
must have made a conscious decision not to disclose it. That argument has 
some force, but to take it too far would be to allow the high materiality of 
the omission to be balanced against a lesser showing of deceptive intent by 
the patentee. Weighing intent and materiality together is appropriate when 
assessing whether the patentee's prosecution conduct was inequitable. 
Molins, 48 F.3d at 1178. However, when Walker Process claimants wield 
that conduct as a “sword” to obtain antitrust damages rather than as a mere 
“shield” against enforcement of the patent, Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1070, 
they must prove deceptive intent independently. The defendants have not 
done so here to the extent necessary for a reasonable jury to find Walker 
Process fraud. The finding of fraud on the PTO is therefore reversed. 
 
DDI also argues that the antitrust judgment must be reversed because the 
jury was not presented with sufficient evidence of the definition of the 
relevant market. Fraudulent acquisition of the asserted patent strips the 
Walker Process defendant of its antitrust immunity, but that is the 
beginning, not the end, of the inquiry. The counterclaimant must also show 
the basic elements of an antitrust violation defined by the regional circuit's 
law, including that the patentee's behavior was directed to a relevant 
product market. Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 
1341, 1363 (Fed.Cir.2004), rev'd on other grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006).
 
In 
this case, DDI's antitrust immunity remains intact due to insufficient 
evidence of fraud. We therefore reach neither DDI's argument on this point 
nor the defendants' argument that DDI waived the market definition issue 
by failing to raise it below. 
 
With the judgment of antitrust liability reversed, the grant of attorney's 
fees under § 4 of the Clayton Act must be vacated.  
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  The Federal Circuit insisted on something more than simply lying about 
barring prior sales in order to ratchet the defendant’s misrepresentation 
from inequitable conduct to an antitrust violation.  But what about the fact 
that years later – after the evidence of the barring sales had grown stale and 
could be found only by luck – the patentee filed an infringement suit?  
Shouldn’t the antitrust issue be evaluated as of the time the allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct took place rather than during the patent application 
process?  
 
2.  Bifurcation. Walker Process suits are typically raised as counterclaims to 
patent infringement litigation.   Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) 
provides that courts may bifurcate a trial even where related patent and 
antitrust claims are consolidated for purposes of discovery and pretrial 
under Rule 42(a). In this instance, the bifurcated claims are tried separately 
but are not considered severed. Dante Disparte v. Corp. Exec. Bd., 223 
F.R.D. 7 (D.D.C. 2004).  
 
When deciding whether or not to bifurcate claims, courts are 
given discretion and generally focus on whether “both parties, using 
different triers of fact, could prevail on their respective claims 
without prejudicing the other party or arriving at inconsistent 
results.” Dante Disparte, 223 F.R.D. at 12. Today, bifurcation is 
common in patent cases that involve antitrust counterclaims and the 
Federal Circuit has referred to the process as “standard” in cases 
involving the two claims. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. GenRAd, Inc., 
882 F.Supp. 1141, 1157 (D. Mass. 1995) (“courts often separate 
patent issues from antitrust counterclaim suits”); Alarm Device Mfg. 
Co. v. Alarm Prods. Int’l., 60 F.D.R. 199, 202 (E.D.N.Y 1973) 
(“[m]ore often than not, separate trials of patent validity-




IGT V. ALLIANCE GAMING CORP. 
2012 WL 6554712 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 17, 2012) 
 
REYNA, Circuit Judge. 
IGT owns several patents related to “wheel games,” a type of casino 
gaming machine containing a secondary bonus game incorporating a 
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spinning wheel. IGT sued Alliance Gaming Corp., Bally Gaming 
International, Inc., and Bally Gaming, Inc. (collectively, “Bally”) for 
infringement of these patents, and Bally counterclaimed under state and 
federal antitrust laws. The district court denied the motions for summary 
judgment on the antitrust issues, granted the motions that the patents were 
invalid and not infringed, and certified the patent issues for interlocutory 
appeal. This court affirmed. On remand, the district court granted summary 
judgment against Bally on its antitrust counterclaims. Because the 
undisputed facts are insufficient to establish the existence of a relevant 
antitrust market in wheel games, we affirm…. 
 
 As a threshold issue in any monopolization claim, the court must 
identify the relevant market.
 
   M.A.P. Oil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 691 F.2d 
1303, 1306 (9th Cir.1982). “The relevant market is the field in which 
meaningful competition is said to exist.” Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.1997). “Market 
definition can be broadly characterized in terms of the ‘cross-elasticity of 
demand’ for or ‘reasonable interchangeability’ of a given set of products or 
services.” M.A.P. Oil, 691 F.2d at 1306 (quoting United States v. E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956)). Definition of the relevant 
market is a question of fact. Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News Am. Mktg. 
FSI, 546 F.3d 991, 1002 (9th Cir.2008). 
 
 Both Bally and IGT provided extensive evidence that wheel games 
compete in the broader gaming machine market. Mr. Isaacs, Bally's 
corporate designee on the wheel game market, stated that he thought “just 
about anything may have potentially displaced the Bally wheel game.” 
Bally's former Vice President of Business Development explained that 
Bally's wheel game “compete[d] with everything that's on the floor. The 
way it works is that you sell a machine and it competes against everything 
there.”  
 
Bally did not rebut this evidence. As Bally has failed to produce 
evidence to show there is a genuine issue of material fact that wheel games 
compete with all gaming machines, the district court did not resolve a 
disputed factual issue. See Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 
1435 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 
(1986)). 
 
The district court rejected wheel games as a relevant market because 
a market limited to wheel games would not encompass all economic 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY                                Ch. 4, Page 19 
Hovenkamp                                                                                       August 2013  
 
substitutes. Focusing on the same undisputed evidence that supported its 
conclusion that wheel games compete with all gaming machines—
specifically, that “casinos mix and match products to maximize floor-space 
revenue generation”—the court reasoned that “the relevant market is 
significantly broader than ‘wheel games' because there is ample evidence 
that non-wheel games compete with wheel games.” The court rejected 
Bally's argument that this competition does not prevent wheel games from 
being a relevant market, concluding that “[b] ecause all gaming machines 
compete, wheel games are not an economically distinct submarket.” Bally 
argues this was error because (1) the existence of some substitution does not 
preclude wheel games from being a submarket, and (2) the analysis focused 
on functional, rather than economic, substitution. We address each point in 
turn. 
 
As discussed above, Bally does not dispute that wheel games 
compete with all gaming machines. Bally does argue, however, that it was 
error for the district court to conclude that this competition prevented wheel 
games from being a relevant market. As authority for this argument, Bally 
points to Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift–Eckrich, Inc., in which this 
court, applying Tenth Circuit law, said: “For every product, substitutes 
exist. But a relevant market cannot meaningfully encompass that infinite 
range.” 375 F.3d 1341, 1364 (Fed.Cir.2004) (quoting Times–Picayune 
Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613 n. 31 (1953)), rev'd on other 
grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006). The truth of this proposition is evident, as is 
the question it suggests: where should the courts draw the line? The 
remainder of the quotation from Times–Picayune suggests an answer: “The 
circle must be drawn narrowly to exclude any other product to which, 
within reasonable variations in price, only a limited number of buyers will 
turn; in technical terms, products whose cross-elasticities of demand are 
small.” Times–Picayune, 345 U.S. at 613, n. 31. This simply refers to the 
well-settled relevant market inquiry focusing on economic substitution. 
 
Bally argues that it has shown a lack of economic substitution by 
satisfying what is known as the small but significant and non-transitory 
increase in price test (“SSNIP”). Under this test, Bally argues that the 
relevant question is “whether the degree of substitutability between the two 
products is sufficiently great that it would restrain a hypothetical 
monopolist from profitably imposing a substantial price increase.” Even 
assuming that SSNIP by itself is the proper test,
1
 Bally has not alleged facts 
                                                 
1
 As support for its assertion that SSNIP is the controlling test, Bally cites Theme 
Promotions, which did allow that “[d] etermining the relevant market can involve” an 
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that would satisfy it. Bally contends that introduction of wheel games 
forced IGT to lower its prices. From this assertion, Bally argues that IGT's 
prior prices were supracompetitive. We accept both of these assertions as 
true. But Bally next asserts that these supracompetitive prices represented a 
SSNIP. With this we cannot agree. Bally has not explained what the 
baseline price for wheel games was from which IGT imposed a SSNIP. 
Although Bally implies that the baseline price should be similar to non-
wheel games, no evidence supports this. Indeed, in a differentiated market, 
one would expect the prices for two differentiated products to be different. 
Having failed to establish such a baseline, Bally cannot successfully argue 
that IGT imposed a SSNIP. Furthermore, if we regard the supracompetitive 
prices as a baseline, Bally has shown that the prices decreased, not that they 
increased. Thus, even if the Guidelines test governs here, Bally has failed to 
put forth evidence that would satisfy it. 
 
 We also reject Bally's argument that the district court improperly 
focused on technological substitutions. The basis for this argument is the 
district court's statement that “it is undisputed that the relevant functionality 
of gaming machines is revenue generation.” The court made this statement 
in the context of its description of the differentiated market of gaming 
machines in which wheel games compete. We hold that the court based its 
ultimate conclusion on competition, not on functionality, and that its 
recognition of meaningful competition was not error. 
 
In addition to its argument that wheel games is a relevant market, 
Bally also contends that the Brown Shoe factors establish wheel games as a 
submarket.
2
  “[A] lthough the general market must include all economic 
substitutes, it is legally permissible to premise antitrust allegations on a 
submarket.” Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 
1045 (9th Cir.2008); Thurman Indus., Inc. v. Pay ‘N Pak Stores, Inc., 875 
F.2d 1369, 1374 (9th Cir.1989) (“In limited settings ... the relevant product 
market may be narrowed beyond the boundaries of physical 
interchangeability and cross-price elasticity to account for identifiable 
submarkets....”). To the extent that the standard for defining a submarket 
                                                                                                                            
SSNIP analysis, among other things. 546 F.3d at 1002. But the discussion of SSNIP in 
Theme Promotions was premised on United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F.Supp.2d 1098 
(N.D.Cal.2004), which in turn was elaborating on the Department of Justice's Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines (“the Guidelines”). The Ninth Circuit has stated that the Guidelines are 
not binding on the courts. See Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir.1993). 
 
2
 We assume, although Bally does not explicitly say so, that Bally's argument is that 
wheel games are a submarket of all gaming machines. 
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differs from the standard for defining a market, it is embodied in the Brown 
Shoe factors.
3
 In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court listed several “practical 
indicia” of an economically distinct submarket: “industry or public 
recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's 
peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct 
customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized 
vendors.” 370 U.S. at 325. “[T]he Brown Shoe indicia are practical aids for 
identifying the areas of actual or potential competition and ... their presence 
or absence does not decide automatically the submarket issue.” Thurman, 
875 F.2d at 1375. “Whether isolating a submarket is justified turns 
ultimately upon whether the factors used to define the submarket are 
‘economically significant.’” Id. (quoting Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General 
Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 932 (9th Cir.1975)). 
 
The undisputed facts, however, are insufficient to establish the 
existence of a submarket under the Brown Shoe factors. By definition, the 
“peculiar characteristic” distinguishing wheel games from other games is 
the wheel-shaped secondary bonus. It is undisputed that there are no unique 
production facilities or specialized vendors for wheel games versus ordinary 
gaming machines; one can just as easily produce a gaming machine with a 
square bonus as one with a circular bonus. This factor is particularly 
important in this case. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325 n. 42 (“The cross-
elasticity of production facilities may also be an important factor in defining 
a product market.”); Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1436 (“[D]efining a market on 
the basis of demand considerations alone is erroneous.”); Calnetics Corp. v. 
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 691 (9th Cir.1976) (“[F]ailure to 
consider production cross-elasticity [i]s inconsistent with the views of the 
Supreme Court and of this circuit.”); see generally Areeda ¶ 561, at 360–64. 
It is also undisputed that there are no distinct customers: wheel games, like 
all gaming machines, are purchased by casinos. 
 
Bally's argument rests entirely on a single Brown Shoe factor: that 
“there is substantial evidence that game players, casinos, and IGT all view 
wheel games as a separate economic activity from non-wheel games.” Bally 
                                                 
3
 A leading antitrust treatise suggests that the two inquiries are the same. See IIB 
Phillip E. Areeda, John L. Solow & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 533c (3d 
ed.2007) [hereinafter Areeda]. Although at least one district court in the Ninth Circuit has 
adopted this position, see United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1118–19 
(N.D.Cal.2009), we are aware of no Ninth Circuit case that has done so. See Newcal, 513 
F.3d at 1045 (identifying the Brown Shoe factors as one way of showing that a submarket 
is economically distinct). In any event, we have already determined that Bally did not meet 
its burden to show that there was a relevant market in wheel games. 
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bases this argument primarily on evidence that some players prefer wheel 
games and that, accordingly, casinos allocate a specific percentages of their 
floor space to different types of games, including to wheel games. But 
evidence of player preference for wheel games says nothing about whether 
there is a public or industry perception that wheel games constitute a 
separate market; to the contrary, it is in harmony with the rest of the 
evidence that gaming machines are a differentiated market and that wheel 
games compete with all gaming machines to accommodate the spectrum of 
player preferences. 
 
In addition to its market definition arguments, Bally contends that 
the district court erred by resolving factual disputes on summary judgment. 
In particular, Bally contends that IGT and its experts “have repeatedly and 
consistently testified that non-wheel games are not substitutes for wheel 
games.” Although Bally provides no further explanation, we understand this 
argument to refer to statements IGT and its experts made in support of its 
patent damages theory. 
 
To prove its patent damages, IGT chose to seek lost profits under the 
Panduit test. Under the Panduit factors, IGT was required to prove the 
absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes. See Rite–Hite Corp. v. 
Kelly Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc) (citing Panduit 
Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir.1978)). By 
claiming that the wheel feature was critical, IGT was able to argue that there 
were no non-infringing substitutes for its wheel game, and that every 
infringing game sold represented a loss of profits to IGT. According to 
Bally, by making this argument, “IGT has admitted that there are no 
substitutes for wheel games and that non-wheel games are not in the same 
market as wheel games.” We disagree. 
 
Even under the summary judgment standard, Troxel's (IGT’s patent 
damages expert) opinion that there were no non-infringing technological 
substitutes cannot be read to mean that there were no economic substitutes. 
To do so, Troxel's opinion would need to be able to support a reasonable 
inference that no economic substitution existed. But, as Bally 
acknowledges, Troxel simply “relied on Bally's assertion that wheel games 
are an antitrust market.” Because Troxel simply assumed that the market 
was co-extensive with the patent, however, such an inference would be 
unreasonable. See Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1435 (“In the context of antitrust 
law, if there are undisputed facts about the structure of the market that 
render the inference economically unreasonable, the expert opinion is 
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insufficient to support a jury verdict.”). And, as discussed above, even if 
wheel games are a relevant market, the high supply elasticity rendered 
demand elasticity immaterial. Id. at 1436 (holding that excessive supply 
elasticity rendered it “immaterial that consumers do not regard the products 
as substitutes, that a price differential exists, or that the prices are not 
closely correlated.”). We therefore conclude that the district court's order 
did not resolve disputed issues of material fact. 
 
The undisputed facts in this case show that meaningful competition 
exists between wheel games and all gaming machines. Furthermore, even 
viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to Bally, the Brown Shoe 
factors do not support a conclusion that wheel games should be considered 
a separate submarket. The district court correctly granted summary 




BRYSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
…  Bally has shown that IGT was charging supracompetitive prices 
before Bally entered the wheel game market and that Bally's entrance into 
the market pressured IGT to lower its prices to a competitive level. Ron 
Rivera, IGT's Senior Vice President of Sales, testified that IGT successfully 
rebuffed calls for discounts on its wheel games before Bally began 
manufacturing wheel games, but that it was forced to acquiesce in those 
demands when customers were able to buy Bally's wheel games. IGT 
admits that the discounts were the direct and sole result of Bally introducing 
its wheel games into the market. The fact that IGT's wheel games were 
subject to price pressure only when other wheel games entered the market 
indicates that consumers were willing to incur monopolistic pricing without 
shifting demand to non-wheel games, i.e., that there was very little, if any, 
cross-elasticity of demand between wheel games and non-wheel games. 
 
IGT's own expert, Richard Troxel, admitted that he saw no need to 
calculate cross-elasticity of demand because there was such strong demand 
for wheel games independent of demand for non-wheel games: “[T]he 
wheel has such a demand and drawing power for consumers that ... it 
seemed to me that the price elasticity was not the issue. Price elasticity 
occurs when you have products that are of a nature that price is going to 
make a difference to the consumer, and whether or not they would move to 
a different type of product or not. In this case the wheel was what they 
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wanted.” That evidence indicates that there was demand for wheel games 
separate from casino gaming machines generally and that consumers would 
rather bear a small but significant non-transitory increase in price than 
switch to non-wheel games. 
 
That analysis is consistent with the evidence from Bally's expert, 
Gregory Adams. While referring to IGT's economic data, he stated that the 
margin and profit per unit for wheel games is higher than for non-wheel 
games and that “the demand for wheel games appears to differ from the 
demand for non-wheel games, even when controlling for [all other 
variables].” Those statements and the economic data underlying them 
provide further support for Bally's contention that wheel games form a 
separate product market. 
 
IGT asserts that Bally was required to calculate cross elasticity of 
demand and that Bally's failure to do so is fatal to its claim. The case law, 
however, does not mandate such a showing by an antitrust plaintiff. See, 
e.g., Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 804 (9th Cir.1976) 
(plaintiffs did not have to “produce a numerical value of the cross-elasticity 
of demand” to prove a relevant market; “[p]roofs of the [ Brown Shoe ] 
factors ... would have sufficed”)….  [S]ee also Ericsson, Inc. v. Harris 
Corp., 352 F.3d 1369, 1376–78 (Fed.Cir.2003) (crediting expert who 
purportedly “failed to calculate the cross-elasticities of demand” and finding 
that the “failure to present all of the economic evidence that Harris now 
identifies does not mean that Ericsson failed to present sound economic 
evidence”). Bally's evidence indicates a clear absence of cross-elasticity of 
demand between wheel and non-wheel games that obviates the need to 
quantify the degree of the elasticity. 
 
The majority contends that Bally's relevant market argument fails 
because it has not offered evidence as to the baseline prices for wheel 
games from which IGT obtained a premium based on its allegedly 
monopolistic practices. But Bally offered evidence that, when it introduced 
wheel games into the market, IGT was required to reduce its prices, and that 
evidence included the amount by which those prices were reduced when 
competitive wheel games became available. That is precisely the kind of 
evidence that shows the effect of the allegedly monopolistic conduct on the 
market. See 2B Philip E. Areeda et al., Antitrust Law: An Analysis of 
Antitrust Principles and Their Application ¶¶ 533b, 563a (3d ed. 2007) (“ 
Areeda ”). 
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IGT's evidence of lost profits due to patent infringement provides a 
further indication that the relevant market is limited to wheel games. See 
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th 
Cir.1978). In making its case for damages in the form of lost profits, IGT 
asserted that there were no acceptable noninfringing substitutes for its 
wheel games. Mr. Troxel testified that there were no non-wheel game 
substitutes and that Bally's wheel games replaced IGT's wheel games on a 
one-for-one basis. Because “ Panduit's second factor, properly applied, 
ensures that any proffered alternative competes in the same market for the 
same customers as the infringer's product[,]” BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1219 (Fed.Cir.1993), the lack of any 
acceptable non-infringing alternatives strongly suggests that the market 
consisted of only IGT's and Bally's wheel games. In other words, IGT's 
evidence that there were no alternatives to which consumers could shift 
their demand other than Bally's products is evidence that the relevant 
market was limited to wheel games. 
 
IGT's higher prices and profit margins on wheel games cannot be 
attributed simply to normal economic performance in a differentiated 
product market that includes wheel and non-wheel games. The court in 
United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1116 (N.D.Cal.2004), 
addressed that issue persuasively, explaining why monopolistic rents do not 
survive in a differentiated market lacking barriers to entry: 
 
Like a seller in a perfect competitive market, however, sellers in 
a “competitive” differentiated products market do not obtain 
monopoly rents. In differentiated product markets with few barriers 
to entry, firms will introduce products that are increasingly close, 
although not perfect substitutes, for the other products in the market. 
The introduction of additional products causes the demand curve 
faced by each seller to shift downward and leftward until, at long 
run equilibrium, the demand curve intersects the average cost curve 
of the seller (defined as economists define costs to include a 
reasonable profit) eliminating the monopolistic rent.... 
 
Although close substitutes, such as reel bonus games and tower 
bonus games, had been introduced, casinos still sought out wheel games 
despite the higher prices for those products, indicating the existence of a 
separate market for wheel games. If a product is priced higher than similar 
competing products, rational costminimizing consumers will shift to the 
lower-priced similar products, even if the lower-priced products differ 
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somewhat from the preferred product. If, instead, there are no similar or 
acceptable alternatives (as occurs in a monopolized market or where patent 
protection bars the introduction of competitive alternatives), consumers will 
bear the increased price for the preferred product because there are no 
satisfactory alternatives to which demand can be shifted. 
 
Because IGT's patents barred potential competitors from marketing 
wheel games, the majority's reference to supply elasticity is beside the 
point.
4
 The majority argues that the fact that there are no unique production 
facilities or specialized vendors for wheel games indicates that there is 
production cross-elasticity and thus elasticity of supply. But the existence of 
IGT's patents barred competitors from producing wheel games regardless of 
how easy it would have been to do so. The whole point of IGT's obtaining 
patent protection for wheel games was to limit the economic effects of 
supply elasticity. 
 
 Bally's evidence was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether IGT used its patents to maintain a monopoly in a market 
that was sufficiently separate from the market for other slot machines that 
IGT was able to demand monopolistic prices over an extended period of 
time. It is not enough to say that IGT's wheel games competed with other 
bonus games or other slot machines in general. It could equally be said that 
IGT's machines competed with other casino games or even with 
entertainment activities generally. But that does not overcome Bally's 
showing that there was a discrete market for wheel games within the overall 
slot machine, gaming, and entertainment markets, as demonstrated by the 
persistent monopolistic prices that resulted from the patent-based 
curtailment of supply and the customer-preference driven specificity of 
demand. See Areeda § 533c, at 255.
5
 
                                                 
4
 Supply elasticity is a theory that neither party advanced. In fact, IGT argued that “the 
critical question in determining an antitrust product market is the “ ‘cross elasticity” of 
demand’ between products.... Stated differently, the relevant antitrust market is the smallest 
group of products for which a hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a ‘small but 
significant and nontransitory increase in price’ (SSNIP).” The majority not only assigns 
weight to the allegedly high supply elasticity for wheel games but, in discussing demand 
elasticity, disparages the same test that IGT believed to be “the critical question” in 
resolving this issue. 
5
 Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir.1995), on which the 
majority relies, stands for the unremarkable proposition that a high degree of supply 
elasticity can bear on the relevant market inquiry and may even be determinative in some 
cases. In that case the court found that full-serve gas stations were potential competitors of 
self-serve stations—and thus belonged in the relevant market—because full-serve stations 
could “easily convert their full-serve pumps, at virtually no cost, into self-serve, cash-only 
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 In light of the record evidence summarized above, I conclude that 
Bally has presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable finder of fact to 
find that the relevant product market is limited to wheel games. The 
relevant market inquiry seeks to determine the scope of the market in which 
a monopolist can exert market power over buyers. Bally alleges, and has 
introduced evidence to prove, that IGT had market power over buyers in 
supplying wheel games. I therefore respectfully dissent. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  What of the fact that when the infringement defendant entered the 
market the infringement plaintiff was forced to cut its prices?  That 
indicates that the competition between the two was much closer than the 
competition with other (i.e., non-wheel) games, does it not?  Should that be 
enough to support a conclusion of market power? 
 
2.  The SSNIP test (“small but significant and non-transitory increase in 
price”) comes from the government Merger Guidelines, which query 
whether a merger might injure competition by imposing such a price 
increase.  See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE 
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 3.1  (4
th
 ed. 2011). If the 
grouping of sales in which the merger occurs could experience such a price 
increase profitably, then that grouping is a relevant market.  The test does 
not work very well for monopolist’s however, because it is often the case 
that the monopolist is already charging a monopoly price to begin with.  
What about margins.  The dissent noted that the margins on wheel games 
were higher than on non-wheel games.  A “margin” is the difference 
between a cost measure, typically marginal cost or variable cost, and the 
amount of revenue that the seller obtains from the sale. 
 
 The use of margins is particularly problematic when a large 
component in a product consists of intellectual property rights, where the 
costs of making an additional unit are very small.  For example, in the case 
of a pure software product, such as Microsoft Office, the costs of making 
                                                                                                                            
pumps, expanding output and thus constraining any attempt by [the alleged monopolist] to 
charge supracompetitive prices for self-serve gasoline.” Id. at 1436. Critically, however, 
nothing prevented the full-serve stations from making that change to their business in order 
to deter or rein in potentially monopolistic pricing by self-serve stations. Here, by contrast, 
potential suppliers were discouraged from entering the wheel game market by vigorous 
enforcement of the very patents that are being attacked as unlawful. 
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one additional unit are very close to zero when the copy is being 
downloaded, or the costs of a DVD plus packaging when it is being sold in 
a physical package.  Nevertheless, the product might claim a price of, say, 
$200.  The games in this case were a combination of physical product, some 
elements of which were patented, and also software. 
 
3.  Supply elasticity, or cross-elasticity of supply, refers to whether rivals 
can develop the alleged dominant firm’s product in response to its higher 
(monopoly) profits.  As the dissent points out, patents can reduce elasticity 
of supply by making it more difficult to copy a firm’s products.  The 
question is complicated, however.  Sometimes a firm can easily invent 
around a patent, and then the patent offers little protection from market 
entry.  Sometimes the patent adds so little value to a product that others can 
compete without employing the device or technology that the patent 
protects. 
 
IN RE DDAVP DIRECT PURCHASER ANTITRUST 
LITIGATION 
585 F.3d 677 (2
nd
 Cir. 2009) 
JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge: 
This case presents a novel question of standing that lies at the junction 
of antitrust and patent law. The plaintiffs, direct purchasers of desmopressin 
acetate tablets (sold under the name DDAVP), filed this class action in the 
Southern District of New York against the defendants Ferring B.V., Ferring 
Pharmaceuticals (collectively, “Ferring”), and Aventis Pharmaceuticals 
(“Aventis”),alleging that Ferring and Aventis abused the patent system to 
unlawfully maintain a monopoly over DDAVP. Ferring developed, 
patented, and manufactures DDAVP, and Aventis holds FDA approval for 
DDAVP tablets as well as a license from Ferring to market and sell the 
drug. The plaintiffs alleged that Ferring and Aventis inflated the price of 
DDAVP by suppressing generic competition for the tablets in violation of 
the antitrust laws. The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that the 
plaintiffs both lacked antitrust standing and had failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted. This appeal followed….. 
In 2002, Ferring filed a patent infringement suit against Barr 
Laboratories, Inc. (“Barr”), which came before the same district judge who 
later presided over this action….  Ferring's suit failed. On summary 
judgment, the district court found that the ′398 patent, rather than having 
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been infringed by Barr, was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct 
before the PTO by Ferring and its agents….  The Federal Circuit affirmed. 
See Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc. (“ Ferring I”), 437 F.3d 1181 
(Fed.Cir.2006)…. 
 
Less than two months after the Federal Circuit's February 2006 ruling, 
the direct purchaser plaintiffs filed the instant suit. …  The plaintiffs claim 
that the lack of competing, generic versions of DDAVP injured them by 
forcing them to pay monopolistic prices for the drug. 
 
Ferring and Aventis jointly moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis 
that, inter alia, the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claimed antitrust 
violations. … 
 
…  As an initial matter, the district court noted the lack of binding 
precedent “with regard to the specific issue of whether purchaser plaintiffs 
like those in this case have standing to assert a Walker Process claim.” Id. 
at 10-11. The district court then held that the plaintiffs lacked antitrust 
standing for their Walker Process claim because the ′398 patent had not 
been enforced against them, and they were not competitors of Ferring or 
Aventis.  
 
The defendants argue that the plaintiffs lack standing to pursue this 
action. We review questions of standing de novo. Comer v. Cisneros, 37 
F.3d 775, 787 (2d Cir.1994). In addition to demonstrating Article III 
standing, an antitrust plaintiff must also establish antitrust standing. See 
Paycom Billing Servs., Inc. v. Mastercard Int'l, Inc., 467 F.3d 283, 290 (2d 
Cir.2006). We analyze antitrust standing under a two-part test: a plaintiff 
must show (1) antitrust injury, which is “injury of the type the antitrust laws 
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' 
acts unlawful,” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 
489 (1977), and (2) that he is a proper plaintiff in light of four “efficient 
enforcer” factors: 
 
(1) the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury; (2) the existence 
of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would 
normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust 
enforcement; (3) the speculativeness of the alleged injury; and (4) 
the difficulty of identifying damages and apportioning them among 
direct and indirect victims so as to avoid duplicative recoveries. 
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In his case, the plaintiffs are purchasers of the defendants' product who 
allege being forced to pay supra-competitive prices as a result of the 
defendants' anticompetitive conduct. Such an injury plainly is “of the type 
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.” Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489; 
see also AGC, 459 U.S. at 530 (“Congress was primarily interested in 
creating an effective remedy for consumers who were forced to pay 
excessive prices by the giant trusts and combinations that dominated certain 
interstate markets.”). Although the defendants' conduct at issue targeted 
their competitors, such as Barr, the plaintiffs' claimed injury of higher prices 
was “inextricably intertwined” with the conduct's anti-competitive effects 
and thus “flow[ed] from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful.” Blue 
Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 484 1982) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Antitrust injury is therefore present. 
 
As for the “efficient enforcer” factors that bear on whether the plaintiffs 
are “proper” antitrust plaintiffs, spelled out in Volvo, each favors granting 
antitrust standing. With respect to the first factor, directness of injury, even 
though the plaintiffs' injuries were derivative of the direct harm experienced 
by the defendants' competitors, harming competitors was simply a means 
for the defendants to charge the plaintiffs higher prices. See Id. at 478-79,; 
In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 400-01 (3d Cir.2000). 
This factor supports the plaintiffs' standing. 
 
As for the second factor, motivation, the defendants argue that their 
competitors are the parties most motivated to enforce the antitrust laws, 
because the competitors were most directly impacted by the alleged 
anticompetitive behavior. They note that we declined to find antitrust 
standing in Paycom in part because the plaintiff there was “not an entity 
whose self-interest would most ‘motivate [it] to vindicate the public interest 
in antitrust enforcement.’ ” 467 F.3d at 294 (quoting AGC, 459 U.S. at 542) 
(alteration in original). But this argument overlooks the fact that the 
Paycom court asked if the plaintiff was an entity most motivated by self-
interest, not the entity most motivated by self-interest. See Id. The second 
factor simply looks for a class of persons naturally motivated to enforce the 
antitrust laws. “Inferiority” to other potential plaintiffs can be relevant, but 
it is not dispositive. See Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., Int'l, 256 
F.3d 799, 816 (D.C.Cir.2001). Even if the competitors might be the most 
motivated, the plaintiffs are also significantly motivated due to their 
“natural economic self-interest” in paying the lowest price possible. See 
Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 444 (2d Cir.2005) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Moreover, the defendants' competitors, unlike the plaintiffs, would be 
seeking lost profits, not overcharges. Lost profits are the difference between 
the competitive price and what the competitors' costs would have been, 
while overcharges are the difference between the defendants' supra-
competitive price and the competitive price. Denying the plaintiffs a remedy 
in favor of a suit by competitors would thus be “likely to leave a significant 
antitrust violation undetected or unremedied.” AGC, 459 U.S. at 542; see 
also Andrx Pharms., 256 F.3d at 817 (noting that lost profits and 
overcharges are distinct injuries). The second factor supports standing. 
 
Tuning to speculativeness, the third factor, the defendants argue that the 
plaintiffs' allegations rest upon tenuous assumptions about the beneficial 
effects of generic competition. The assumptions are not as speculative as 
the defendants suggest. That no other manufacturer would have obtained a 
patent on the drug is a fair assumption, we think, given that “[t]he 
reluctance of the PTO to issue the ′398 patent was evident” in advance of 
the defendants' inequitable conduct. Ferring I, 437 F.3d at 1186. And that 
generic manufacturers would have decided to compete for DDAVP sales is 
self-evident: manufacturers sought approval for generic DDAVP when the 
′398 patent was still enforceable. It may be difficult to account precisely for 
the likely effects of generic competition, but we have little doubt that those 
effects can be sufficiently estimated and measured here. See Geneva 
Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 499 (2d Cir.2004) 
(listing literature analyzing generic drug competition). This is especially so 
when “[t]he most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy 
require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his 
own wrong has created.” Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 
265 (1946). Like the first two factors, the third factor supports the plaintiffs' 
antitrust standing. 
 
As for the fourth factor, the potential for duplicative recovery, the 
difference between lost profits and overcharges is again relevant. Even 
assuming some overlap between lost profits and overcharges (as could 
occur if generic manufacturers charged more than the competitive price), 
the two are conceptually different measures that we think can be fairly 
apportioned in order to avoid duplicative recoveries. See Andrx Pharms., 
256 F.3d at 817. This factor also supports the plaintiffs' antitrust standing. 
 
In sum, then, although the relative weight given to each factor is 
imprecise, see, e.g., Daniel, 428 F.3d at 443, the plaintiffs would be 
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efficient enforcers under any formulation. What complicates the standing 
question, however, is the centrality of the alleged Walker Process fraud to 
the plaintiffs' case. Walker Process claims are based on a fraudulently 
obtained patent, and are typically brought as counterclaims in patent 
infringement suits: the plaintiff claims the defendant infringed his patent, 
and the defendant responds that the patent was invalid as fraudulently 
obtained, and that the plaintiff's enforcement efforts violate Walker Process. 
See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1067 
(Fed.Cir.1998). If a patent is valid, a Walker Process claim cannot stand. 
 
Outside of an infringement suit counterclaim, a patent's validity can be 
challenged only by a party (1) producing or preparing to produce the 
patented product, and (2) being threatened or reasonably likely to be 
threatened with an infringement suit. See, e.g., Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, 
Inc., 835 F.2d 859, 862 (Fed.Cir.1987). As purchasers of DDAVP, the 
plaintiffs do not satisfy these requirements and cannot directly challenge the 
′398 patent's validity. As the district court noted, whether the plaintiffs have 
standing to bring their Walker Process claim, when a court has yet to find 
the ′398 patent fraudulently obtained, is a question of first impression. 
 
The defendants acknowledge that Walker Process standing might be 
warranted for a purchaser when a patent has already been held to have been 
fraudulently procured. But the defendants urge us to hold that, when dealing 
with a patent not yet found to be fraudulently obtained, a party has Walker 
Process standing only if that party also has standing to challenge the 
patent's validity. They argue that giving Walker Process standing to the 
plaintiffs, who cannot directly challenge the ′398 patent's validity, could 
result in an avalanche of patent challenges, because direct purchasers 
otherwise unable to challenge a patent's validity could do so simply by 
dressing their patent challenge with a Walker Process claim…. 
 
Walker Process itself, of course, reflects a willingness to let antitrust 
liability impact the patent system. However, the defendants argue that 
Walker Process is the product of the Supreme Court's careful balancing of 
antitrust and patent policies, a balance which should not be upset and under 
which Walker Process plaintiffs must be independently able to first prove 
the patent's fraudulent procurement. Yet the language of Walker Process 
does not necessarily suggest such a limit: 
 
While one of [the claim's] elements is the fraudulent 
procurement of a patent, the action does not directly seek the 
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patent's annulment. The gist of Walker's claim is that since Food 
Machinery obtained its patent by fraud it cannot enjoy the limited 
exception to the prohibitions of § 2 of the Sherman Act, but must 
answer under that section ... to those injured by any monopolistic 
action taken under the fraudulent patent claim. Nor can the interest 
in protecting patentees from ‘innumerable vexatious suits' be used to 
frustrate the assertion of rights conferred by the antitrust laws. 
 
To be sure, the Walker Process Court also noted that allowing antitrust 
recovery “accord[ed]” with the “long-recognized procedures” that 
controlled how parties could challenge a patent's validity, thereby 
suggesting that the Court may not have envisioned expanding the universe 
of potential patent challengers. 
 
Nonetheless, we are reluctant to embrace the defendants' position 
because we are wary of creating the potential “to leave a significant antitrust 
violation undetected or unremedied.” As the defendants would have it, 
direct purchasers would be able to recover antitrust damages from a 
fraudulent patentee only after that patentee first loses on a fraudulent 
procurement claim. This asks too much of the generic competitors and other 
potential patent challengers, who may not have the strategic interest or the 
resources to start or win such a battle, or who may be presented with strong 
incentives to settle their challenge by patent holders seeking not only to 
preserve their patent's enforceability, but also to avoid potential Walker 
Process liability. See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical 
Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1553, 
1616 (2006) (noting how “an innovator has an especially strong incentive to 
pay to neutralize ... potential competition” when a generic manufacturer 
first files an ANDA). 
 
Although settlements between patent holders and generic manufacturers 
that delay generic entry into the market may themselves invite antitrust 
liability, a plaintiff must be able to show the settled litigation to have been a 
sham in order to succeed. See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 208-09 (“In such a 
case, so long as the patent litigation is neither a sham nor otherwise 
baseless, the patent holder is seeking to arrive at a settlement in order to 
protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly over the 
manufacture and distribution of the patented product.”). A purchaser 
seeking to challenge the settlement by showing the underlying infringement 
litigation to be a sham would need to attach antitrust liability to the patent 
enforcement efforts-a move that would raise the same standing issues 
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presented by this case. Thus, not only are there strong potential settlement 
incentives, but these settlements could be shielded from purchaser attack…. 
 
On the other hand, we do not pass lightly over the defendants' objections 
to expanding the universe of patent challengers. The risk of disturbing the 
incentives for innovation dictates that we tread carefully. As a result, we 
decline to decide whether purchaser plaintiffs per se have standing to raise 
Walker Process claims. In this case, the plaintiffs are challenging an already 
tarnished patent. We are able to grant them antitrust standing without 
altering the typical limits on who can start a challenge to a patent's validity. 
We therefore hold only that purchaser plaintiffs have standing to raise 
Walker Process claims for patents that are already unenforceable due to 
inequitable conduct. The district court erred by concluding to the contrary. 
 
Granting standing to the plaintiffs does not resolve this appeal, because 
the district court also concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to state a 
claim. “We review the district court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to 
state a claim de novo, accepting as true all facts alleged in the complaint 
and drawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiff....” Faulkner v. Beer, 463 
F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[O]nly a 
complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to 
dismiss.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950  (2009). We believe that 
the plaintiffs meet this standard for their antitrust claim under each of their 
four theories. 
 
Walker Process fraud, the plaintiffs' first theory, requires: 
 
(1) a representation of a material fact, (2) the falsity of that 
representation, (3) the intent to deceive or, at least, a state of 
mind so reckless as to the consequences that it is held to be 
the equivalent of intent (scienter), (4) a justifiable reliance 
upon the misrepresentation by the party deceived which 
induces him to act thereon, and (5) injury to the party 
deceived as a result of his reliance on the misrepresentation. 
 
Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1069-70. A fraudulent omission, which “can be 
just as reprehensible as a fraudulent misrepresentation,” can be sufficient to 
“support a finding of Walker Process fraud.” 
 
A party “alleging fraud or mistake ... must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). The 
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plaintiffs argue that they have pled each element with sufficient specificity. 
They alleged a series of “highly material” omissions, without which “the ′ 
398 patent would not have issued.” The Federal Circuit agreed on the “high[ 
] material[ity]” of the omissions when it found the ′398 patent 
unenforceable. Ferring I, 437 F.3d at 1194. The Ferring I litigation also 
addressed the third element of intent, as the district court found “clear and 
convincing evidence of an intent to mislead the examiners.” Ferring B.V., 
2005 WL 437981, at 9. Reliance and injury, the fourth and fifth elements, 
are straightforward here: the PTO was justified in relying on the 
information the defendants provided, and injury is a “matter of course 
whenever the other four elements are met.” Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. 
Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1361 (Fed.Cir.2004), rev'd on other 
grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006). Thus, the plaintiffs contend the district 
court's dismissal on the pleadings was erroneous…. 
 
The defendants next argue that the plaintiffs must allege evidence of 
intent distinct from the omission itself. While a false or clearly misleading 
statement can permit an inference of deceptive intent, a misrepresentation in 
the form of an omission is more likely to be innocent and cannot support 
Walker Process fraud without “evidence of intent separable from the simple 
fact of the omission.” Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1347 
(Fed.Cir.2007). The issue in the initial infringement litigation was 
inequitable conduct, not Walker Process fraud. Moreover, the district court 
in that litigation correctly noted that high materiality could overcome a 
lesser showing of intent. Ferring B.V., 2005 WL 437981, at 9; see 
Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380-81 
(Fed.Cir.2001). While such balancing is impermissible with Walker Process 
claims, we think the plaintiffs' allegations are nonetheless sufficient. Dippin' 
Dots concerned findings, not pleadings, see 476 F.3d at 1341-42; even if the 
district court's findings in the Ferring I litigation could not satisfy Dippin' 
Dots, the plaintiffs' pleadings could plausibly lead to additional findings that 
would satisfy Dippin' Dots, which is all that is required at this stage of the 
litigation…. 
 
We likewise conclude that the sham litigation claim has been adequately 
alleged. In order to state a claim for sham litigation, the plaintiffs need to 
allege that “the litigation in question is: (i) ‘objectively baseless,’ and (ii) 
‘an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a 
competitor through the use of the governmental process ... as an 
anticompetitive weapon.’ ” Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat'l 
Broadcasting Co., 219 F.3d 92, 100-01 (2d Cir.2000) (citing Prof'l Real 
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Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 
(1993)). Based on the same facts alleged to sustain a Walker Process claim, 
we find that in the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs' allegations are 
also sufficient to make out a sham litigation claim. The defendants 
effectively concede as much. See Brief of Defendants-Appellees Ferring 
B.V. and Ferring Pharms. at 38 (“[A] sham litigation claim here not only 
requires proof that defendants defrauded the PTO, but also that they knew 
their misconduct before the PTO had rendered the patent invalid.... 
[Plaintiffs'] ‘sham’ litigation allegation is thus substantively duplicative of 
their patent fraud claim....”). 
 
Overall, the plaintiffs have stated an antitrust claim upon which 
relief may be granted…. 
 
RITZ CAMERA & IMAGE, LLC v. SANDISK CORP. 
700 F.3d 503 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
 
BRYSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case comes to us on an interlocutory appeal from the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California. The certified question 
concerns the limits on standing to bring so-called Walker Process antitrust 
claims. The Supreme Court in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food 
Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), held that antitrust 
liability may attach when a party uses a patent to obtain or preserve a 
monopoly if the patent was procured through intentional fraud on the Patent 
and Trademark Office (“PTO”). The question in this case is whether an 
antitrust action against the owner of a patent, based on the Walker Process 
theory of liability, can be brought by a direct purchaser of goods that are 
protected by the patent, even if the purchaser faces no threat of an action for 
patent infringement and has no other basis to seek a declaratory judgment 
holding the patent invalid or unenforceable. We hold that the district court 
was correct to rule that a direct purchaser is not categorically precluded 
from bringing a Walker Process antitrust claim, even if it would not be 
entitled to seek declaratory relief against the patentee under the patent laws. 
 
 Defendant SanDisk allegedly controls about three quarters of the 
market for NAND flash memory. Flash memory is a computer chip that can 
be erased and reprogrammed; NAND is a particular type of flash memory. 
The capacity of NAND flash memory to store large amounts of data and to 
rewrite the contents of that data has led to its widespread use in consumer 
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products such as digital cameras, mobile phones, and USB drives. SanDisk 
holds patent rights needed to make NAND products. With those patents, 
SanDisk manufactures and sells flash memory products and also licenses 
the technology to other manufacturers. Retailers such as plaintiff Ritz 
Camera & Image, LLC, purchase flash memory products from SanDisk and 
its licensees. 
 
 In June 2010, Ritz filed suit on behalf of itself and a class of direct 
purchasers of NAND flash memory, alleging that SanDisk had violated 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. The complaint alleged that 
SanDisk had fraudulently procured two patents central to its flash memory 
business—U.S. Patent Nos. 5,172,338 and 5,991,517 (“the ′338 and ′517 
patents”)—by failing to disclose known prior art and making affirmative 
misrepresentations to the PTO. Ritz further alleged that SanDisk established 
its monopoly position by enforcing those patents against its competitors and 
by threatening the competitors' customers. Ritz contends that those actions 
have caused direct purchasers to pay inflated, supracompetitive prices for 
NAND flash memory products. 
 
SanDisk moved to dismiss the complaint. Among its arguments, 
SanDisk asserted that Ritz lacked standing to bring a Walker Process 
antitrust claim based on the invalidity or unenforceability of SanDisk's 
patents, because Ritz faced no threat of an infringement action and had no 




 The district court rejected SanDisk's argument.  The court 
acknowledged that Walker Process claims normally are brought by 
competitors of the patentee as counter claims in patent infringement actions. 
However, the court noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Walker 
Process “places no limitation on the class of plaintiffs eligible to bring 
[such claims].” Moreover, the court was not persuaded by SanDisk's 
                                                 
6
 The Supreme Court in Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 
118, 127 (2007), rejected our “reasonable apprehension of suit” test for 
declaratory judgment standing and held that the proper test is whether 
“there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal 
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a 
declaratory judgment.” See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 
F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2007). Ritz does not claim that it could have 
brought a declaratory judgment action against SanDisk seeking relief under 
the patent laws. 
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contention that expressly authorizing direct purchasers to bring Walker 
Process claims “could result in an avalanche of patent challenges” because 
such claims are “rare” and because the Supreme Court rejected the same 
argument in Walker Process.  In the course of its opinion, the court pointed 
out that allegations of fraud relating to the ′338 and ′517 patents had 
survived a motion for summary judgment in a different litigation, which 
“raise[s] at least some question as to the validity of the subject patent[s].”... 
 
 SanDisk's appeal is limited to a single question: Whether direct 
purchasers who cannot challenge a patent's validity or enforceability 
through a declaratory judgment action (and have not been sued for 
infringement, and so cannot assert invalidity or unenforceability as a 
defense in the infringement action) may nevertheless bring a Walker 
Process antitrust claim that includes as one of its elements the need to show 
that the patent was procured through fraud. SanDisk contends that allowing 
parties such as Ritz to use a Walker Process antitrust lawsuit to challenge 
patents would represent an unjustifiable expansion of the Walker Process 
doctrine and would undermine well-recognized limitations on standing to 
bring a declaratory judgment action challenging a patent. We disagree. 
 
 Walker Process set forth two conditions for antitrust liability based 
on the fraudulent procurement of a patent. First, the plaintiff must show that 
the defendant procured the relevant patent by knowing and willful fraud on 
the PTO or (in the case of an assignee) that the defendant maintained and 
enforced the patent with knowledge of the fraudulent manner in which it 
was obtained. Second, the plaintiff must prove all the elements otherwise 
necessary to establish a Sherman Act monopolization charge.... With the 
first condition, the Court made clear that the invalidity of the patent was not 
sufficient; a showing of intentional fraud in its procurement was required.  
With the second condition, the Court incorporated the rules of antitrust law 
generally. As Justice Harlan stated in his concurring opinion, “as to this 
class of improper patent monopolies, antitrust remedies should be allowed 
room for full play.” The “full play” of antitrust remedies encompasses the 
standing requirements that apply in the antitrust setting, see, e.g., 
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 537–46 (1983); In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser 
Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 688 (2d Cir.2009), including the recognition 
that direct purchasers are not only eligible to sue under the antitrust laws, 
but have been characterized as “preferred” antitrust plaintiffs. 
 
 Nothing in Walker Process supports SanDisk's argument that the 
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rules governing standing to bring patent validity challenges should be 
imported into an antitrust case simply because one element of the antitrust 
cause of action requires proof of improper procurement of a patent. In fact, 
the Supreme Court in Walker Process rejected an argument closely 
analogous to SanDisk's argument here. The Court stated that it found no 
merit in the proposition that rules defining who may bring suit “to cancel or 
annul a patent” should also dictate the boundaries of antitrust standing. 
Notwithstanding the fact that “one of its elements is the fraudulent 
procurement of a patent,” the Court explained, an antitrust claim under the 
Clayton Act is not a claim under the patent laws. Rather, “the gist of [the 
antitrust] claim is that since [the defendant] obtained its patent by fraud it 
cannot enjoy the limited exception to the prohibitions of § 2 of the Sherman 
Act, but must answer under that section and § 4 of the Clayton Act in treble 
damages to those injured by any monopolistic action taken under the 
fraudulent patent claim.”  The Court did not suggest that the class of “those 
injured by any monopolistic action” should be limited to those within that 
class who would have standing to bring an independent challenge to the 
patents at issue. 
 
 In arguing that the right to bring a Walker Process claim should be 
governed by the standing requirements of the Declaratory Judgment Act 
rather than traditional antitrust standing requirements, SanDisk relies on the 
Court's statement in Walker Process that permitting a plaintiff to bring an 
antitrust claim based on a fraudulently procured patent “accords with ... 
long-recognized procedures.” Because that statement follows a brief survey 
of cases concerning patent validity disputes, SanDisk argues that it evinces 
the Court's intent to limit the class of potential antitrust plaintiffs to those 
who could contest a patent's validity directly. The quoted sentence, 
however, does not say what SanDisk claims. The context makes clear that 
the sentence in question simply explains that recognizing a cause of action 
for an antitrust claim based on a fraudulently procured patent is not 
inconsistent with patent law rules permitting challenges to patently validity 
or patent misuse. Nothing in that sentence, or elsewhere in the Court's 
opinion, suggests that the standing limitations on direct actions to challenge 
patent validity should be imported into antitrust actions predicated on 
fraudulently procured patents. 
 
 Noting the distinction between patent and antitrust actions drawn in 
Walker Process, this court and others have declined to apply limitations on 
patent invalidity suits to Walker Process antitrust actions. In Hydril Co. v. 
Grant Prideco LP, 474 F.3d 1344 (Fed.Cir.2007), this court refused to apply 
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the standing limitation on declaratory judgment actions challenging a 
patent's validity to the context of a Walker Process claim.  Similarly, the 
Second Circuit has held that direct purchasers had standing to pursue their 
Walker Process claim despite the fact that, as purchasers, they could not 
directly challenge the patent's validity.
7
  The D.C. Circuit has likewise 
allowed a Walker Process claim to proceed even though the patentee had 
disclaimed the patent and thus the plaintiff faced no risk of an infringement 
suit. Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, GmbH, 556 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir.1977). The rule 
urged by SanDisk—to limit Walker Process antitrust claimants to 
competitors who could bring a declaratory judgment action attacking a 
patent's validity—would conflict with all of those decisions. 
 
 SanDisk argues that allowing direct purchasers to bring Walker 
Process claims would authorize an intolerable end-run around the patent 
laws because parties unable to pursue invalidity claims could achieve the 
same result by way of a Sherman Act claim. We do not share SanDisk's 
concern. A Walker Process antitrust claim is a separate cause of action from 
a patent declaratory judgment action. It is governed by principles of 
antitrust law, and there is nothing novel about the fact that it includes as one 
of its elements the need to prove a violation that is not independently 
actionable between the same parties. Walker Process explained that while 
one of the elements of the antitrust claim is the fraudulent procurement of a 
patent, the action “does not directly seek the patent's annulment.”   Ritz's 
claim likewise seeks relief under the antitrust laws; it does not directly seek 
to invalidate SanDisk's patents or render them unenforceable, even though 
                                                 
7
 [In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 688 (2d 
Cir.2009)], The Second Circuit “decline[d] to decide whether purchaser 
plaintiffs per se have standing to raise Walker Process claims,” and held 
“only that purchaser plaintiffs have standing to raise Walker Process claims 
for patents that are already unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.” 585 
F.3d at 691–92. The district court in this case noted that claims of 
intentional fraud against the ′338 and ′ 517 patents had previously survived 
a motion for summary judgment in another case. We see no reason to limit 
the scope of Walker Process standing to cases in which the patents have 
been “tarnished” in another proceeding. Walker Process contains no such 
limitation, and applying such a requirement would have the undesirable 
effect of subjecting injured parties' claims to the litigation strategies of 
others. It would also be likely to generate unproductive wrangling over 
what counts as a sufficiently “tarnished” patent to support a Walker Process 
claim. 
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that would likely be the practical effect if Ritz were to prevail on its Walker 
Process claim. 
 
 Moreover, as to SanDisk's assertion that granting standing to direct 
purchasers would trigger a flood of litigation and stem innovation, the 
Supreme Court rejected the same argument in Walker Process when it 
explained that “the interest in protecting patentees from ‘innumerable 
vexatious suits' [cannot] be used to frustrate the assertion of rights conferred 
by the antitrust laws.”  As the Court explained, Walker Process claims “deal 
only with a special class of patents, i.e., those procured by intentional 
fraud,” and “cannot well be thought to impinge upon the policy of the 
patent laws to encourage inventions and their disclosure,”  (Harlan, J., 
concurring). Particularly in light of the demanding proof requirements of a 
Walker Process claim, we are not persuaded by SanDisk's “flood of 
litigation” argument. 
 
 In sum, Walker Process recognizes a clear distinction between 
claims that arise under the antitrust laws and those that arise under the 
patent laws. Because direct purchasers are generally permitted to bring 
antitrust actions, and because the Walker Process decision did not preclude 
purchasers from bringing this particular type of antitrust claim, we hold that 
Ritz's status as a direct purchaser gives it standing to pursue its Walker 
Process claim even if it could not have sought a declaratory judgment of 
patent invalidity or unenforceability. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  Why shouldn't customers of a patented product have a general right 
to challenge the validity of a patent when they are paying an overcharge or 
suffering a loss in product variety as a result?  One answer, of course, is that 
the Patent Act contains no equivalent to §4 of the Clayton Act, which 
permits any "person who shall be injured" by an antitrust violation to sue 
for damages.  The Declaratory Judgment Action is not a good substitute 
because it requires an "actual controversy."  28 U.S.C. §2201.  What of the 
fact that an ongoing customer of a patented good acquires an implied 
license to use any incorporated patents.  A licensee generally does have 
standing to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of a 
licensed patent, although the cases have generally involved manufacturing 
licensees, not simply product purchasers.  MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, 
Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).  The difference between such a challenge and an 
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antitrust challenge such as the one in Ritz Camera could be significant.  The 
antitrust plaintiffs in Ritz must still make out all of the other elements of an 
antitrust violation, including monopoly power, which typically requires 
costly definition of a relevant market.  By contrast, a simple validity 
challenge requires only a showing that a patent is not enforceable. 
 
2.  Under Ritz a plaintiff's burden could still be substantial.  See, e.g., 
the Federal Circuit's decision in Therasense, reprinted infra. 
 
     3.  The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over “an appeal from a 
final decision of a district court of the United States . . . if the jurisdiction of 
that court was based in whole or part, on 28 U.S.C. § 1338.” 28 U.S.C. 
1295(a)(1). Section 1338 grants federal district courts jurisdiction over 
patent cases. 28. U.S.C. 1338(a). This, even in cases involving both patent 
and non-patent claims, the Federal Circuit will have exclusive jurisdiction if 
a patent law claim appears on the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded 
complaint. See Korody-Colyer Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 486 U.S. 
800, 808-09 (1998).  
 
However, if assertion of a fraudulent patent is an act of 
monopolization, then one would anticipate that consumers must pay higher 
prices.  Further antitrust’s private action provision, §4 of the Clayton Act, 
gives a claim to “any person” who is injured by an antitrust violation.  15 
U.S.C. §15.  Since customers are typically not the targets of infringement 
actions, the case does not “arise” under the Patent Act and the appeal will 
go to the regional Circuit rather than the Federal Circuit.  
 
4.  “Reverse Payment” settlements make a particularly strong case for 
granting standing to consumers, do they not.  The issue of reverse payment 
settlements is discussed further in the notes after the Arkansas Carpenters 
Health and Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2nd Cir. 2010), 
reprinted infra.  Suppose the patentee of a drug, Alpha, files a patent 
infringement suit against the only plausible rival, Beta, and the two settle 
the dispute by an arrangement under which the patentee pays the rival not to 
produce the patented product.  If the patent is invalid the two firms have 
effectively agreed to divide up a monopoly, just as a cartel would, rather 
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THERASENSE, INC. V. BECTON, DICKINSON AND CO. 




 The United States District Court for the Northern District of California 
found U.S. Patent No. 5,820,551 (“the '551 patent”) unenforceable due to 
inequitable conduct….  The ′551 involves disposable blood glucose test 
strips for diabetes management. These strips employ electrochemical 
sensors to measure the level of glucose in a sample of blood. When blood 
contacts a test strip, glucose in the blood reacts with an enzyme on the strip, 
resulting in the transfer of electrons from the glucose to the enzyme. A 
mediator transfers these electrons to an electrode on the strip. Then, the 
electrons flow from the strip to a glucose meter, which calculates the 
glucose concentration based on the electrical current….. 
 
Abbott filed the original application leading to the ′551 patent in 1984. 
Over thirteen years, that original application saw multiple rejections for 
anticipation and obviousness…. [During this time Abbott through its agents 
made claims in the United States patent proceedings that were inconsistent 
with factual assertions it made in claims before the European Patent Office 
[EPO]; this inconsistency was the basis of the inequitable conduct claim. – 
ed.] 
 
Inequitable conduct is an equitable defense to patent infringement that, if 
proved, bars enforcement of a patent. This judge-made doctrine evolved 
from a trio of Supreme Court cases that applied the doctrine of unclean 
hands to dismiss patent cases involving egregious misconduct: Keystone 
Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933), Hazel–Atlas 
Glass Co. v. Hartford–Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), overruled on other 
grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976), 
and Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance 
Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945). 
 
Keystone involved the manufacture and suppression of evidence. 290 U.S. 
at 243. The patentee knew of “a possible prior use” by a third party prior to 
filing a patent application but did not inform the PTO. Id. at 243. After the 
issuance of the patent, the patentee paid the prior user to sign a false 
affidavit stating that his use was an abandoned experiment and bought his 
agreement to keep secret the details of the prior use and to suppress 
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The Supreme Court explained that if the corrupt transaction between the 
patentee and the prior user had been discovered… “the court undoubtedly 
would have been warranted in holding it sufficient to require dismissal” [of 
a subsequent infringement suit].  
 
Like Keystone, Hazel–Atlas involved both the manufacture and 
suppression of evidence. 322 U.S. at 240. Faced with “apparently 
insurmountable Patent Office opposition,” the patentee's attorneys wrote an 
article describing the invention as a remarkable advance in the art and had 
William Clarke, a well-known expert, sign it as his own and publish it in a 
trade journal.  After the patentee submitted the Clarke article to the PTO in 
support of its application, the PTO allowed a patent to issue. 
 
The patentee brought suit against Hazel–Atlas Glass Co. (“Hazel–Atlas”), 
alleging infringement of this patent.  The district court found no 
infringement. On appeal, the patentee's attorneys emphasized the Clarke 
article, and the Third Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, holding 
the patent valid and infringed.  The patentee then went to great lengths to 
conceal the false authorship of the Clarke article, contacting Clarke multiple 
times, including before and after Hazel–Atlas's investigators spoke to 
him.  After Hazel–Atlas settled with the patentee, the patentee paid Clarke a 
total of $8,000. These facts surfaced in a later suit. 
 
On the basis of these newly-discovered facts, Hazel–Atlas petitioned the 
Third Circuit to vacate its judgment, but the court refused.  The Supreme 
Court reversed.  The Supreme Court explained that if the district court had 
learned of the patentee's deception before the PTO, it would have been 
warranted in dismissing the patentee's case under the doctrine of unclean 
hands. … Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment against 
Hazel–Atlas and reinstated the original judgment dismissing the patentee's 
case. 
 
In Precision, the patentee suppressed evidence of perjury before the PTO 
and attempted to enforce the perjury-tainted patent…. 
  
The district court found that Automotive had unclean hands and dismissed 
the suit.  The Seventh Circuit reversed.  The Supreme Court reversed the 
Seventh Circuit's decision, explaining that dismissal was warranted because 
not only had the patentee failed to disclose its knowledge of perjury to the 
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PTO, it had actively suppressed evidence of the perjury and magnified its 
effects.   
 
The unclean hands cases of Keystone, Hazel–Atlas, and Precision formed 
the basis for a new doctrine of inequitable conduct that developed and 
evolved over time. Each of these unclean hands cases before the Supreme 
Court dealt with particularly egregious misconduct, including perjury, the 
manufacture of false evidence, and the suppression of evidence….  As the 
inequitable conduct doctrine evolved from these unclean hands cases, it 
came to embrace a broader scope of misconduct, including not only 
egregious affirmative acts of misconduct intended to deceive both the PTO 
and the courts but also the mere nondisclosure of information to the PTO. 
Inequitable conduct also diverged from the doctrine of unclean hands by 
adopting a different and more potent remedy—unenforceability of the entire 
patent rather than mere dismissal of the instant suit.  
 
In line with this wider scope and stronger remedy, inequitable conduct 
came to require a finding of both intent to deceive and materiality. Star 
Scientific Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 
(Fed.Cir.2008). To prevail on the defense of inequitable conduct, the 
accused infringer must prove that the applicant misrepresented or omitted 
material information with the specific intent to deceive the PTO.  The 
accused infringer must prove both elements—intent and materiality—by 
clear and convincing evidence.  If the accused infringer meets its burden, 
then the district court must weigh the equities to determine whether the 
applicant's conduct before the PTO warrants rendering the entire patent 
unenforceable…. 
 
As inequitable conduct emerged from unclean hands, the standards for 
intent to deceive and materiality have fluctuated over time. In the past, this 
court has espoused low standards for meeting the intent requirement, 
finding it satisfied based on gross negligence or even 
negligence. See Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed.Cir. 
1984) (“Where they knew, or should have known, that the withheld 
reference would be material to the PTO's consideration, their failure to 
disclose the reference is sufficient proof of the existence of an intent to 
mislead the PTO.”); Orthopedic Equip. Co., Inc. v. All Orthopedic 
Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1383–84 (Fed.Cir.1983) (requiring only 
gross negligence to sustain a finding of intent). This court has also 
previously adopted a broad view of materiality, using a “reasonable 
examiner” standard based on the PTO's 1977 amendment to Rule 
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56. See Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 
(Fed.Cir.1984); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977) (a reference is material if 
“there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider 
it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a 
patent”). Further weakening the showing needed to establish inequitable 
conduct, this court then placed intent and materiality together on a “sliding 
scale.” Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1362. This modification to the inequitable 
conduct doctrine held patents unenforceable based on a reduced showing of 
intent if the record contained a strong showing of materiality, and vice 
versa. In effect, this change conflated, and diluted, the standards for both 
intent and materiality. 
 
This court embraced these reduced standards for intent and materiality to 
foster full disclosure to the PTO.  This new focus on encouraging disclosure 
has had numerous unforeseen and unintended consequences. Most 
prominently, inequitable conduct has become a significant litigation 
strategy. A charge of inequitable conduct conveniently expands discovery 
into corporate practices before patent filing and disqualifies the prosecuting 
attorney from the patentee's litigation team. Moreover, inequitable conduct 
charges cast a dark cloud over the patent's validity and paint the patentee as 
a bad actor. Because the doctrine focuses on the moral turpitude of the 
patentee with ruinous consequences for the reputation of his patent attorney, 
it discourages settlement and deflects attention from the merits of validity 
and infringement issues…. Inequitable conduct disputes also “increas[e] the 
complexity, duration and cost of patent infringement litigation that is 
already notorious for its complexity and high cost.” Brief and Appendix of 
the American Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 9. 
 
Perhaps most importantly, the remedy for inequitable conduct is the 
“atomic bomb” of patent law.  Unlike validity defenses, which are claim 
specific, inequitable conduct regarding any single claim renders the entire 
patent unenforceable. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister 
Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed.Cir.1988). Unlike other deficiencies, 
inequitable conduct cannot be cured by reissue, Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1341, 
n. 6, or reexamination, Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 
(Fed.Cir.1995). Moreover, the taint of a finding of inequitable conduct can 
spread from a single patent to render unenforceable other related patents 
and applications in the same technology family. See, e.g., Consol. 
Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 808–12 (Fed.Cir.1990). 
Thus, a finding of inequitable conduct may endanger a substantial portion 
of a company's patent portfolio. 
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A finding of inequitable conduct may also spawn antitrust and unfair 
competition claims. See Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 
1471 (Fed.Cir.1998) (unfair competition claim); Walker Process Equip., 
Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 178 (1965) (antitrust 
action for treble damages). Further, prevailing on a claim of inequitable 
conduct often makes a case “exceptional,” leading potentially to an award 
of attorneys' fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285. Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker 
Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2001). A finding of inequitable 
conduct may also prove the crime or fraud exception to the attorney-client 
privilege. See In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 807 
(Fed.Cir.2000). 
 
With these far-reaching consequences, it is no wonder that charging 
inequitable conduct has become a common litigation tactic. One study 
estimated that eighty percent of patent infringement cases included 
allegations of inequitable conduct. Committee Position Paper at 75; see 
also Christian Mammen, Controlling the “Plague”: Reforming the Doctrine 
of Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1358 (2009)….. 
 
While honesty at the PTO is essential, low standards for intent and 
materiality have inadvertently led to many unintended consequences, 
among them, increased adjudication cost and complexity, reduced 
likelihood of settlement, burdened courts, strained PTO resources, increased 
PTO backlog, and impaired patent quality. This court now tightens the 
standards for finding both intent and materiality in order to redirect a 
doctrine that has been overused to the detriment of the public. 
 
 To prevail on a claim of inequitable conduct, the accused infringer must 
prove that the patentee acted with the specific intent to deceive the 
PTO. Star, 537 F.3d at 1366 (citing Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876). A finding 
that the misrepresentation or omission amounts to gross negligence or 
negligence under a “should have known” standard does not satisfy this 
intent requirement.  “In a case involving nondisclosure of information, clear 
and convincing evidence must show that the applicant made a deliberate 
decision to withhold a known material reference.” In other words, the 
accused infringer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
applicant knew of the reference, knew that it was material, and made a 
deliberate decision to withhold it…. 
 
 Intent and materiality are separate requirements. Hoffmann–La Roche, 
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Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed.Cir.2003). A district court 
should not use a “sliding scale,” where a weak showing of intent may be 
found sufficient based on a strong showing of materiality, and vice versa. 
Moreover, a district court may not infer intent solely from materiality. 
Instead, a court must weigh the evidence of intent to deceive independent of 
its analysis of materiality. Proving that the applicant knew of a reference, 
should have known of its materiality, and decided not to submit it to the 
PTO does not prove specific intent to deceive. 
 
Because direct evidence of deceptive intent is rare, a district court may 
infer intent from indirect and circumstantial evidence. However, to meet the 
clear and convincing evidence standard, the specific intent to deceive must 
be “the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the 
evidence.”  Indeed, the evidence “must be sufficient to require a finding of 
deceitful intent in the light of all the circumstances.” Hence, when there are 
multiple reasonable inferences that may be drawn, intent to deceive cannot 
be found. 
 
 Because the party alleging inequitable conduct bears the burden of proof, 
the “patentee need not offer any good faith explanation unless the accused 
infringer first ... prove[s] a threshold level of intent to deceive by clear and 
convincing evidence.”  The absence of a good faith explanation for 
withholding a material reference does not, by itself, prove intent to deceive. 
 
This court holds that, as a general matter, the materiality required to 
establish inequitable conduct is but-for materiality. When an applicant fails 
to disclose prior art to the PTO, that prior art is but-for material if the PTO 
would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed prior 
art. Hence, in assessing the materiality of a withheld reference, the court 
must determine whether the PTO would have allowed the claim if it had 
been aware of the undisclosed reference. In making this patentability 
determination, the court should apply the preponderance of the evidence 
standard and give claims their broadest reasonable construction.  Often the 
patentability of a claim will be congruent with the validity determination—
if a claim is properly invalidated in district court based on the deliberately 
withheld reference, then that reference is necessarily material because a 
finding of invalidity in a district court requires clear and convincing 
evidence, a higher evidentiary burden than that used in prosecution at the 
PTO. However, even if a district court does not invalidate a claim based on 
a deliberately withheld reference, the reference may be material if it would 
have blocked patent issuance under the PTO's different evidentiary 
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 As an equitable doctrine, inequitable conduct hinges on basic fairness. 
“[T]he remedy imposed by a court of equity should be commensurate with 
the violation.” Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 (1979). 
Because inequitable conduct renders an entire patent (or even a patent 
family) unenforceable, as a general rule, this doctrine should only be 
applied in instances where the patentee's misconduct resulted in the unfair 
benefit of receiving an unwarranted claim. Star, 537 F.3d at 1366 (“[j]ust as 
it is inequitable to permit a patentee who obtained his patent through 
deliberate misrepresentations or omissions of material information to 
enforce the patent against others, it is also inequitable to strike down an 
entire patent where the patentee committed only minor missteps or acted 
with minimal culpability”). After all, the patentee obtains no advantage 
from misconduct if the patent would have issued anyway….. 
 
 In this case, the district court held the ′551 patent unenforceable for 
inequitable conduct because Abbott did not disclose briefs it submitted to 
the EPO regarding the European counterpart of the ′382 patent. Trial 
Opinion at 1127. Because the district court found statements made in the 
EPO briefs material under the PTO's Rule 56 materiality standard, not under 
the but-for materiality standard set forth in this opinion, this court vacates 
the district court's findings of materiality.  On remand, the district court 
should determine whether the PTO would not have granted the patent but 
for Abbott's failure to disclose the EPO briefs….. 
 
 The district court found intent to deceive based on the absence of a good 
faith explanation for failing to disclose the EPO briefs.  However, a 
“patentee need not offer any good faith explanation unless the accused 
infringer first ... prove[s] a threshold level of intent to deceive by clear and 
convincing evidence.”  The district court also relied upon the “should have 
known” negligence standard in reaching its finding of intent….  Because 
the district court did not find intent to deceive under the knowing and 
deliberate standard set forth in this opinion, this court vacates the district 
court's findings of intent.   On remand, the district court should determine 
whether there is clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that [the 
United States applicant] knew of the EPO briefs, knew of their materiality, 
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  In a dissenting opinion, Judge Bryson took issue with the majority’s 
standard for determining whether the conduct at issue is sufficiently 
material to render the patent suit unenforceable. Judge Bryson pointed out 
that:  
 
Since its first days, this court has looked to the PTO's disclosure 
rule, Rule 56, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56, as the standard for defining 
materiality in inequitable conduct cases involving the failure to 
disclose material information. In its current form, that rule provides 
that information is material not only if it establishes a prima facie 
case of unpatentability, but also if it refutes or is inconsistent with a 
position the applicant takes before the PTO with respect to 
patentability. Id. at 22. 
 
Judge Bryson argued that the PTO’s materiality standard set for in 
its disclosure rule should be followed because, “ the PTO is in the best 
position to know what information examiners need to conduct effective and 
efficient examinations,” and that, “the higher standard of materiality 
adopted by the majority will not provide appropriate incentives for patent 
applicants to comply with the disclosure obligations the PTO places upon 
them.” Id. at 22. Moreover, citing Rule 56’s legislative history: 
 
At the time it adopted the 1992 revision to Rule 56, the PTO 
considered the possibility of adopting a “but for” test of 
materiality of the sort that the majority has adopted today. The 
Office rejected that test, concluding that adopting such a narrow 
standard “would not cause the Office to obtain the information it 
needs to evaluate patentability so that its decisions may be 
presumed correct by the courts.” Duty of Disclosure, 57 
Fed.Reg. at 2023. Id. at 31. 
 
Additionally, argued Judge Bryson, the majority “does not merely 
reform the doctrine of inequitable conduct, but comes close to abolishing it 
altogether.” Id. at 24. In reference to the majority’s new standard, he states, 
“[t]his court has repeatedly rejected the ‘but for’ test as too restrictive in 
light of the policies served by the inequitable conduct doctrine.”   
 
2.  The proper role of equity courts. Judge O’Malley also wrote a separate 
opinion.  He argued that “when addressing the types of conduct that should 
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be deemed of sufficient concern to allow for a finding of inequitable 
conduct, both the majority and dissent strain too hard to impose hard and 
fast rules.” Judge O’Malley offered the following test for materiality: 
 
(1) but for the conduct (whether it be in the form of an 
affirmative act or intentional non-disclosure), the patent would 
not have issued (as Chief Judge Rader explains that concept in 
the majority opinion); (2) the conduct constitutes a false or 
misleading representation of fact (rendered so either because the 
statement made is false on its face or information is omitted 
which, if known, would render the representation false or 
misleading); or (3) the district court finds that the behavior is so 
offensive that the court is left with a firm conviction that the 
integrity of the PTO process as to the application at issue was 
wholly undermined. 
 
Judge O’Malley refused to weigh in on the policy debate between 
the majority and dissenters concerning litigation abuses surrounding the 
improper use of the inequitable conduct doctrine. “Policy concerns cannot 
… justify adopting broad legal standards that diverge from doctrines 
explicated by the Supreme Court.”  
EON-NET LP v. FLAGSTAR BANCORP 
653 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
…  [T]he district court found that Eon–Net's litigation misconduct and 
its filing of a baseless infringement action in bad faith for an improper 
purpose warranted an exceptional case finding. We conclude that the district 





The district court's opinion recounted numerous instances of litigation 
misconduct. First, the district court found that Eon–Net and its counsel 
destroyed relevant documents prior to the initiation of its lawsuit against 
Flagstar and that Eon–Net intentionally did not implement a document 
retention plan. Exceptional Case Order, at 17–18. As recounted by the 
district court, Eon–Net's principal, Mitchell Medina, testified with regard to 
document retention, collection, and production that “I don't save anything 
so I don't have to look” and further testified that Eon–Net and Millennium 
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“have adopted a document retention policy which is that we don't retain any 
documents” because those companies have “evolved into patent 
enforcement companies which are involved in the business of litigation.” …  
it is undisputed that Medina and ultimately Eon–Net had an independent 
duty to preserve evidence during the ongoing lawsuits, see Sensonics, Inc. v. 
Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1996), and, in light of 
Medina's testimony, it was not clear error for the district court to conclude 
that Eon–Net did not observe that duty. 
 
Filing Objectively Baseless Litigation in Bad Faith 
 
Eon–Net also challenges the district court's finding that Eon–Net 
pursued baseless infringement allegations in bad faith and for an improper 
purpose…. 
 
... [T]he written description repeatedly defines the invention as a system 
for processing information that originates from hard copy documents, and, 
under this construction, it is undisputed that Flagstar does not infringe any 
asserted claim of the ′697, ′673, and ′162 patents. Thus, because the written 
description clearly refutes Eon–Net's claim construction, the district court 
did not clearly err in finding that Eon–Net pursued objectively baseless 
infringement claims….. 
 
In addition to finding that Eon–Net filed an objectively baseless 
infringement action, the district court also determined that Eon–Net filed 
the lawsuit in bad faith and for an improper purpose. Exceptional Case 
Order, at 16–17. In particular, the district court found that Eon–Net's case 
against Flagstar had “indicia of extortion” because it was part of Eon–Net's 
history of filing nearly identical patent infringement complaints against a 
plethora of diverse defendants, where Eon–Net followed each filing with a 
demand for a quick settlement at a price far lower than the cost to defend 
the litigation. 
 
The record supports the district court's finding that Eon–Net acted in bad 
faith by exploiting the high cost to defend complex litigation to extract a 
nuisance value settlement from Flagstar. At the time that the district court 
made its exceptional case finding, Eon–Net and its related entities, 
Millennium and Glory, had filed over 100 lawsuits against a number of 
diverse defendants alleging infringement of one or more patents from the 
Patent Portfolio.  Each complaint was followed by a “demand for a quick 
settlement at a price far lower than the cost of litigation, a demand to which 
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most defendants apparently have agreed.”  In this case, as with the other 
cases, Eon–Net offered to settle using a license fee schedule based on the 
defendant's annual sales: $25,000 for sales less than $3,000,000; $50,000 
for sales between $3,000,000 and $20,000,000; and $75,000 for sales 
between $20,000,000 and $100,000,000. Rule 11 Sanctions Order, at 3–4. 
 
Meritless cases like this one unnecessarily require the district court to 
engage in excessive claim construction analysis before it is able to see the 
lack of merit of the patentee's infringement allegations. …   In this case, 
Flagstar expended over $600,000 in attorney fees and costs to litigate this 
case through claim construction. Viewed against Eon–Net's $25,000 to 
$75,000 settlement offer range, it becomes apparent why the vast majority 
of those that Eon–Net accused of infringement chose to settle early in the 
litigation rather than expend the resources required to demonstrate to a court 
that the asserted patents are limited to processing information that originates 
from a hard copy document. Thus, those low settlement offers—less than 
ten percent of the cost that Flagstar expended to defend suit—effectively 
ensured that Eon–Net's baseless infringement allegations remained 
unexposed, allowing Eon–Net to continue to collect additional nuisance 
value settlements…. 
 
In addition to its ability to impose high costs to defend against its 
meritless claims, Eon–Net placed little at risk when filing suit. As a non-
practicing entity, Eon–Net was generally immune to counterclaims for 
patent infringement, antitrust, or unfair competition because it did not 
engage in business activities that would potentially give rise to those claims. 
And while Eon–Net risked licensing revenue should its patents be found 
invalid or if a court narrowly construed the patents' claims to exclude 
valuable targets, Eon–Net did not face any business risk resulting from the 
loss of patent protection over a product or process. Its patents protected only 
settlement receipts, not its own products. 
 
  Eon–Net argues that it is not improper for a patentee to vigorously 
enforce its patent rights or offer standard licensing terms, and Eon–Net is 
correct. But the appetite for licensing revenue cannot overpower a litigant's 
and its counsel's obligation to file cases reasonably based in law and fact 
and to litigate those cases in good faith. Here, the district court did not 
clearly err when it found that Eon–Net filed an objectively baseless 
infringement action against Flagstar and brought that action in bad faith, 
specifically to extract a nuisance value settlement by exploiting the high 
cost imposed on Flagstar to defend against Eon–Net's baseless claims. It 
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also appears that in filing this case, Zimmerman merely followed the 
direction of his client, Medina, who Zimmerman characterized at oral 
argument as “difficult to control.”  But an attorney, in addition to his 
obligation to his client, also has an obligation to the court and should not 
blindly follow the client's interests if not supported by law and facts. In 
these circumstances, coupled with the district court's supported findings 
regarding Eon–Net's litigation misconduct, we conclude that the district 
court did not clearly err in its exceptional case finding. 
 
Rule 11 Sanctions 
 
 Eon–Net also appeals the district court's imposition of Rule 
11 sanctions. We apply the law of the regional circuit, here the Ninth 
Circuit, to review an award of Rule 11 sanctions. Power Mosfet Techs., 
L.L.C. v. Siemens AG, 378 F.3d 1396, 1406–07 (Fed.Cir.2004). Before a 
district court awards Rule 11 sanctions under Ninth Circuit law, the district 
court must determine that the complaint is “legally or factually ‘baseless' 
from an objective perspective” and that the attorney failed to conduct a 
“reasonable and competent inquiry” before filing the complaint. Christian v. 
Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Buster v. 
Greisen,104 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir.1997)). We review all aspects of a 
district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions under an abuse of discretion 
standard. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). 
 
The district court imposed Rule 11 sanctions against Zimmerman and 
Eon–Net because it found that Eon–Net's infringement allegations were 
legally baseless and that Eon–Net and Zimmerman failed to perform a 
reasonable pre-suit investigation. Eon–Net argues that its claim construction 
was not objectively baseless. As explained above, however, the district 
court did not clearly err in concluding that Eon–Net's infringement 
allegations were objectively baseless, and, for the same reasons, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Eon–Net's infringement 
allegations were legally baseless. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  Suppose a patent holder came to you intending to file a patent 
infringement suit against a competitor. After review of the relevant 
document available at the time, you decide the case does have merit and 
submit the complaint. However, since litigation, like life, never goes 
according to plan, new evidence is brought to your attention during the 
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discovery process that seriously calls into question the validity of your 
client’s patent.  What would you do with this new information? Do you 
have a duty to disclose this evidence to opposing counsel? Would any of 
your answers change if you were the attorney who drafted the patent 
application?  See Rule 26(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2.  The “exceptional case” procedure emanates from the Patent Act, 35 
U.S.C. §285, which states that “The court in exceptional cases may award 
reasonable attorneys fees to the prevailing party.”  The rule can be applied 
to either party.  See Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 
F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001); and see Christopher A. Cotropia, 
Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY 
TECH.L.J. 723 (2009). 
 
3.  Attorney-Client Privilege. In this case, both EON-Net and its counsel 
destroyed  documents relevant to litigation, a clear violation of both 
discovery and ethics rules. However, whether or not attorney-client 
communication is privileged is a very common discovery issue in patent 
infringement litigation. Why might you think this is such a common 
occurrence? Whatever the reason may be, when faced with this issue, the 
court has the challenge of balancing the need for discovery against the 
policy “encourag[ing] full and frank communication between attorneys and 
their clients and thereby promote broader public interest in the observance 
of law and administration of justice.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 
383, 389 (1981). 
 
Additionally, what if you client tells you information that may call 
into question the validity of their patent? Is that communication protected or 
will you be obligated to disclose the information to opposing counsel? 
Additionally, what if the patent holder discloses that he did in fact engage in 
fraudulent conduct in his dealings with the Patent and Trademark Office. 
Would your answer change if he initially acted fraudulently but has since 
stopped? What if he stopped his conduct but the impact of his actions is still 
occurring?  On how lawyers respond to these and related issues, see 
William T. Gallagher, IP Legal Ethics in the Everyday Practice of Law: an 
Empirical Perspective on Patent Litigators, 10 JOHN MARSHALL REV. 
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RAMBUS, INC. v.. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
 
522 F.3d 456 (D.C.Cir. 2008) 
 
WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: 
 
Rambus Inc. develops computer memory technologies, secures 
intellectual property rights over them, and then licenses them to 
manufacturers in exchange for royalty payments. In 1990, Rambus's 
founders filed a patent application claiming the invention of a faster 
architecture for dynamic random access memory (“DRAM”). In recent 
years, Rambus has asserted that patents issued to protect its invention cover 
four technologies that a private standard-setting organization (“SSO”) 
included in DRAM industry standards. 
 
Before an SSO adopts a standard, there is often vigorous competition 
among different technologies for incorporation into that standard. After 
standardization, however, the dynamic typically shifts, as industry members 
begin adhering to the standard and the standardized features start to 
dominate. In this case, 90% of DRAM production is compliant with the 
standards at issue, and therefore the technologies adopted in those 
standards-including those over which Rambus claims patent rights-enjoy a 
similar level of dominance over their alternatives. 
 
After lengthy proceedings, the Federal Trade Commission determined that 
Rambus, while participating in the standard-setting process, deceptively 
failed to disclose to the SSO the patent interests it held in four technologies 
that were standardized. Those interests ranged from issued patents, to 
pending patent applications, to plans to amend those patent applications to 
add new claims; Rambus's patent rights in all these interests are said to be 
sufficiently connected to the invention described in Rambus's original 1990 
application that its rights would relate back to its date. 
 
Rambus petitions for review. We grant the petition, holding that the 
Commission failed to sustain its allegation of monopolization. Its factual 
conclusion was that Rambus's alleged deception enabled it either to acquire 
a monopoly through the standardization of its patented technologies rather 
than possible alternatives, or to avoid limits on its patent licensing fees that 
the SSO would have imposed as part of its normal process of standardizing 
patented technologies. But the latter-deceit merely enabling a monopolist to 
charge higher prices than it otherwise could have charged-would not in 
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itself constitute monopolization. We also address whether there is 
substantial evidence that Rambus engaged in deceptive conduct at all, and 
express our serious concerns about the sufficiency of the evidence on two 
particular points. 
 
* * * 
During the early 1990s, the computer hardware industry faced a “memory 
bottleneck”: the development of faster memory lagged behind the 
development of faster central processing units, and this risked limiting 
future gains in overall computer performance. To address this problem, 
Michael Farmwald and Mark Horowitz began collaborating during the late 
1980s and invented a higher-performance DRAM architecture. Together, 
they founded Rambus in March 1990 and filed Patent Application No. 
07/510,898 (“the ′898 application”) on April 18, 1990. 
 
As originally filed, the ′898 application included a 62-page written 
description of Farmwald and Horowitz's invention, 150 claims, and 15 
technical drawings. Under the direction of the Patent Office, acting pursuant 
to 35 U.S.C. § 121, Rambus effectively split the application into several 
(the original one and 10 “ divisionals”). Thereafter, Rambus amended some 
of these applications and filed additional continuation and divisional 
applications. 
 
While Rambus was developing a patent portfolio based on its founders' 
inventions, the computer memory industry was at work standardizing 
DRAM technologies. The locus of those efforts was the Joint Electron 
Device Engineering Council (“JEDEC”)-then an “activity” of what is now 
called the Electronics Industries Alliance (“EIA”) and, since 2000, a trade 
association affiliated with EIA and known as the JEDEC Solid State 
Technology Association. Any company involved in the solid state products 
industry could join JEDEC by submitting an application and paying annual 
dues, and members could receive JEDEC mailings, participate 
in JEDEC committees, and vote on pending matters. 
 
One JEDEC committee, JC 42.3, developed standards for computer 
memory products. Rambus attended its first JC 42.3 meeting as a guest in 
December 1991 and began formally participating when it joined JEDEC in 
February 1992. At the time, JC 42.3 was at work on what 
became JEDEC's synchronous DRAM (“SDRAM”) standard. The 
committee voted to approve the completed standard in March 1993, 
and JEDEC's governing body gave its final approval on May 24, 1993. The 
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SDRAM standard includes two of the four technologies over which Rambus 
asserts patent rights-programmable CAS latency and programmable burst 
length. 
 
Despite SDRAM's standardization, its manufacture increased very slowly 
and asynchronous DRAM continued to dominate the computer memory 
market, so JC 42.3 began to consider a number of possible responses-among 
them specifications it could include in a next-generation SDRAM standard. 
As part of that process, JC 42.3 members received a survey ballot in 
October 1995 soliciting their opinions on features of an advanced SDRAM-
which ultimately emerged as the double data rate (“DDR”) SDRAM 
standard. Among the features voted on were the other two technologies at 
issue here: on-chip phase lock and delay lock loops (“on-chip PLL/DLL”) 
and dual-edge clocking. The Committee tallied and discussed the survey 
results at its December 1995 meeting, which was Rambus's last as 
a JEDEC member. Rambus formally withdrew from JEDEC by letter dated 
June 17, 1996, saying (among other things) that the terms on which it 
proposed to license its proprietary technology “may not be consistent with 
the terms set by standards bodies, including JEDEC.” Complaint Counsel's 
Exhibit (“CX”) 887. 
 
JC 42.3's work continued after Rambus's departure. In March 1998 the 
committee adopted the DDR SDRAM standard, and the JEDEC Board of 
Directors approved it in 1999. This standard retained SDRAM features 
including programmable CAS latency and programmable burst length, and 
it added on-chip PLL/DLL and dual-edge clocking; DDR SDRAM, 
therefore, included all four of the technologies at issue here. 
 
Starting in 1999, Rambus informed major DRAM and chipset 
manufacturers that it held patent rights over technologies included in 
JEDEC's SDRAM and DDR SDRAM standards, and that the continued 
manufacture, sale, or use of products compliant with those standards 
infringed its rights. It invited the manufacturers to resolve the alleged 
infringement through licensing negotiations. A number of manufacturers 
agreed to licenses, see Opinion of the Commission (“Liability Op.”), In re 
Rambus, Docket No. 9302, at 48 n. 262 (July 31, 2006) (discussing cases); 
others did not, and litigation ensued, see id. at 17-21. 
 
On June 18, 2002, the Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint under 
§ 5(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b), charging that Rambus engaged in 
unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
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violation of the Act, see id. § 45(a). Specifically, the Commission alleged 
that Rambus breached JEDEC policies requiring it to disclose patent 
interests related to standardization efforts and that the disclosures it did 
make were misleading. By this deceptive conduct, it said, Rambus 
unlawfully monopolized four technology markets in which its patented 
technologies compete with alternative innovations to address technical 
issues relating to DRAM design-markets for latency, burst length, data 
acceleration, and clock synchronization technologies. 
 
Proceedings began before an administrative law judge, who in due course 
dismissed the Complaint in its entirety. Initial Decision (“ALJ Op.”) at 334 
(Feb. 23, 2004). He concluded that Rambus did not impermissibly withhold 
material information about its intellectual property, id. at 260-86, and that, 
in any event, there was insufficient evidence that, if Rambus had disclosed 
all the information allegedly required of it, JEDEC would have standardized 
an alternative technology. 
 
Complaint Counsel appealed the ALJ's Initial Decision to the 
Commission, which reopened the record to receive additional evidence and 
did its own plenary review. See Liability Op. at 17, 21. On July 31, 2006 the 
Commission vacated the ALJ's decision and set aside his findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. Id. at 21. The Commission found that 
while JEDEC's patent disclosure policies were “not a model of 
clarity,” id. at 52, members expected one another to disclose patents and 
patent applications that were relevant to technologies being considered for 
standardization, plus (though the Commission was far less clear on these 
latter items) planned amendments to pending applications or “anything 
they're working on that they potentially wanted to protect with patents down 
the road,” id. at 56; see generally id. at 51-59, 66. Based on this 
interpretation of JEDEC's disclosure requirements, the Commission held 
that Rambus willfully and intentionally engaged in misrepresentations, 
omissions, and other practices that misled JEDEC members about 
intellectual property information “highly material” to the standard-setting 
process. Id. at 68; see also id. at 37-48 (outlining Rambus's “Chronology of 
Concealment”). 
 
The Commission focused entirely on the allegation of monopolization.  In 
particular, the Commission held that the evidence and inferences from 
Rambus's purpose demonstrated that “but for Rambus's deceptive course of 
conduct, JEDEC either would have excluded Rambus's patented 
technologies from the JEDEC DRAM standards, or would have demanded 
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RAND assurances [ i.e.,assurances of ‘reasonable and nondiscriminatory’ 
license fees], with an opportunity for ex ante licensing negotiations.” Id. at 
74; see also id. at 77, 118-19. Rejecting Rambus's argument that factors 
other than JEDEC's standards allowed Rambus's technologies to dominate 
their respective markets, id. at 79-96, the Commission concluded that 
Rambus's deception of JEDEC “significantly contributed to its acquisition 
of monopoly power,” id. at 118. 
 
After additional briefing by the parties, see id. at 119-20, the Commission 
rendered a separate remedial opinion and final order. It held that it had the 
authority in principle to order compulsory licensing, but that remedies 
beyond injunctions against future anticompetitive conduct would require 
stronger proof that they were necessary to restore competitive conditions. 
Remedy Op. at 2-11. Applying that more demanding burden to Complaint 
Counsel's claims for relief, the Commission refused to compel Rambus to 
license its relevant patents royalty-free because there was insufficient 
evidence that “absent Rambus's deception” JEDEC would have 
standardized non-proprietary technologies instead of Rambus's; thus, 
Complaint Counsel had failed to show that such a remedy was “necessary to 
restore competition that would have existed in the ‘but for’ world.” Id. at 
12; see also id. at 13, 16. Instead, the Commission decided to compel 
licensing at “reasonable royalty rates,” which it calculated based on what it 
believed would have resulted from negotiations between Rambus and 
manufacturers before JEDEC committed to the standards. Id. at 16-25. The 
Commission's order limits Rambus's royalties for three years to 0.25% for 
JEDEC-compliant SDRAM and 0.5% for JEDEC-compliant DDR SDRAM 
(with double those royalties for certain JEDEC-compliant, non-DRAM 
products); after those three years, it forbids any royalty collection…. 
 
Rambus challenges the Commission's determination that it engaged in 
unlawful monopolization-and thereby violated § 5 of the FTC Act-on a 
variety of grounds, of which two are most prominent. First, it argues that 
the Commission erred in finding that it violated any JEDEC patent 
disclosure rules and thus that it breached any antitrust duty to provide 
information to its rivals. Second, it asserts that even if its nondisclosure 
contravened JEDEC's policies, the Commission found the consequences of 
such nondisclosure only in the alternative: that it 
prevented JEDEC either from adopting a non-proprietary standard, or from 
extracting a RAND commitment from Rambus when standardizing its 
technology. As the latter would not involve an antitrust violation, says 
Rambus, there is an insufficient basis for liability. 
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We find the second of these arguments to be persuasive, and conclude that 
the Commission failed to demonstrate that Rambus's conduct was 
exclusionary under settled principles of antitrust law. Given that conclusion, 
we need not dwell very long on the substantiality of the evidence, which we 
address only to express our serious concerns about the breadth the 
Commission ascribed to JEDEC's disclosure policies and their relation to 
what Rambus did or did not disclose. 
 
* * * 
In this case under § 5 of the FTC Act, the Commission expressly limited 
its theory of liability to Rambus's unlawful monopolization of four markets 
in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. See Liability Op. at 
27 n. 124; see also FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948) (§ 5 reaches 
all conduct that violates § 2 of the Sherman Act). Therefore, we apply 
principles of antitrust law developed under the Sherman Act, and we review 
the Commission's construction and application of the antitrust laws de novo. 
 
 It is settled law that the mere existence of a monopoly does not violate 
the Sherman Act. See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004); United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C.Cir.2001) (en banc) ( per curiam ). In addition 
to “the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market,” the offense 
of monopolization requires “ ‘the willful acquisition or maintenance of that 
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a 
superior product, business acumen, or historical accident.’ ” Trinko, 540 
U.S. at 407 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 
(1966)); Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 50 (same). In this case, Rambus does not 
dispute the nature of the relevant markets or that its patent rights in the four 
relevant technologies give it monopoly power in each of those markets. The 
critical question is whether Rambus engaged in exclusionary conduct, and 
thereby acquired its monopoly power in the relevant markets unlawfully. 
 
 To answer that question, we adhere to two antitrust principles that guided 
us in Microsoft. First, “to be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist's act 
must have ‘anticompetitive effect.’ That is, it must harm the 
competitive process and thereby harm consumers. In contrast, harm to one 
or more competitors will not suffice.” 
 
The Commission held that Rambus engaged in exclusionary conduct 
consisting of misrepresentations, omissions, and other practices that 
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deceived JEDEC about the nature and scope of its patent interests while the 
organization standardized technologies covered by those interests.  Had 
Rambus fully disclosed its intellectual property, “JEDEC either would have 
excluded Rambus's patented technologies from the JEDEC DRAM 
standards, or would have demanded RAND assurances, with an opportunity 
for ex ante licensing negotiations.”  But the Commission did not determine 
that one or the other of these two possible outcomes was the more likely. 
The Commission's conclusion that Rambus's conduct was exclusionary 
depends, therefore, on a syllogism: Rambus avoided one of two outcomes 
by not disclosing its patent interests; the avoidance of either of those 
outcomes was anticompetitive; therefore Rambus's nondisclosure was 
anticompetitive. 
 
We assume without deciding that avoidance of the first of these possible 
outcomes was indeed anticompetitive; that is, that if Rambus's more 
complete disclosure would have caused JEDEC to adopt a different (open, 
non-proprietary) standard, then its failure to disclose harmed competition 
and would support a monopolization claim. But while we can assume that 
Rambus's nondisclosure made the adoption of its technologies somewhat 
more likely than broad disclosure would have, the Commission made clear 
in its remedial opinion that there was insufficient evidence 
that JEDEC would have standardized other technologies had it known the 
full scope of Rambus's intellectual property. See Remedy Op. 12. Therefore, 
for the Commission's syllogism to survive-and for the Commission to have 
carried its burden of proving that Rambus's conduct had an anticompetitive 
effect-we must also be convinced that if Rambus's conduct merely enabled 
it to avoid the other possible outcome, namely JEDEC's obtaining 
assurances from Rambus of RAND licensing terms, such conduct, alone, 
could be said to harm competition. 
 
 Deceptive conduct-like any other kind-must have an anticompetitive 
effect in order to form the basis of a monopolization claim. “Even an act of 
pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, without 
more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws,” without proof of “a 
dangerous probability that [the defendant] would monopolize a particular 
market.” Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 225. Even if deception raises the price 
secured by a seller, but does so without harming competition, it is beyond 
the antitrust laws' reach. Cases that recognize deception as exclusionary 
hinge, therefore, on whether the conduct impaired rivals in a manner 
tending to bring about or protect a defendant's monopoly power. 
In Microsoft, for example, we found Microsoft engaged in anticompetitive 
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conduct when it tricked independent software developers into believing that 
its software development tools could be used to design cross-platform Java 
applications when, in fact, they produced Windows-specific ones. The 
deceit had caused “developers who were opting for portability over 
performance ... unwittingly [to write] Java applications that [ran] only on 
Windows.” 253 F.3d at 76. The focus of our antitrust scrutiny, therefore, 
was properly placed on the resulting harms to competition rather than the 
deception itself…. 
 
But an otherwise lawful monopolist's use of deception simply to obtain 
higher prices normally has no particular tendency to exclude rivals and thus 
to diminish competition. Consider, for example, NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, 
Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998), in which the Court addressed 
the antitrust implications of allegations that NYNEX's subsidiary, New 
York Telephone Company, a lawful monopoly provider of local telephone 
services, charged its customers higher prices as result of fraudulent conduct 
in the market for the service of removing outdated telephone switching 
equipment (called “removal services”). Discon had alleged that New York 
Telephone (through its corporate affiliate, Materiel Enterprises) switched its 
purchases of removal services from Discon to a higher-priced independent 
firm (AT & T Technologies). Materiel Enterprises would pass the higher 
fees on to New York Telephone, which in turn passed them on to customers 
through higher rates approved by regulators. The nub of the deception, 
Discon alleged, was that AT & T Technologies would provide Materiel 
Enterprises with a special rebate at year's end, which it would then share 
with NYNEX. Id. By thus hoodwinking the regulators, the scam raised 
prices for consumers; Discon, which refused to play the rebate game, was 
driven out of business. Discon alleged that this arrangement was 
anticompetitive and constituted both an agreement in restraint of trade in 
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act and a conspiracy to monopolize the 
market for removal services in violation of § 2.  
 
As to Discon's § 1 claim, the Court held that where a single buyer favors 
one supplier over another for an improper reason, the plaintiff must “allege 
and prove harm, not just to a single competitor, but to the competitive 
process.” Id. at 135; see generally id. at 133-37. Nor, as Justice Breyer 
wrote for a unanimous Court, would harm to the consumers in the form of 
higher prices change the matter: “We concede Discon's claim that the 
[defendants'] behavior hurt consumers by raising telephone service rates. 
But that consumer injury naturally flowed not so much from a less 
competitive market for removal services, as from the exercise of market 
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power that is lawfully in the hands of a monopolist, namely, New York 
Telephone, combined with a deception worked upon the regulatory agency 
that prevented the agency from controlling New York Telephone's exercise 
of its monopoly power.” Id. at 136. 
 
Because Discon based its § 2 claim on the very same allegations of fraud, 
the Court vacated the appellate court's decision to uphold that claim because 
“[u]nless those agreements harmed the competitive process, they did not 
amount to a conspiracy to monopolize.” …. 
 
While the Commission's brief doesn't mention NYNEX, much less try to 
distinguish it, it does cite Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,501 F.3d 297 
(3d Cir. 2007), which in turn had cited the Commission's own “landmark” 
decision in the case under review here, Id. at 311.There the court held that a 
patent holder's intentionally false promise to a standard-setting organization 
that it would license its technology on RAND terms, “coupled with [the 
organization's] reliance on that promise when including the technology in a 
standard,” was anticompetitive conduct, on the ground that it increased “the 
likelihood that patent rights will confer monopoly power on the patent 
holder.” Id. at 314; accord id. at 315-16. To the extent that the ruling (which 
simply reversed a grant of dismissal) rested on the argument that deceit 
lured the SSO away from non-proprietary technology, see id., it cannot help 
the Commission in view of its inability to find that Rambus's behavior 
caused JEDEC's choice; to the extent that it may have rested on a 
supposition that there is a cognizable violation of the Sherman Act when a 
lawful monopolist's deceit has the effect of raising prices (without an effect 
on competitive structure), it conflicts with NYNEX. 
 
Here, the Commission expressly left open the likelihood 
that JEDEC would have standardized Rambus's technologies even if 
Rambus had disclosed its intellectual property. Under this 
hypothesis, JEDEC lost only an opportunity to secure a RAND commitment 
from Rambus. But loss of such a commitment is not a harm to competition 
from alternative technologies in the relevant markets. See 2 Hovenkamp et 
al., IP & Antitrust § 35.5 at 35-45 (Supp. 2008) [hereinafter “IP 
& Antitrust”] (“[A]n antitrust plaintiff must establish that the standard-
setting organization would not have adopted the standard in question but for 
the misrepresentation or omission.”). Indeed, had JEDEC limited Rambus 
to reasonable royalties and required it to provide licenses on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, we would expect less competition from alternative 
technologies, not more; high prices and constrained output tend to attract 
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competitors, not to repel them. 
 
Scholars in the field have urged that if nondisclosure to an SSO enables a 
participant to obtain higher royalties than would otherwise have been 
attainable, the “overcharge can properly constitute competitive harm 
attributable to the nondisclosure,” as the overcharge “will distort 
competition in the downstream market.” 2 Hovenkamp, et al., IP 
& Antitrust § 35.5 at 35-47. The contention that price-raising deception has 
downstream effects is surely correct, but that consequence was equally 
surely true in NYNEX (though perhaps on a smaller scale) and equally 
obvious to the Court. The Commission makes the related contention that 
because the ability to profitably restrict output and set supracompetitive 
prices is the sine qua non of monopoly power, any conduct that permits a 
monopolist to avoid constraints on the exercise of that power must be 
anticompetitive. But again, as in NYNEX, an otherwise lawful monopolist's 
end-run around price constraints, even when deceptive or fraudulent, does 
not alone present a harm to competition in the monopolized market. 
 
Thus, if JEDEC, in the world that would have existed but for Rambus's 
deception, would have standardized the very same technologies, Rambus's 
alleged deception cannot be said to have had an effect on competition in 
violation of the antitrust laws; JEDEC's loss of an opportunity to seek 
favorable licensing terms is not as such an antitrust harm. Yet the 
Commission did not reject this as being a possible-perhaps even the more 
probable-effect of Rambus's conduct. We hold, therefore, that the 
Commission failed to demonstrate that Rambus's conduct was exclusionary, 
and thus to establish its claim that Rambus unlawfully monopolized the 
relevant markets. 
 
* * * 
Our conclusion that the Commission failed to demonstrate that Rambus 
inflicted any harm on competition requires vacatur of the Commission's 
orders. But the original complaint also included a count charging Rambus 
with other unfair methods of competition in violation of § 5(a) of the FTC 
Act. While the Commission dropped this aspect of its case and focused on a 
theory of liability premised on unlawful monopolization, see Liability Op. 
at 27 n. 124, at least one Commissioner suggested that a “stand-alone” § 5 
action would have had a “broader province” than a Sherman Act case. See 
Concurring Opinion of Commissioner Jon Leibowitz at 18, 21, Docket No. 
9302 (Jul. 31, 2006). Because of the chance of further proceedings on 
remand, we express briefly our serious concerns about strength of the 
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evidence relied on to support some of the Commission's crucial findings 
regarding the scope of JEDEC's patent disclosure policies and Rambus's 
alleged violation of those policies. 
 
In noting our concerns, we recognize, of course, that the Commission's 
findings are conclusive so long as they are supported by substantial 
evidence. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(c); see also Polygram Holding, 416 F.3d at 
33. The Commission's findings are murky on both the relevant margins: 
what JEDEC's disclosure policies were, and what, within those mandates, 
Rambus failed to disclose. 
 
First, the Commission evidently could find that Rambus 
violated JEDEC's disclosure policies only by relying quite significantly on 
participants' having been obliged to disclose their work in progress 
on potential amendments to pending applications, as that work became 
pertinent. The Commission's counsel confirmed as much at oral argument. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 37-38. Indeed, the parties stipulated that as 
of Rambus's last JEDEC meeting it held no patents that were essential to the 
manufacture or use of devices complying with any JEDEC standard, and 
that when JEDEC issued the SDRAM standard Rambus had no pending 
patent claims that would necessarily have been infringed by a device 
compliant with that standard.  
 
The case appears (and we emphasize appears, as the Commission's 
opinion leaves us uncertain of its real view) to turn on the idea 
that JEDEC participants were obliged to disclose not merely relevant 
patents and patent applications, but also their work in progress on 
amendments to pending applications that included new patent claims. We 
do not see in the record any formal finding that the policies were so broad, 
but the Commission's opinion points to testimony of witnesses that might be 
the basis of such a finding. Five former JC 42.3 participants testified (in 
some cases ambiguously) that they understood JEDEC's written policies, 
requiring the disclosure of pending applications, to also include a duty to 
disclose work in progress on unfiled amendments to those applications, 
and JEDEC's general counsel testified that he believed a firm was 
required to disclose plans to amend if supported by the firm's current 
interpretation of an extant application. JEDEC participants did not have 
unanimous recollections on this point, however, and the Commission noted 
that another JC 42.3 member testified that there was no duty to disclose 
work on future filings. 
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Reading these statements as interpretations of JEDEC's written policies 
seems to significantly stretch the policies' language. The most disclosure-
friendly of those policies is JEDEC Manual No. 21-I, published in October 
1993, which refers to “the obligation of all participants to inform the 
meeting of any knowledge they may have of any patents, or pending 
patents, that might be involved in the work they are undertaking.” CX 208 
at 19; see also id. at 19 (“For the purpose of this policy, the word ‘patented’ 
also includes items and processes for which a patent has been applied and 
may be pending.”), 27 (referring to “technical information covered by [a] 
patent or pending patent”). This language speaks fairly clearly of disclosure 
obligations related to patents and pending patent applications, but says 
nothing of unfiled work in progress on potential amendments to patent 
applications. We don't see how a few strands of trial testimony would 
persuade the Commission to read this language more broadly, especially as 
at least two of the five participants cited merely stated that disclosure 
obligations reached anything in the patent “process”-which leaves open the 
question of when that “process” can be said to begin. See Joint Appendix 
1908-09 (testimony of Desi Rhoden); id. at 2038 (testimony of Brett 
Williams). 
 
Alternatively, to the extent the Commission reads this testimony not to 
broaden the interpretation of Manual 21-I, but rather to provide evidence of 
disclosure expectations that extended beyond those incorporated into 
written policies, a different problem may arise. As the Federal Circuit has 
said, JEDEC's patent disclosure policies suffered from “a staggering lack of 
defining details.” Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 
1102 (Fed.Cir.2003); see also Liability Op. at 52 (stating that the record 
shows that JEDEC's patent policies “are not a model of clarity”). Even 
assuming that any evidence of unwritten disclosure expectations would 
survive a possible narrowing effect based upon the written directive of 
Manual 21-I, the vagueness of any such expectations would nonetheless 
remain an obstacle. One would expect that disclosure expectations 
ostensibly requiring competitors to share information that they would 
otherwise vigorously protect as trade secrets would provide “clear 
guidance” and “define clearly what, when, how, and to whom the members 
must disclose.” Infineon, 318 F.3d at 1102. This need for clarity seems 
especially acute where disclosure of those trade secrets itself implicates 
antitrust concerns; JEDEC involved, after all, collaboration 
by competitors. Cf. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 
U.S. 492, 500 (1988) (stating that because SSO members have incentives to 
restrain competition, such organizations “have traditionally been objects 
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of antitrust scrutiny”); Am Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 
U.S. 556, 571 (1982) (noting that SSOs are “rife with opportunities for 
anticompetitive activity”). In any event, the more vague and muddled a 
particular expectation of disclosure, the more difficult it should be for the 
Commission to ascribe competitive harm to its breach. See 2 IP 
& Antitrust § 35.5 at 35-51 (“[A]lthough antitrust can serve as a useful 
check on abuses of the standard-setting process, it cannot substitute for a 
general enforcement regime for disclosure rules.”). 
 
The Commission's conclusion that Rambus engaged in deceptive conduct 
affecting the inclusion of on-chip PLL/DLL and dual-edge clocking in the 
DDR SDRAM standard, which JEDEC adopted more than two years after 
Rambus's last JC 42.3 meeting, presents an additional, independent concern. 
To support this conclusion, the Commission looked to a technical 
presentation made to JC 42.3 in September 1994, and the survey balloting 
of that committee in October 1995 on whether to proceed with the 
consideration of particular features (including the two Rambus technologies 
ultimately adopted), finding that Rambus deliberately failed to disclose 
patent interests in any of the named technologies. Liability Op. 42-44. This 
finding is evidently the basis, so far as DDR SDRAM is concerned, of its 
conclusion that Rambus breached a duty to disclose. 
 
Once again, the Commission has taken an aggressive interpretation of 
rather weak evidence. For example, the October 1995 survey ballot gauged 
participant interest in a range of technologies and did not ask those 
surveyed about their intellectual property (as did the more formal ballots on 
proposed standards). See CX 260. The Commission nonetheless believes 
that every member of JC 42.3-membership that included most of the 
DRAM industry-was duty-bound to disclose any potential patents they were 
working on that related to any of the questions posed by the survey. The 
record shows, however, that the only company that made a disclosure at the 
next meeting was the one that formally presented the survey results. See 
Liability Op. at 44-45; ALJ Op. at 58 ¶ 401 (citing Joint Exhibit 28, at 6). 
For reasons similar to those that make vague but broad disclosure 
obligations among competitors unlikely, it seems to us unlikely that 
JEDEC participants placed themselves under such a sweeping and early 
duty to disclose, triggered by the mere chance that a technology might 
someday (in this case, more than two years later) be formally proposed for 
standardization. 
 
* * * 
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We set aside the Commission's orders and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  Other aspects of the standard setting process are covered in Chapter 
Nine. 
   
     2.  Spoliation and the Duty to Preserve. As noted earlier, Rambus did not 
initially file its patent application with claims explicitly directed at 
SDRAM, however, after Rambus decide to leave JEDEC, it amended its 
claims to cover the SDRAM technology adopted as the standard by JEDEC. 
As one may be able to assume, the patents stemming from the original 
application and its amendments have been the subjects of numerous suits. 
Recently, the Federal Circuit issued opinions addressing Rambus’s alleged 
spoliation of relevant evidence for patents claiming priority to the 
07/510,898 application. Prior the Federal Circuits decision, the District of 
Delaware and the Northern District of Califorina courts issued two 
inconsistent opinions regarding Rambus’s duty to preserve evidence. See 
Micoron Technology, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
and Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.2d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
The facts of both cases uncovered that Rambus established a 
document retention policy as an integral part its litigation strategy against 
probable infringers of its patents in April of 1998. Micron, 645 F.3d at 
1316-18. Additionally, throughout the year, Rambus destroyed email 
backup tapes and in September it held its first “Shed Day,” destroying 400 
boxes of documents. Id. at 18. In June 1999, the first patent suit was filed.  
 
In Micron, a Delaware court had held that Rambus committed 
intentional spoliation and declared several of its patents unenforceable. 
Micron, 645 F.3d at 1322.  In Hynix, a California court concluded that 
Rambus destroyed documents before the duty to preserve, thus no spoliation 
had occurred. Hynix, 645 F.3d at 1347. 
 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Delaware’s court’s spoliation findings, 
while reversing and remanding for a remedy.  But the court reversed the 
California court’s decision, remanding for reconsideration of the spoliation 
issue. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit declared that whether litigation is 
reasonably foreseeable and thus triggers a duty to preserve is an “objective 
standard, asking not whether the party in fact reasonably foresaw litigation, 
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but whether a reasonable party in the same factual circumstances would 
have reasonably foreseen litigation.” Micron, 645 F.3d at 1320-21. The 
Federal Circuit then went on to explain that the reasonably foreseeable test 
is “a flexible fact-specific standard,” and does not trigger the duty to 
preserve when litigation is merely possible or “from the mere existence of a 
potential claim.” Additionally, the court rejected the standard that litigation 
be “imminent, or probable without significant contingencies.” Hynix, 645 
F.3d at 1345.  
 
The Federal Circuit made clear that there is a duty to preserve relevant 
evidence but what exactly does “relevant” entail? Rule 26(b)(1) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure define the scope of discovery as “any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense - 
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location 
of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of 
persons who know of any discoverable matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 
Additionally, the Federal Circuit has held that “relevance” under Rule 
26(b)(1) “is construed more broadly for discovery that for trial[,]” and that 
in most instances, the trial court should err on side of permitting discovery. 
Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro-Air Eng’g, 813 F.2d 1207, 1211-12 (Fed. Cir. 
1987).  
Considering the definitions provided by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Federal Circuit, what impact do you think a Walker 
Process or sham litigation claim will have on discovery? 
 
 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT SETTLEMENTS AND "PAY 
FOR DELAY" 
 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. ACTAVIS, INC. 
133 S.Ct. 2223 (2013) 
 
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, 
GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ROBERTS, C.J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined. 
ALITO, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
 
Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
 Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The two 
companies settle under terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed 
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infringer, not to produce the patented product until the patent's term expires, 
and (2) Company A, the patentee, to pay B many millions of dollars. 
Because the settlement requires the patentee to pay the alleged infringer, 
rather than the other way around, this kind of settlement agreement is often 
called a “reverse payment” settlement agreement. And the basic question 
here is whether such an agreement can sometimes unreasonably diminish 
competition in violation of the antitrust laws.... 
 
 In this case, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed a Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) complaint claiming that a particular reverse payment 
settlement agreement violated the antitrust laws. In doing so, the Circuit 
stated that a reverse payment settlement agreement generally is “immune 
from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the 
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.” And since the alleged 
infringer's promise not to enter the patentee's market expired before the 
patent's term ended, the Circuit found the agreement legal and dismissed the 
FTC complaint.  In our view, however, reverse payment settlements such as 
the agreement alleged in the complaint before us can sometimes violate the 
antitrust laws. We consequently hold that the Eleventh Circuit should have 




 Apparently most if not all reverse payment settlement agreements 
arise in the context of pharmaceutical drug regulation, and specifically in 
the context of suits brought under statutory provisions allowing a generic 
drug manufacturer (seeking speedy marketing approval) to challenge the 
validity of a patent owned by an already-approved brand-name drug owner. 
See Brief for Petitioner 29; 12 P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 
2046, p. 338 (3d ed. 2012) (hereinafter Areeda); Hovenkamp, Sensible 
Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F.L.Rev. 11, 24 
(2004). We consequently describe four key features of the relevant drug-
regulatory framework established by the Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1585, as amended. That Act is 
commonly known as the Hatch–Waxman Act. 
 
 First, a drug manufacturer, wishing to market a new prescription 
drug, must submit a New Drug Application to the federal Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and undergo a long, comprehensive, and costly 
testing process, after which, if successful, the manufacturer will receive 
marketing approval from the FDA. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (requiring, 
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among other things, “full reports of investigations” into safety and 
effectiveness; “a full list of the articles used as components”; and a “full 
description” of how the drug is manufactured, processed, and packed). 
 
 Second, once the FDA has approved a brand-name drug for 
marketing, a manufacturer of a generic drug can obtain similar marketing 
approval through use of abbreviated procedures. The Hatch–Waxman Act 
permits a generic manufacturer to file an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application specifying that the generic has the “same active ingredients as,” 
and is “biologically equivalent” to, the already-approved brand-name 
drug....  In this way the generic manufacturer can obtain approval while 
avoiding the “costly and time-consuming studies” needed to obtain approval 
“for a pioneer drug.”... The Hatch–Waxman process, by allowing the 
generic to piggy-back on the pioneer's approval efforts, “speed[s] the 
introduction of low-cost generic drugs to market,” thereby furthering drug 
competition. 
 
 Third, the Hatch–Waxman Act sets forth special procedures for 
identifying, and resolving, related patent disputes. It requires the pioneer 
brand-name manufacturer to list in its New Drug Application the “number 
and the expiration date” of any relevant patent. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). 
And it requires the generic manufacturer in its Abbreviated New Drug 
Application to “assure the FDA” that the generic “will not infringe” the 
brand-name's patents.... 
 
 [The generic] can certify that any relevant patents have expired. It 
can request approval to market beginning when any still-in-force patents 
expire. Or, it can certify that any listed, relevant patent “is invalid or will 
not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale” of the drug described in 
the Abbreviated New Drug Application. Taking this last-mentioned route 
(called the “paragraph IV” route), automatically counts as patent 
infringement...  and often “means provoking litigation.”.... If the brand-
name patentee brings an infringement suit within 45 days, the FDA then 
must withhold approving the generic, usually for a 30–month period, while 
the parties litigate patent validity (or infringement) in court. If the courts 
decide the matter within that period, the FDA follows that determination; if 
they do not, the FDA may go forward and give approval to market the 
generic product. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 
 Fourth, Hatch–Waxman provides a special incentive for a generic to 
be the first to file an Abbreviated New Drug Application taking the 
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paragraph IV route. That applicant will enjoy a period of 180 days of 
exclusivity (from the first commercial marketing of its drug). See § 
355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (establishing exclusivity period). During that period of 
exclusivity no other generic can compete with the brand-name drug. If the 
first-to-file generic manufacturer can overcome any patent obstacle and 
bring the generic to market, this 180–day period of exclusivity can prove 
valuable, possibly “worth several hundred million dollars.” Hemphill, 
Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design 
Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1553, 1579 (2006)....  The 180–day exclusivity 
period, however, can belong only to the first generic to file. Should that 
first-to-file generic forfeit the exclusivity right in one of the ways specified 




 In 1999, Solvay Pharmaceuticals, a respondent here, filed a New 
Drug Application for a brand-name drug called AndroGel. The FDA 
approved the application in 2000. In 2003, Solvay obtained a relevant patent 
and disclosed that fact to the FDA, 677 F.3d, at 1308, as Hatch–Waxman 
requires.... 
 
 Later the same year another respondent, Actavis, Inc. (then known 
as Watson Pharmaceuticals), filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application 
for a generic drug modeled after AndroGel. Subsequently, Paddock 
Laboratories, also a respondent, separately filed an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application for its own generic product. Both Actavis and Paddock certified 
under paragraph IV that Solvay's listed patent was invalid and their drugs 
did not infringe it. A fourth manufacturer, Par Pharmaceutical, likewise a 
respondent, did not file an application of its own but joined forces with 
Paddock, agreeing to share the patent litigation costs in return for a share of 
profits if Paddock obtained approval for its generic drug. 
 
 Solvay initiated paragraph IV patent litigation against Actavis and 
Paddock. Thirty months later the FDA approved Actavis' first-to-file 
generic product, but, in 2006, the patent-litigation parties all settled. Under 
the terms of the settlement Actavis agreed that it would not bring its generic 
to market until August 31, 2015, 65 months before Solvay's patent expired 
(unless someone else marketed a generic sooner). Actavis also agreed to 
promote AndroGel to urologists. The other generic manufacturers made 
roughly similar promises. And Solvay agreed to pay millions of dollars to 
each generic—$12 million in total to Paddock; $60 million in total to Par; 
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and an estimated $19–$30 million annually, for nine years, to Actavis. See 
App. 46, 49–50, Complaint ¶¶ 66, 77. The companies described these 
payments as compensation for other services the generics promised to 
perform, but the FTC contends the other services had little value. According 
to the FTC the true point of the payments was to compensate the generics 
for agreeing not to compete against AndroGel until 2015. See id., at 50–53, 
Complaint ¶¶ 81–85. 
 
2 
On January 29, 2009, the FTC filed this lawsuit against all the settling 
parties, namely, Solvay, Actavis, Paddock, and Par. The FTC's complaint 
(as since amended) alleged that respondents violated § 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, by unlawfully agreeing “to share in 
Solvay's monopoly profits, abandon their patent challenges, and refrain 
from launching their low-cost generic products to compete with AndroGel 
for nine years.” ..  The District Court held that these allegations did not set 
forth an antitrust law violation.... 
 
 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District 
Court. It wrote that “absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, 
a reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so long as its 
anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of 
the patent.” 677 F.3d, at 1312. The court recognized that “antitrust laws 
typically prohibit agreements where one company pays a potential 
competitor not to enter the market.” See also Palmer, 498 U.S., at 50 
(agreement to divide territorial markets held “unlawful on its face”). But, 
the court found that “reverse payment settlements of patent litigation 
presen[t] atypical cases because one of the parties owns a patent.”... Patent 
holders have a “lawful right to exclude others from the market”; thus a 
patent “conveys the right to cripple competition.”  The court recognized 
that, if the parties to this sort of case do not settle, a court might declare the 
patent invalid.  But, in light of the public policy favoring settlement of 
disputes (among other considerations) it held that the courts could not 
require the parties to continue to litigate in order to avoid antitrust liability. 
 
 The FTC sought certiorari. Because different courts have reached 
different conclusions about the application of the antitrust laws to Hatch–
Waxman–related patent settlements, we granted the FTC's petition. 
Compare, e.g., id., at 1312 (case below) (settlements generally “immune 
from antitrust attack”); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust 
Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323, 1332–1337 (C.A.Fed.2008) (similar); In re 
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Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 212–213 (C.A.2 
2006) (similar), with In re K–Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 197, 214–





 Solvay's patent, if valid and infringed, might have permitted it to 
charge drug prices sufficient to recoup the reverse settlement payments it 
agreed to make to its potential generic competitors. And we are willing to 
take this fact as evidence that the agreement's “anticompetitive effects fall 
within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”   But we do not 
agree that that fact, or characterization, can immunize the agreement from 
antitrust attack. 
 
 For one thing, to refer, as the Circuit referred, simply to what the 
holder of a valid patent could do does not by itself  answer the antitrust 
question. The patent here may or may not be valid, and may or may not be 
infringed. “[A] valid patent excludes all except its owner from the use of the 
protected process or product,” United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 
287, 308 (1948).  And that exclusion may permit the patent owner to charge 
a higher-than-competitive price for the patented product. But an invalidated 
patent carries with it no such right. And even a valid patent confers no right 
to exclude products or processes that do not actually infringe. The 
paragraph IV litigation in this case put the patent's validity at issue, as well 
as its actual preclusive scope. The parties' settlement ended that litigation. 
The FTC alleges that in substance, the plaintiff agreed to pay the defendants 
many millions of dollars to stay out of its market, even though the 
defendants did not have any claim that the plaintiff was liable to them for 
damages. That form of settlement is unusual. And, for reasons discussed in 
Part II–B, infra, there is reason for concern that settlements taking this form 
tend to have significant adverse effects on competition. 
 
 Given these factors, it would be incongruous to determine antitrust 
legality by measuring the settlement's anticompetitive effects solely against 
patent law policy, rather than by measuring them against procompetitive 
antitrust policies as well. And indeed, contrary to the Circuit's view that the 
only pertinent question is whether “the settlement agreement ... fall[s] 
within” the legitimate “scope” of the patent's “exclusionary potential,” this 
Court has indicated that patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in 
determining the “scope of the patent monopoly”—and consequently 
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antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent. 
 
 Thus, the Court in Line Material explained that “the improper use of 
[a patent] monopoly,” is “invalid” under the antitrust laws and resolved the 
antitrust question in that case by seeking an accommodation “between the 
lawful restraint on trade of the patent monopoly and the illegal restraint 
prohibited broadly by the Sherman Act.” To strike that balance, the Court 
asked questions such as whether “the patent statute specifically gives a 
right” to restrain competition in the manner challenged; and whether 
“competition is impeded to a greater degree” by the restraint at issue than 
other restraints previously approved as reasonable. See also United States v. 
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 390–391 (1948) (courts must 
“balance the privileges of [the patent holder] and its licensees under the 
patent grants with the prohibitions of the Sherman Act against combinations 
and attempts to monopolize”).... In short, rather than measure the length or 
amount of a restriction solely against the length of the patent's term or its 
earning potential, as the Court of Appeals apparently did here, this Court 
answered the antitrust question by considering traditional antitrust factors 
such as likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, market power, and 
potentially offsetting legal considerations present in the circumstances, such 
as here those related to patents. See Part II–B, infIra. Whether a particular 
restraint lies “beyond the limits of the patent monopoly” is a conclusion that 
flows from that analysis and not, as the Chief Justice suggests, its starting 
point. Post, at 2239, 2241 – 2242 (dissenting opinion). 
 
 For another thing, this Court's precedents make clear that patent-
related settlement agreements can sometimes violate the antitrust laws. In 
United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963), for example, two 
sewing machine companies possessed competing patent claims; a third 
company sought a patent under circumstances where doing so might lead to 
the disclosure of information that would invalidate the other two firms' 
patents. All three firms settled their patent-related disagreements while 
assigning the broadest claims to the firm best able to enforce the patent 
against yet other potential competitors. The Court did not examine whether, 
on the assumption that all three patents were valid, patent law would have 
allowed the patents' holders to do the same. Rather, emphasizing that the 
Sherman Act “imposes strict limitations on the concerted activities in which 
patent owners may lawfully engage,” it held that the agreements, although 
settling patent disputes, violated the antitrust laws.  And that, in important 
part, was because “the public interest in granting patent monopolies” exists 
only to the extent that “the public is given a novel and useful invention” in 
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“consideration for its grant.” Id., at 199 (White, J., concurring). See also 
United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 378 (1952) (applying 
antitrust scrutiny to patent settlement); Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United 
States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931) (same). 
 
 Similarly, both within the settlement context and without, the Court 
has struck down overly restrictive patent licensing agreements—irrespective 
of whether those agreements produced supra-patent-permitted revenues. We 
concede that in United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 
(1926), the Court permitted a single patentee to grant to a single licensee a 
license containing a minimum resale price requirement. But in Line 
Material, supra, the Court held that the antitrust laws forbid a group of 
patentees, each owning one or more patents, to cross-license each other, 
and, in doing so, to insist that each licensee maintain retail prices set 
collectively by the patent holders. The Court was willing to presume that 
the single-patentee practice approved in General Electric was a “reasonable 
restraint” that “accords with the patent monopoly granted by the patent 
law,” but declined to extend that conclusion to multiple-patentee 
agreements: “As the Sherman Act prohibits agreements to fix prices, any 
arrangement between patentees runs afoul of that prohibition and is outside 
the patent monopoly.”  In New Wrinkle, 342 U.S., at 378, the Court held 
roughly the same, this time in respect to a similar arrangement in settlement 
of a litigation between two patentees, each of which contended that its own 
patent gave it the exclusive right to control production. That one or the 
other company (we may presume) was right about its patent did not lead the 
Court to confer antitrust immunity. Far from it, the agreement was found to 
violate the Sherman Act. 
 
 Finally in Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), the Court upheld cross-
licensing agreements among patentees that settled actual and impending 
patent litigation, 283 U.S., at 168, which agreements set royalty rates to be 
charged third parties  for a license to practice all the patents at issue (and 
which divided resulting revenues).  But, in doing so, Justice Brandeis, 
writing for the Court, warned that such an arrangement would have violated 
the Sherman Act had the patent holders thereby “dominate[d]” the industry 
and “curtail[ed] the manufacture and supply of an unpatented product.”  
These cases do not simply ask whether a hypothetically valid patent's holder 
would be able to charge, e.g., the high prices that the challenged patent-
related term allowed. Rather, they seek to accommodate patent and antitrust 
policies, finding challenged terms and conditions unlawful unless patent 
law policy offsets the antitrust law policy strongly favoring competition. 
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 Thus, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, there is nothing novel 
about our approach. What does appear novel are the dissent's suggestions 
that a patent holder may simply “pa[y] a competitor to respect its patent” 
and quit its patent invalidity or noninfringement claim without any antitrust 
scrutiny whatever, and that “such settlements ... are a well-known feature of 
intellectual property litigation.”  Closer examination casts doubt on these 
claims. The dissent does not identify any patent statute that it understands to 
grant such a right to a patentee, whether expressly or by fair implication. It 
would be difficult to reconcile the proposed right with the patent-related 
policy of eliminating unwarranted patent grants so the public will not 
“continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without 
need or justification.” Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969). 
 
 And the authorities cited for this proposition (none from this Court, 
and none an antitrust case) are not on point. Some of them say that when 
Company A sues Company B for patent infringement and demands, say, 
$100 million in damages, it is not uncommon for B (the defendant) to pay A 
(the plaintiff) some amount less than the full demand as part of the 
settlement—$40 million, for example. See Schildkraut, Patent–Splitting 
Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71 Antitrust L.J. 1033, 1046 
(2004) (suggesting that this hypothetical settlement includes “an implicit net 
payment” from A to B of $60 million— i.e., the amount of the settlement 
discount). The cited authorities also indicate that if B has a counterclaim for 
damages against A, the original infringement plaintiff, A might end up 
paying B to settle B's counterclaim. Cf. Metro–Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. v. 007 
Safety Prods., Inc., 183 F.3d 10, 13 (C.A.1 1999) (describing trademark 
dispute and settlement). Insofar as the dissent urges that settlements taking 
these commonplace forms have not been thought for that reason alone 
subject to antitrust liability, we agree, and do not intend to alter that 
understanding. But the dissent appears also to suggest that reverse payment 
settlements— e.g., in which A, the plaintiff, pays money to defendant B 
purely so B will give up the patent fight—should be viewed for antitrust 
purposes in the same light as these familiar settlement forms. See post, at 
2231 – 2232. We cannot agree. In the traditional examples cited above, a 
party with a claim (or counterclaim) for damages receives a sum equal to or 
less than the value of its claim. In reverse payment settlements, in contrast, 
a party with no claim for damages (something that is usually true of a 
paragraph IV litigation defendant) walks away with money simply so it will 
stay away from the patentee's market. That, we think, is something quite 
different. Cf. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
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Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) (“[C]ollusion” is “the supreme evil 
of antitrust”). 
 
 Finally, the Hatch–Waxman Act itself does not embody a statutory 
policy that supports the Eleventh Circuit's view. Rather, the general 
procompetitive thrust of the statute, its specific provisions facilitating 
challenges to a patent's validity, see Part I–A, supra, and its later-added 
provisions requiring parties to a patent dispute triggered by a paragraph IV 
filing to report settlement terms to the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice, all suggest the contrary. Those interested in 
legislative history may also wish to examine the statements of individual 
Members of Congress condemning reverse payment settlements in advance 
of the 2003 amendments. See, e.g., 148 Cong. Rec. 14437 (2002) (remarks 
of Sen. Hatch) (“It was and is very clear that the [Hatch–Waxman Act] was 
not designed to allow deals between brand and generic companies to delay 
competition”); 146 Cong. Rec. 18774 (2000) (remarks of Rep. Waxman) 
(introducing bill to deter companies from “strik[ing] collusive agreements 
to trade multimillion dollar payoffs by the brand company for delays in the 
introduction of lower cost, generic alternatives”). 
 
B 
 The Eleventh Circuit's conclusion finds some degree of support in a 
general legal policy favoring the settlement of disputes. ...  The Circuit's 
related underlying practical concern consists of its fear that antitrust 
scrutiny of a reverse payment agreement would require the parties to litigate 
the validity of the patent in order to demonstrate what would have happened 
to competition in the absence of the settlement. Any such litigation will 
prove time consuming, complex, and expensive. The antitrust game, the 
Circuit may believe, would not be worth that litigation candle. 
 
 We recognize the value of settlements and the patent litigation 
problem. But we nonetheless conclude that this patent-related factor should 
not determine the result here. Rather, five sets of considerations lead us to 
conclude that the FTC should have been given the opportunity to prove its 
antitrust claim. 
 
 First, the specific restraint at issue has the “potential for genuine 
adverse effects on competition.” Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S., at 
460–461 (citing 7 Areeda ¶ 1511, at 429 (1986)). The payment in effect 
amounts to a purchase by the patentee of the exclusive right to sell its 
product, a right it already claims but would lose if the patent litigation were 
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to continue and the patent were held invalid or not infringed by the generic 
product. Suppose, for example, that the exclusive right to sell produces $50 
million in supracompetitive profits per year for the patentee. And suppose 
further that the patent has 10 more years to run. Continued litigation, if it 
results in patent invalidation or a finding of noninfringement, could cost the 
patentee $500 million in lost revenues, a sum that then would flow in large 
part to consumers in the form of lower prices. 
 
 We concede that settlement on terms permitting the patent 
challenger to enter the market before the patent expires would also bring 
about competition, again to the consumer's benefit. But settlement on the 
terms said by the FTC to be at issue here—payment in return for staying out 
of the market—simply keeps prices at patentee-set levels, potentially 
producing the full patent-related $500 million monopoly return while 
dividing that return between the challenged patentee and the patent 
challenger. The patentee and the challenger gain; the consumer loses. 
Indeed, there are indications that patentees sometimes pay a generic 
challenger a sum even larger than what the generic would gain in profits if 
it won the paragraph IV litigation and entered the market. See Hemphill, 81 
N.Y.U. L.Rev., at 1581. See also Brief for 118 Law, Economics, and 
Business Professors et al. as Amici Curiae 25 (estimating that this is true of 
the settlement challenged here). The rationale behind a payment of this size 
cannot in every case be supported by traditional settlement considerations. 
The payment may instead provide strong evidence that the patentee seeks to 
induce the generic challenger to abandon its claim with a share of its 
monopoly profits that would otherwise be lost in the competitive market. 
 
 But, one might ask, as a practical matter would the parties be able to 
enter into such an anticompetitive agreement? Would not a high reverse 
payment signal to other potential challengers that the patentee lacks 
confidence in its patent, thereby provoking additional challenges, perhaps 
too many for the patentee to “buy off?” Two special features of Hatch–
Waxman mean that the answer to this question is “not necessarily so.” First, 
under Hatch–Waxman only the first challenger gains the special advantage 
of 180 days of an exclusive right to sell a generic version of the brand-name 
product. See Part I–A, supra. And as noted, that right has proved valuable—
indeed, it can be worth several hundred million dollars. See Hemphill, 
supra, at 1579; Brief for Petitioner 6. Subsequent challengers cannot secure 
that exclusivity period, and thus stand to win significantly less than the first 
if they bring a successful paragraph IV challenge. That is, if subsequent 
litigation results in invalidation of the patent, or a ruling that the patent is 
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not infringed, that litigation victory will free not just the challenger to 
compete, but all other potential competitors too (once they obtain FDA 
approval). The potential reward available to a subsequent challenger being 
significantly less, the patentee's payment to the initial challenger (in return 
for not pressing the patent challenge) will not necessarily provoke 
subsequent challenges. Second, a generic that files a paragraph IV after 
learning that the first filer has settled will (if sued by the brand-name) have 
to wait out a stay period of (roughly) 30 months before the FDA may 
approve its application, just as the first filer did. See 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(5)(B)(iii). These features together mean that a reverse payment 
settlement with the first filer (or, as in this case, all of the initial filers) 
“removes from consideration the most motivated challenger, and the one 
closest to introducing competition.” Hemphill, supra, at 1586. The dissent 
may doubt these provisions matter, post, at 2234 – 2236, but scholars in the 
field tell us that “where only one party owns a patent, it is virtually unheard 
of outside of pharmaceuticals for that party to pay an accused infringer to 
settle the lawsuit.” 1 H. Hovenkamp, M. Janis, M. Lemley, & C. Leslie, IP 
and Antitrust § 15.3, p. 15–45, n. 161 (2d ed. Supp. 2011). It may well be 
that Hatch–Waxman's unique regulatory framework, including the special 
advantage that the 180–day exclusivity period gives to first filers, does 
much to explain why in this context, but not others, the patentee's ordinary 
incentives to resist paying off challengers ( i.e., the fear of provoking 
myriad other challengers) appear to be more frequently overcome. See 12 
Areeda ¶ 2046, at 341 (3d ed. 2010) (noting that these provisions, no doubt 
unintentionally, have created special incentives for collusion). 
 
 Second, these anticompetitive consequences will at least sometimes 
prove unjustified. See 7 id., ¶ 1504, at 410–415 (3d ed. 2010); California 
Dental Assn. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 786–787 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). As the FTC admits, offsetting or redeeming 
virtues are sometimes present. Brief for Petitioner 37–39. The reverse 
payment, for example, may amount to no more than a rough approximation 
of the litigation expenses saved through the settlement. That payment may 
reflect compensation for other services that the generic has promised to 
perform—such as distributing the patented item or helping to develop a 
market for that item. There may be other justifications. Where a reverse 
payment reflects traditional settlement considerations, such as avoided 
litigation costs or fair value for services, there is not the same concern that a 
patentee is using its monopoly profits to avoid the risk of patent invalidation 
or a finding of noninfringement. In such cases, the parties may have 
provided for a reverse payment without having sought or brought about the 
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anticompetitive consequences we mentioned above. But that possibility 
does not justify dismissing the FTC's complaint. An antitrust defendant may 
show in the antitrust proceeding that legitimate justifications are present, 
thereby explaining the presence of the challenged term and showing the 
lawfulness of that term under the rule of reason. See, e.g., Indiana 
Federation of Dentists, supra, at 459; 7 Areeda ¶¶ 1504a–1504b, at 401–404 
(3d ed. 2010). 
 
 Third, where a reverse payment threatens to work unjustified 
anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the power to bring that 
harm about in practice. See id., ¶ 1503, at 392–393. At least, the “size of the 
payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a prospective generic is itself 
a strong indicator of power”—namely, the power to charge prices higher 
than the competitive level. 12 id., ¶ 2046, at 351. An important patent itself 
helps to assure such power. Neither is a firm without that power likely to 
pay “large sums” to induce “others to stay out of its market.” Ibid. In any 
event, the Commission has referred to studies showing that reverse payment 
agreements are associated with the presence of higher-than-competitive 
profits—a strong indication of market power. 
 
 Fourth, an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible 
administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed. The Circuit's holding 
does avoid the need to litigate the patent's validity (and also, any question of 
infringement). But to do so, it throws the baby out with the bath water, and 
there is no need to take that drastic step. That is because it is normally not 
necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question (unless, 
perhaps, to determine whether the patent litigation is a sham, see 677 F.3d, 
at 1312). An unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally 
suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent's survival. And 
that fact, in turn, suggests that the payment's objective is to maintain 
supracompetitive prices to be shared among the patentee and the challenger 
rather than face what might have been a competitive market—the very 
anticompetitive consequence that underlies the claim of antitrust 
unlawfulness. The owner of a particularly valuable patent might contend, of 
course, that even a small risk of invalidity justifies a large payment. But, be 
that as it may, the payment (if otherwise unexplained) likely seeks to 
prevent the risk of competition. And, as we have said, that consequence 
constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm. In a word, the size of the 
unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a 
patent's  weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed 
exploration of the validity of the patent itself. 12 Areeda ¶ 2046, at 350–
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 Fifth, the fact that a large, unjustified reverse payment risks antitrust 
liability does not prevent litigating parties from settling their lawsuit. They 
may, as in other industries, settle in other ways, for example, by allowing 
the generic manufacturer to enter the patentee's market prior to the patent's 
expiration, without the patentee paying the challenger to stay out prior to 
that point. Although the parties may have reasons to prefer settlements that 
include reverse payments, the relevant antitrust question is: What are those 
reasons? If the basic reason is a desire to maintain and to share patent-
generated monopoly profits, then, in the absence of some other justification, 
the antitrust laws are likely to forbid the arrangement. 
 
 In sum, a reverse payment, where large and unjustified, can bring 
with it the risk of significant anticompetitive effects; one who makes such a 
payment may be unable to explain and to justify it; such a firm or individual 
may well possess market power derived from the patent; a court, by 
examining the size of the payment, may well be able to assess its likely 
anticompetitive effects along with its potential justifications without 
litigating the validity of the patent; and parties may well find ways to settle 
patent disputes without the use of reverse payments. In our view, these 
considerations, taken together, outweigh the single strong consideration—
the desirability of settlements—that led the Eleventh Circuit to provide 




 The FTC urges us to hold that reverse payment settlement 
agreements are presumptively unlawful and that courts reviewing such 
agreements should proceed via a “quick look” approach, rather than 
applying a “rule of reason.” See California Dental, 526 U.S., at 775, n. 12 
(“Quick-look analysis in effect” shifts to “a defendant the burden to show 
empirical evidence of procompetitive effects”); 7 Areeda ¶ 1508, at 435–
440 (3d ed. 2010). We decline to do so. In California Dental, we held 
(unanimously) that abandonment of the “rule of reason” in favor of 
presumptive rules (or a “quick-look” approach) is appropriate only where 
“an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could 
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive 
effect on customers and markets.” 526 U.S., at 770 (BREYER, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). We do not believe that reverse 
payment settlements, in the context we here discuss, meet this criterion. 
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 That is because the likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about 
anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the 
payor's anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other 
services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other 
convincing justification. The existence and degree of any anticompetitive 
consequence may also vary as among industries. These complexities lead us 
to conclude that the FTC must prove its case as in other rule-of-reason 
cases. 
 
 To say this is not to require the courts to insist, contrary to what we 
have said, that the Commission need litigate the patent's validity, 
empirically demonstrate the virtues or vices of the patent system, present 
every possible supporting fact or refute every possible pro-defense theory. 
As a leading antitrust scholar has pointed out, “ ‘[t]here is always something 
of a sliding scale in appraising reasonableness,’” and as such “ ‘the quality 
of proof required should vary with the circumstances.’ ” California Dental, 
supra, at 780 (quoting with approval 7 Areeda ¶ 1507, at 402 (1986)). 
 
 As in other areas of law, trial courts can structure antitrust litigation 
so as to avoid, on the one hand, the use of antitrust theories too abbreviated 
to permit proper analysis, and, on the other, consideration of every possible 
fact or theory irrespective of the minimal light it may shed on the basic 
question—that of the presence of significant unjustified anticompetitive 
consequences. See 7 id., ¶ 1508c, at 438–440. We therefore leave to the 
lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation. 
We reverse the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. And we remand the case 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
 Chief Justice ROBERTS, with whom Justice SCALIA and Justice 
THOMAS join, dissenting. 
 
 Solvay Pharmaceuticals holds a patent. It sued two generic drug 
manufacturers that it alleged were infringing that patent. Those companies 
counterclaimed, contending the patent was invalid and that, in any event, 
their products did not infringe. The parties litigated for three years before 
settling on these terms: Solvay agreed to pay the generics millions of dollars 
and to allow them into the market five years before the patent was set to 
expire; in exchange, the generics agreed to provide certain services (help 
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with marketing and manufacturing) and to honor Solvay's patent. The 
Federal Trade Commission alleges that such a settlement violates the 
antitrust laws. The question is how to assess that claim. 
 
 A patent carves out an exception to the applicability of antitrust 
laws. The correct approach should therefore be to ask whether the 
settlement gives Solvay monopoly power beyond what the patent already 
gave it. The Court, however, departs from this approach, and would instead 
use antitrust law's amorphous rule of reason to inquire into the 
anticompetitive effects of such settlements. This novel approach is without 
support in any statute, and will discourage the settlement of patent 
litigation. I respectfully dissent. 
 
I 
 The point of antitrust law is to encourage competitive markets to 
promote consumer welfare. The point of patent law is to grant limited 
monopolies as a way of encouraging innovation. Thus, a patent grants “the 
right to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention.” Dawson 
Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980). In doing so it 
provides an exception to antitrust law, and the scope of the patent— i.e., the 
rights conferred by the patent—forms the zone within which the patent 
holder may operate without facing antitrust liability. 
 
 This should go without saying, in part because we've said it so many 
times. Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical 
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (“ ‘A patent ... is an exception to the general rule 
against monopolies' ”); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 
300 (1948) (“[T]he precise terms of the grant define the limits of a 
patentee's monopoly and the area in which the patentee is freed from 
competition”); United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 485 (1926) 
(“It is only when ... [the patentee] steps out of the scope of his patent rights” 
that he comes within the operation of the Sherman Act); Simpson v. Union 
Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964) (similar). Thus, although it is per se 
unlawful to fix prices under antitrust law, we have long recognized that a 
patent holder is entitled to license a competitor to sell its product on the 
condition that the competitor charge a certain, fixed price. See, e.g., General 
Elec. Co. 
 
 We have never held that it violates antitrust law for a competitor to 
refrain from challenging a patent. And by extension, we have long 
recognized that the settlement of patent litigation does not by itself violate 
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the antitrust laws. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 
(1931) (“Where there are legitimately conflicting claims or threatened 
interferences, a settlement by agreement, rather than litigation, is not 
precluded by the [Sherman] Act”). Like most litigation, patent litigation is 
settled all the time, and such settlements—which can include agreements 
that clearly violate antitrust law, such as licenses that fix prices, or 
agreements among competitors to divide territory—do not ordinarily 
subject the litigants to antitrust liability. See 1 H. Hovenkamp, M. Janis, M. 
Lemley, & C. Leslie, IP and Antitrust § 7.3, pp. 7–13 to 7–15 (2d ed. 2003). 
 
 The key, of course, is that the patent holder—when doing anything, 
including settling—must act within the scope of the patent. If its actions go 
beyond the monopoly powers conferred by the patent, we have held that 
such actions are subject to antitrust scrutiny. See, e.g., United States v. 
Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196–197 (1963). If its actions are within the 
scope of the patent, they are not subject to antitrust scrutiny, with two 
exceptions concededly not applicable here: (1) when the parties settle sham 
litigation, cf. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures 
Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993); and (2) when the litigation 
involves a patent obtained through fraud on the Patent and Trademark 
Office. Walker Process Equipment, supra, at 177. 
 
 Thus, under our precedent, this is a fairly straight-forward case. 
Solvay paid a competitor to respect its patent—conduct which did not 
exceed the scope of its patent. No one alleges that there was sham litigation, 
or that Solvay's patent was obtained through fraud on the PTO. As in any 
settlement, Solvay gave its competitors something of value (money) and, in 
exchange, its competitors gave it something of value (dropping their legal 
claims). In doing so, they put an end to litigation that had been dragging on 




Today, however, the Court announces a new rule. It is willing to accept 
that Solvay's actions did not exceed the scope of its patent. But it does not 
agree that this is enough to “immunize the agreement from antitrust attack.” 
Ibid. According to the majority, if a patent holder settles litigation by 
paying an alleged infringer a “large and unjustified” payment, in exchange 
for having the alleged infringer honor the patent, a court should employ the 
antitrust rule of reason to determine whether the settlement violates antitrust 
law. 
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 The Court's justifications for this holding are unpersuasive. First, the 
majority explains that “the patent here may or may not be valid, and may or 
may not be infringed.” Because there is “uncertainty” about whether the 
patent is actually valid, the Court says that any questions regarding the 
legality of the settlement should be “measur[ed]” by “procompetitive 
antitrust policies,” rather than “patent law policy.” This simply states the 
conclusion. The difficulty with such an approach is that a patent holder 
acting within the scope of its patent has an obvious defense to any antitrust 
suit: that its patent allows it to engage in conduct that would otherwise 
violate the antitrust laws. But again, that's the whole point of a patent: to 
confer a limited monopoly. The problem, as the Court correctly recognizes, 
is that we're not quite certain if the patent is actually valid, or if the 
competitor is infringing it. But that is always the case, and is plainly a 
question of patent law. 
 
The majority, however, would assess those patent law issues according 
to “antitrust policies.” According to the majority, this is what the Court did 
in Line Material— i.e., it “accommodat[ed]” antitrust principles and struck 
a “balance” between patent and antitrust law.  But the Court in Line 
Material did no such thing. Rather, it explained that it is “well settled that 
the possession of a valid patent or patents does not give the patentee any 
exemption from the provisions of the Sherman Act beyond the limits of the 
patent monopoly.”  It then, in the very next sentence, stated that “[b]y 
aggregating patents in one control, the holder of the patents cannot escape 
the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.” Ibid. That second sentence follows 
only if such conduct—the aggregation of multiple patents—goes “beyond 
the limits of the patent monopoly,” which is precisely what the Court 
concluded. See id., at 312 (“There is no suggestion in the patent statutes of 
authority to combine with other patent owners to fix prices on articles 
covered by the respective patents” (emphasis added)). The Court stressed, 
over and over, that a patent holder does not violate the antitrust laws when it 
acts within the scope of its patent. See id., at 305 (“Within the limits of the 
patentee's rights under his patent, monopoly of the process or product by 
him is authorized by the patent statutes”); id., at 310 (“price limitations on 
patented devices beyond the limits of a patent monopoly violate the 
Sherman Act” (emphasis added)). 
 
 The majority suggests that “[w]hether a particular restraint lies 
‘beyond the limits of the patent monopoly’ is a conclusion that flows from” 
applying traditional antitrust principles.  It seems to have in mind a regime 
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where courts ignore the patent, and simply conduct an antitrust analysis of 
the settlement without regard to the validity of the patent. But a patent 
holder acting within the scope of its patent does not engage in any unlawful 
anticompetitive behavior; it is simply exercising the monopoly rights 
granted to it by the Government. Its behavior would be unlawful only if its 
patent were invalid or not infringed. And the scope of the patent—i.e., what 
rights are conferred by the patent—should be determined by reference to 
patent law. While it is conceivable to set up a legal system where you assess 
the validity of patents or questions of infringement by bringing an antitrust 
suit, neither the majority nor the Government suggests that Congress has 
done so. 
 
 Second, the majority contends that “this Court's precedents make 
clear that patent-related settlement agreements can sometimes violate the 
antitrust laws.”  For this carefully worded proposition, it cites Singer 
Manufacturing Co., United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 
(1952), and Standard Oil Co. (Indiana). But each of those cases stands for 
the same, uncontroversial point: that when a patent holder acts outside the 
scope of its patent, it is no longer protected from antitrust scrutiny by the 
patent. 
 
 To begin, the majority's description of Singer is inaccurate. In 
Singer, several patent holders with competing claims entered into a 
settlement agreement in which they cross-licensed their patents to each 
other, and did so in order to disadvantage Japanese competition. See 374 
U.S., at 194–195 (finding that the agreement had “a common purpose to 
suppress the Japanese machine competition in the United States”  
According to the majority, the Court in Singer “did not examine whether, 
on the assumption that all three patents were valid, patent law would have 
allowed the patents' holders to do the same.” Rather, the majority contends, 
Singer held that this agreement violated the anti-trust laws because “in 
important part ... ‘the public interest in granting patent monopolies' exists 
only to the extent that ‘the public is given a novel and useful invention’ in 
‘consideration for its grant.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Singer, 374 U.S., at 199 
(White, J., concurring)). But the majority in Singer certainly did ask 
whether patent law permitted such an arrangement, concluding that it did 
not. See id., at 196–197 (reiterating that it “is equally well settled that the 
possession of a valid patent or patents does not give the patentee any 
exemption from the provisions of the Sherman Act beyond the limits of the 
patent monopoly ” and holding that “those limitations have been exceeded 
in this case” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
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Hovenkamp § 7.2b, at 7–8, n. 15 (citing Singer as a quintessential case in 
which patent holders were subject to antitrust liability because their 
settlement agreement went beyond the scope of their patents and thus 
conferred monopoly power beyond what the patent lawfully authorized). 
 
 New Wrinkle is to the same effect. There, the Court explained that 
because “[p]rice control through cross-licensing [is] barred as beyond the 
patent monopoly,” an “arrangement ... made between patent holders to pool 
their patents and fix prices on the products for themselves and their 
licensees ... plainly violate[s] the Sherman Act.” 342 U.S., at 379, 380. As 
the Court further explained, a patent holder may not, “ ‘acting in concert 
with all members of an industry ... issue substantially identical licenses to 
all members of the industry under the terms of which the industry is 
completely regimented, the production of competitive unpatented products 
suppressed, a class of distributors squeezed out, and prices on unpatented 
products stabilized.’ ” Id., at 379–380 (quoting United States v. United 
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400 (1948)). The majority here, however, 
ignores this discussion, and instead categorizes the case as “applying 
antitrust scrutiny to [a] patent settlement.” 
 
 Again, in Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), the parties settled claims 
regarding “competing patented processes for manufacturing an unpatented 
product,” which threatened to create a monopoly over the unpatented 
product. 283 U.S., at 175. The Court explained that “an exchange of 
licenses for the purpose of curtailing the ... supply of an unpatented product, 
is beyond the privileges conferred by the patents.” 
 
 The majority is therefore right to suggest that these “precedents 
make clear that patent-related settlement agreements can sometimes violate 
the antitrust laws.” The key word is sometimes. And those some times are 
spelled out in our precedents. Those cases have made very clear that patent 
settlements—and for that matter, any agreements relating to patents—are 
subject to antitrust scrutiny if they confer benefits beyond the scope of the 
patent. This makes sense. A patent exempts its holder from the antitrust 
laws only insofar as the holder operates within the scope of the patent. 
When the holder steps outside the scope of the patent, he can no longer use 
the patent as his defense. The majority points to no case where a patent 
settlement was subject to antitrust scrutiny merely because the validity of 
the patent was uncertain. Not one. It is remarkable, and surely worth 
something, that in the 123 years since the Sherman Act was passed, we have 
never let antitrust law cross that Rubicon. 
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 Next, the majority points to the “general procompetitive thrust” of 
the Hatch–Waxman Act, the fact that Hatch–Waxman “facilitat[es] 
challenges to a patent's validity,” and its “provisions requiring parties to 
[such] patent dispute [s] ... to report settlement terms to the FTC and the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.” The Hatch–Waxman Act 
surely seeks to encourage competition in the drug market. And, like every 
law, it accomplishes its ends through specific provisions. These provisions, 
for example, allow generic manufacturers to enter the market without 
undergoing a duplicative application process; they also grant a 180–day 
monopoly to the first qualifying generic to commercially market a 
competing product. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv), 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
So yes, the point of these provisions is to encourage competition. But it 
should by now be trite—and unnecessary—to say that “no legislation 
pursues its purposes at all costs” and that “it frustrates rather than 
effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers 
the statute's primary objective must be the law.” Rodriguez v. United States, 
480 U.S. 522, 525–526 (1987) ( per curiam ). It is especially disturbing 
here, where the Court discerns from specific provisions a very broad 
policy—a “general procompetitive thrust,” in its words—and uses that 
policy to unsettle the established relationship between patent and antitrust 
law. Indeed, for whatever it may be worth, Congress has repeatedly 
declined to enact legislation addressing the issue the Court takes on today. 
 
 In addition, it is of no consequence that settlement terms must be 
reported to the FTC and the Department of Justice. Such a requirement does 
not increase the role of antitrust law in scrutinizing patent settlements. 
Rather, it ensures that such terms are scrutinized consistent with existing 
antitrust law. In other words, it ensures that the FTC and Antitrust Division 
can review the settlements to make sure that they do not confer monopoly 
power beyond the scope of the patent. 
 
 The majority suggests that “[a]pparently most if not all reverse 
payment settlement agreements arise in the context of pharmaceutical drug 
regulation.” Ante, at 2227. This claim is not supported empirically by 
anything the majority cites, and seems unlikely. The term “reverse payment 
agreement”—coined to create the impression that such settlements are 
unique—simply highlights the fact that the party suing ends up paying. But 
this is no anomaly, nor is it evidence of a nefarious plot; it simply results 
from the fact that the patent holder plaintiff is a defendant against an 
invalidity counterclaim—not a rare situation in intellectual property 
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litigation. Whatever one might call them, such settlements—paying an 
alleged infringer to drop its invalidity claim—are a well-known feature of 
intellectual property litigation, and reflect an intuitive way to settle such 
disputes. See Metro–Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. v. 007 Safety Prods., Inc., 183 
F.3d 10, 13 (C.A.1 1999); see also Schildkraut, Patent–Splitting Settlements 
and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71 Antitrust L.J. 1033, 1033, 1046–1049 
(2004); Brief for Actavis 54, n. 20 (citing examples). To the extent there are 
not scores and scores of these settlements to point to, this is because such 
settlements—outside the context of Hatch–Waxman—are private 
agreements that for obvious reasons are generally not appealed, nor publicly 
available. 
 
 The majority suggests that reverse-payment agreements are distinct 
because “a party with no claim for damages ... walks away with money 
simply so it will stay away from the patentee's market.” Again a distinction 
without a difference. While the alleged infringer may not be suing for the 
patent holder's money, it is suing for the right to use and market the 
(intellectual) property, which is worth money. 
 
 Finally, the majority complains that nothing in “any patent statute” 
gives patent-holders the right to settle when faced with allegations of 
invalidity. But the right to settle generally accompanies the right to litigate 
in the first place; no one contends that drivers in an automobile accident 
may not settle their competing claims merely because no statute grants them 
that authority. The majority suggests that such a right makes it harder to 
“eliminat[e] unwarranted patent grants.” Ibid. That may be so, but such a 
result—true of all patent settlements—is no reason to adjudicate questions 
of patent law under antitrust principles. Our cases establish that antitrust 
law has no business prying into a patent settlement so long as that 
settlement confers to the patent holder no monopoly power beyond what the 
patent itself conferred—unless, of course, the patent was invalid, but that 
again is a question of patent law, not antitrust law. 
 
 In sum, none of the Court's reasons supports its conclusion that a 
patent holder, when settling a claim that its patent is invalid, is not 
immunized by the fact that it is acting within the scope of its patent. And I 
fear the Court's attempt to limit its holding to the context of patent 
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 The majority's rule will discourage settlement of patent litigation. 
Simply put, there would be no incentive to settle if, immediately after 
settling, the parties would have to litigate the same issue—the question of 
patent validity—as part of a defense against an antitrust suit. In that suit, the 
alleged infringer would be in the especially awkward position of being for 
the patent after being against it. 
 
 This is unfortunate because patent litigation is particularly complex, 
and particularly costly. As one treatise noted, “[t]he median patent case that 
goes to trial costs each side $1.5 million in legal fees” alone. Hovenkamp § 
7.1c, at 7–5, n. 6. One study found that the cost of litigation in this specific 
context—a generic challenging a brand name pharmaceutical patent—was 
about $10 million per suit. See Herman, Note, The Stay Dilemma: 
Examining Brand and Generic Incentives for Delaying the Resolution of 
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 111 Colum. L.Rev. 1788, 1795, n. 41 
(2011) (citing M. Goodman, G. Nachman, & L. Chen, Morgan Stanley 
Equity Research, Quantifying the Impact from Authorized Generics 9 
(2004)). 
 
 The Court acknowledges these problems but nonetheless offers “five 
sets of considerations” that it tells us overcome these concerns: (1) 
sometimes patent settlements will have “ ‘genuine adverse effects on 
competition’ ”; (2) “these anticompetitive consequences will at least 
sometimes prove unjustified”; (3) “where a reverse payment threatens to 
work unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the 
power to bring that harm about in practice”; (4) “it is normally not 
necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question” because 
“[a]n unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally suggest that 
the patentee has serious doubts about the patent's survival,” and using a 
“payment ... to prevent the risk of competition ... constitutes the relevant 
anticompetitive harm”; and (5) parties may still “settle in other ways” such 
as “by allowing the generic manufacturer to enter the patentee's market 
prior to the patent's expiration, without the patentee paying the challenger to 
stay out prior to that point.” 
 
 Almost all of these are unresponsive to the basic problem that 
settling a patent claim cannot possibly impose unlawful anticompetitive 
harm if the patent holder is acting within the scope of a valid patent and 
therefore permitted to do precisely what the antitrust suit claims is unlawful. 
This means that in any such antitrust suit, the defendant (patent holder) will 
want to use the validity of his patent as a defense—in other words, he'll 
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want to say “I can do this because I have a valid patent that lets me do this.” 
I therefore don't see how the majority can conclude that it won't normally be 
“necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question,” unless 
it means to suggest that the defendant (patent holder) cannot raise his patent 
as a defense in an antitrust suit. But depriving him of such a defense—if 
that's what the majority means to do—defeats the point of the patent, which 
is to confer a lawful monopoly on its holder. 
 
 The majority seems to think that even if the patent is valid, a patent 
holder violates the antitrust laws merely because the settlement took away 
some chance that his patent would be declared invalid by a court. See ante 
(“payment ... to prevent the risk of competition ... constitutes the relevant 
anticompetitive harm.”  This is flawed for several reasons. 
 
 First, a patent is either valid or invalid. The parties of course don't 
know the answer with certainty at the outset of litigation; hence the 
litigation. But the same is true of any hard legal question that is yet to be 
adjudicated. Just because people don't know the answer doesn't mean there 
is no answer until a court declares one. Yet the majority would impose 
antitrust liability based on the parties' subjective uncertainty about that legal 
conclusion. 
 
 The Court does so on the assumption that offering a “large” sum is 
reliable evidence that the patent holder has serious doubts about the patent. 
Not true. A patent holder may be 95% sure about the validity of its patent, 
but particularly risk averse or litigation averse, and willing to pay a good 
deal of money to rid itself of the 5% chance of a finding of invalidity. What 
is actually motivating a patent holder is apparently a question district courts 
will have to resolve on a case-by-case basis. The task of trying to discern 
whether a patent holder is motivated by uncertainty about its patent, or other 
legitimate factors like risk aversion, will be made all the more difficult by 
the fact that much of the evidence about the party's motivation may be 
embedded in legal advice from its attorney, which would presumably be 
shielded from discovery. 
 
 Second, the majority's position leads to absurd results. Let's say in 
2005, a patent holder sues a competitor for infringement and faces a 
counterclaim that its patent is invalid. The patent holder determines that the 
risk of losing on the question of validity is low, but after a year of litigating, 
grows increasingly risk averse, tired of litigation, and concerned about the 
company's image, so it pays the competitor a “large” payment in exchange 
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for having the competitor honor its patent. Then let's say in 2006, a different 
competitor, inspired by the first competitor's success, sues the patent holder 
and seeks a similar payment. The patent holder, recognizing that this 
dynamic is unsustainable, litigates this suit to conclusion, all the way to the 
Supreme Court, which unanimously decides the patent was valid. 
According to the majority, the first settlement would violate the antitrust 
laws even though the patent was ultimately declared valid, because that first 
settlement took away some chance that the patent would be invalidated in 
the first go around. Under this approach, a patent holder may be found 
liable under antitrust law for doing what its perfectly valid patent allowed it 
to do in the first place; its sin was to settle, rather than prove the correctness 
of its position by litigating until the bitter end. 
 
 Third, this logic—that taking away any chance that a patent will be 
invalidated is itself an antitrust problem—cannot possibly be limited to 
reverse-payment agreements, or those that are “large.” Ibid. The 
Government's brief acknowledges as much, suggesting that if antitrust 
scrutiny is invited for such cash payments, it may also be required for 
“other consideration” and “alternative arrangements.”  For example, when a 
patent holder licenses its product to a licensee at a fixed monopoly price, 
surely it takes away some chance that its patent will be challenged by that 
licensee. According to the majority's reasoning, that's an antitrust problem 
that must be analyzed under the rule of reason. But see General Elec. Co., 
272 U.S., at 488 (holding that a patent holder may license its invention at a 
fixed price). Indeed, the Court's own solution—that patent holders should 
negotiate to allow generics into the market sooner, rather than paying them 
money—also takes away some chance that the generic would have litigated 
until the patent was invalidated. 
 
 Thus, although the question posed by this case is fundamentally a 
question of patent law— i.e., whether Solvay's patent was valid and 
therefore permitted Solvay to pay competitors to honor the scope of its 
patent—the majority declares that such questions should henceforth be 
scrutinized by antitrust law's unruly rule of reason. Good luck to the district 
courts that must, when faced with a patent settlement, weigh the “likely 
anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, market power, and potentially 




 The majority invokes “procompetitive antitrust policies” but misses 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY                                Ch. 4, Page 95 
Hovenkamp                                                                                       August 2013  
 
the basic point that patent laws promote consumer interests in a different 
way, by providing protection against competition. As one treatise explains: 
 
“The purpose of the rule of reason is to determine whether, on 
balance, a practice is reasonably likely to be anticompetitive or 
competitively harmless—that is, whether it yields lower or higher 
marketwide output. By contrast, patent policy encompasses a set of 
judgments about the proper tradeoff between competition and the 
incentive to innovate over the long run. Antitrust's rule of reason 
was not designed for such judgments and is not adept at making 
them.” 
Hovenkamp § 7.3, at 7–13 (footnote omitted). 
 
 The majority recognizes that “a high reverse payment” may “signal 
to other potential challengers that the patentee lacks confidence in its patent, 
thereby provoking additional challenges.”  It brushes this off, however, 
because of two features of Hatch–Waxman that make it “ ‘not necessarily 
so.’ ”  First, it points out that the first challenger gets a 180–day exclusive 
period to market a generic version of the brand name drug, and that 
subsequent challengers cannot secure that exclusivity period—meaning 
when the patent holder buys off the first challenger, it has bought off its 
most motivated competitor. There are two problems with this argument. 
First, according to the Food and Drug Administration, all manufacturers 
who file on the first day are considered “first applicants” who share the 
exclusivity period. Thus, if ten generics file an application to market a 
generic drug on the first day, all will be considered “first applicants.” See 
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb); see also FDA, Guidance for Industry: 
180–Day Exclusivity When Multiple ANDAs Are Submitted on the Same 
Day 4 (July 2003). This is not an unusual occurrence. See Brief for Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association as Amicus Curiae 23–24 (citing FTC data 
indicating that some drugs “have been subject to as many as sixteen first-
day” generic applications; that in 2005, the average number of first-day 
applications per drug was 11; and that between 2002 and 2008, the yearly 
average never dropped below three first-day applications per drug). 
 
 Second, and more fundamentally, the 180 days of exclusivity simply 
provides more incentive for generic challenges. Even if a subsequent 
generic would not be entitled to this additional incentive, it will have as 
much or nearly as much incentive to challenge the patent as a potential 
challenger would in any other context outside of Hatch–Waxman, where 
there is no 180–day exclusivity period. And a patent holder who gives away 
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notably large sums of money because it is, as the majority surmises, 
concerned about the strength of its patent, would be putting blood in water 
where sharks are always near. 
 
 The majority also points to the fact that, under Hatch–Waxman, the 
FDA is enjoined from approving a generic's application to market a drug for 
30 months if the brand name sues the generic for patent infringement within 
45 days of that application being filed. Ante, at 2235 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(5)(B)(iii)). According to the majority, this provision will chill 
subsequent generics from challenging the patent (because they will have to 
wait 30 months before receiving FDA approval to market their drug). But 
this overlooks an important feature of the law: the FDA may approve the 
application before the 30 months are up “if before the expiration of [the 30 
months,] the district court decides that the patent is invalid or not 
infringed.” § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I). And even if the FDA did not have to wait 
30 months, it is far from clear that a generic would want to market a drug 
prior to obtaining a judgment of invalidity or noninfringement. Doing so 
may expose it to ruinous liability for infringement. 
 
 The irony of all this is that the majority's decision may very well 
discourage generics from challenging pharmaceutical patents in the first 
place. Patent litigation is costly, time consuming, and uncertain. See Cybor 
Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476, n. 4 (C.A.Fed.1998) 
(opinion of Rader, J.) (en banc) (discussing study showing that the Federal 
Circuit wholly or partially reversed in almost 40 percent of claim 
construction appeals in a 30–month period); Brief for Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association as Amicus Curiae 16 (citing a 2010 study 
analyzing the prior decade's cases and showing that generics prevailed in 82 
cases and lost in 89 cases). Generics “enter this risky terrain only after 
careful analysis of the potential gains if they prevail and the potential 
exposure if they lose.”  Taking the prospect of settlements off the table—or 
limiting settlements to an earlier entry date for the generic, which may still 
be many years in the future—puts a damper on the generic's expected value 
going into litigation, and decreases its incentive to sue in the first place. The 
majority assures us, with no support, that everything will be okay because 
the parties can settle by simply negotiating an earlier entry date for the 
generic drug manufacturer, rather than settling with money. Ante, at 2246 – 
2247 . But it's a matter of common sense, confirmed by experience, that 
parties are more likely to settle when they have a broader set of valuable 
things to trade. 
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 The majority today departs from the settled approach separating 
patent and antitrust law, weakens the protections afforded to innovators by 
patents, frustrates the public policy in favor of settling, and likely 
undermines the very policy it seeks to promote by forcing generics who step 
into the litigation ring to do so without the prospect of cash settlements. I 
would keep things as they were and not subject basic questions of patent 
law to an unbounded inquiry under antitrust law, with its treble damages 
and famously burdensome discovery....  I respectfully dissent. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.   Interestingly all eight Justices (Justice Alito did not participate) appear 
to agree that consumer welfare is the goal of the antitrust laws.  That 
perspective dominates Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court, but even 
Chief Justice Roberts states early in his dissent that “The point of antitrust 
law is to encourage competitive markets to promote consumer welfare.”  A 
strict consumer welfare approach measures antitrust violations by their 
impact on consumers, including reduced market output, higher prices, or 
reduced innovation.  A "total welfare" approach looks at effects on 
everyone, including producers.  For example, a practice that increases prices 
by $1 million but that produces offsetting efficiency gains to producers of 
$1.2 million would be lawful under a total welfare approach even though 
consumers are injured.  The welfare goals of the antitrust laws have been 
the subject of an enormous scholarly debate for decades.  However, the 
courts almost uniformly follow a consumer welfare principle and Actavis is 
in line with that tradition.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing 
Antitrust's Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L.REV. 2471 (2013). 
 
2.  An unanticipated consequence of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to set up 
little two-firm cartels between the pioneer patentee and the first generic 
entrant.  Guaranteed freedom from entry by a third competitor for 180 days 
following the generic firm's production, they have a strong incentive to 
perpetuate any monopoly the patent (assuming its validity) creates rather 
than enter into competition.  Further, until Actavis the general rule favored 
settlements of patent infringement disputes, even tolerating settlements that 
divided markets, as these do.  For two firms agreeing with each other, their 
joint profit-maximizing output and price is exactly the same as that of a 
monopolist, and sharing these monopoly profits is more profitable in nearly 
every case than competing.  For example, suppose manufacturing costs to 
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both parties are 50 cents per unit.  The monopoly price is 90 cents per unit.  
When the generic enters, if the two firms behave competitively the price 
will drop to 50 cents and they will each earn only a competitive return.  By 
contrast, if they settle via a payment for delayed entry, the two firms will 
share the 40 cents in monopoly profits for a time, at consumers’ expense.  
The ironic result is that it is more profitable for the generic to settle than 
even to win the lawsuit outright, which would make the market competitive.   
The parties might of course achieve a similar result if the generic produced 
and the two firms colluded on the product price.   The statute does not 
permit price collusion, however, and as a result it would be per se violation 
of the antitrust laws.  So the Hatch-Waxman settlement somewhat 
resembles the story of two price-fixers who shut down one of their plants 
and produce the cartel output from the remaining plant. 
 
 Generally speaking, patent settlements are devices for addressing the 
risk of a legal outcome that is unfavorable to the pioneer patentee, such as a 
finding of invalidity.  In the typical infringement case the patentee discounts 
the risk of losing the lawsuit into an agreement that typically includes a 
license to the infringer to produce under the patent at a specified royalty.  
One significant difference between conventional settlements and reverse 
payment settlements is that the ordinary settlement is an output increasing 
event, making both patentee and licensee into producers.  By contrast, a 
reverse payment settlement presumptively reduces output by preserving 
production only by the pioneer while raising its costs. 
 
In general, pioneer pharmaceutical patents are strong and relatively 
durable, preventing far few problems of interpretation and validity than, 
say, information technologies patents.  See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. 
MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS 
PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 138-146 (2009).  Most Hatch-Waxman 
settlements are not on original pioneer molecules, however.  They are 
typically on "evergreened" extension patents for new uses, new dosages, 
new forms of delivery, and the like.  The failure rate of these patents is 
much higher, and the incentives to profit from the bilateral monopoly 
accordingly greater.  Indeed, while the invalidity rate of litigated patents is 
an already-too-high 40%, the invalidity rate of pharmaceutical patents 
litigated under paragraph IV of the Hatch-Waxman process is nearly double 
that, 73% (FTC, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration (2002),, 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf. In 
Actavis the drug patent was on a particular gel formulation of a drug that 
was established and widely available but whose patent had expired. As a 
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result the formulation may not have met patent law's novelty requirement.  
The drug itself was in the public domain, and gel formulations of drugs 
have been well known for decades. 
 
3.   Consider the range of options open to the Court, ranging from least 
to most restrictive: 
  
a.  Any settlement, including ones that involve pay-for-delay, is 
immune from antitrust attack if it is facially "within the scope of the 
patent."  For example, if a patent has six years remaining and the pay-
for-delay exclusion agreement runs only five years, then the payment is 
lawful because the patent standing alone would have kept the infringer 
out of the market in any event.  Under this approach the court may not 
second guess the settlement by inquiring into the validity of the patent 
or the defendant's actual infringement; the settlement itself shields these 
queries from the court, with a possible exception for egregious 
situations involving obviously invalid patents.  That is, it creates an 
"almost unrebuttable presumpton of patent validity," and thus "assumes 
away the question being litigated in the underlying patent suit...." In re 
K–Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 197, 214 (C.A.3 2012) (rejecting "scope 
of the patent" approach). This is the approach that many lower courts have 
taken, including the Eleventh Circuit decision that the Supreme Court 
reversed, and it is consistent with a long tradition of federal judicial 
deference to settlements of patent infringement disputes.  See 12 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶2046 (3d ed. 2012).  On the 
course taken by earlier decisions, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, 
MARK A. LEMLEY, AND CHRISTOPHER LESLIE, IP AND ANTITRUST §15.3 (2d 
ed. Supp. 2013)  Justice Breyer acknowledged a "general legal policy 
favoring the settlement of disputes." 
 
b.  A settlement payment that seems very large in proportion to 
litigation risks is a sign that something is wrong with the patent.  It is 
likely either invalid or not infringed.  This should be construed as an 
invitation to open the question that courts traditionally avoid in 
challenges to settlements.   They should look more closely at the 
underlying patent and the infringement action in order to determine 
whether the settlement is really a good faith attempt to manage litigation 
and business risk, given the general uncertainty of patent infringement 
lawsuit outcomes.  Or is this simply an attempt to continue an 
unjustified stream of monopoly profits, albeit with two firms sharing it 
rather than one?  Possibilities for this close look have included direct 
judicial evaluation of the patent or perhaps a call for re-examination by 
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the USPTO.  See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN AND HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN 
INNOVATION 93-96 (2012) (noting limitations on this approach); Gregory 
Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 281 (2011) (defending it). 
 
c.  A "large" settlement exclusion payment disproportionate to 
litigation risk can be unlawful under antitrust's rule of reason, without 
inquiry into whether the patent is actually invalid or not infringed, and 
even if the settlement agreement does not go "beyond the scope" of the 
patent's nominal coverage.  The plaintiff has the burden of showing both 
market power and competitive harm. 
 
d.  Same as c, except a large payment triggers a "quick look," or 
truncated, antitrust analysis in which the plaintiff can enjoy 
presumptions about market power or anticompetitive effect.  The 
defendant has the burden of defending against these and showing 
offsetting defenses. 
 
e.  Pay-for-delay settlements are unlawful per se -- that is, the 
plaintiff need prove only that such an agreement exists; power and 
anticompetitive effects need not be proven. 
 
The Supreme Court chose option c.  Most lower courts had chosen 
some version of option a. Although a minority had chosen either d or e. 
 
4.  Nevertheless, just how different is the "rule of reason" that Justice 
Breyer insisted must apply in this case and the "quick look" that the FTC 
had requested?  The Supreme Court in general, but Justice Breyer in 
particular, has never been a big fan of "quick look" antitrust analysis.  The 
question of truncated antitrust analysis actually revolves around two issues.  
The first is the assignment of burdens of proof, while the second is the 
question of what kind of evidence is necessary for the plaintiff to carry its 
burden.  On the first, the majority rejected the FTC's request that once an 
unreasonably large payment was shown the burden shifted to the defendant 
to justify it.  On the second question, however, the Court also held that 
power could be inferred from a very large payment -- indicating that a 
relevant market need not be defined and a market share need not be 
computed.  Second, it held that anticompetitive effects in the form of higher 
consumer prices could also be inferred from the high payment.  The 
defenses that the Court acknowledged were that the payment was no larger 
than reasonably anticipated litigation costs, and that the generic was in fact 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY                                Ch. 4, Page 101 
Hovenkamp                                                                                       August 2013  
 
contracting to provide services to the pioneer (probably distribution and 
marketing) whose fair market value equalled the excess payment.  Note that 
the one defense that the Court did not acknowledge was that the patent was 
valid.  In fact, the Court repeatedly stated that patent validity vel non was 
not an essential aspect of the antitrust case. 
 
5.  Although Justice Breyer did not reach the issue, one important query in 
rule of reason cases is whether a less restrictive alternative exists to a 
challenged restraint found to pose a significant risk of competitive harm.  
Wouldn’t it be a less restrictive alternative for the pioneer patentee and the 
generic to enter into an agreement under which the generic paid a license 
fee and produced the drug in competition with the patentee?  That is a 
typical outcome in patent infringement suits and rarely raises competitive 
problems.  The licensing arrangement adds an additional purchaser.  The 
more doubtful the validity of the patent, the lower the license fee will be.  
Further, license arrangements of this sort – unlike pay-for-delay settlements 
– are expressly authorized by the Patent Act.  See 35 U.S.C. §261. 
 
6.  The majority and dissent disputed whether pay-for-delay settlements are 
a unique feature of Hatch-Waxman (majority) or are in fact relatively 
common among patent settlements generally (dissent).  The question is 
important because traditional settlements (generic pays for a license to 
produce) are generally procompetitive, and that would make them a less 
restrictive alternative.  Chief Justice Roberts cited a law review article and 
the defendant's brief, which cited some non-Hatch-Waxman cases as 
examples of pay-for-delay settlements.  None of the cases involved patents.  
Two were trademark cases in which the parties settled with reverse 
payments in the $150,000 - $300,000 range after the district courts had 
denied preliminary injunctions.  But $300,000 is very likely less than the 
prospective cost of litigation.  See MGM, Inc. v. 007 Safety Prods., Inc., 
183 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 1999); Time Prods., Ltd. v. Toy Biz, Inc., 38 F.3d 660 
(2d Cir. 1994).  The third case was also a trademark case in which 
Microsoft made a $20,000,000 exit payment to a firm that produced an open 
source computer operating system called "Lindows." (probably a 
combination of "Linux" and "Windows").   Microsoft had already lost a 
request for a preliminary injunction twice, and the district court had ruled 
that a jury should decide whether the name "Windows" was generic, and 
thus in the public domain.  The United States Patent Trademark Office had 
twice held that the name Windows was generic, but then changed its mind 
without explanation.  In sum, the litigation risk for Windows was not 
merely that the defendant could keep the name Lindows, but that the 
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Windows name would go into the public domain.  $20,000,000 was a small 
price to pay. 
 
7.  Language  in the majority's opinion may carry the Actavis holding 
beyond the Hatch-Waxman context.  Most importantly is Justice Breyer's 
distinction between practices that are authorized by the Patent Act and those 
that are not.  If a particular provision (1) appears anticompetitive; and (2) is 
not authorized by the Patent Act, then the decision may permit an antitrust 
challenge even though the patents in question are valid.  One good example 
is product price fixing in settlement agreements.  In the much criticized 
decision in United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926),  the 
Supreme Court approved a license agreement in which patentee GE licensed 
Westinghouse to manufacture light bulbs and stipulated the price at which 
the bulbs must be sold by Westinghouse's retailers.  Justice Breyer read the 
decision very narrowly, stating that it "permitted a single patentee to grant 
to a single licensee a license containing a minimum resale price 
requirement."  Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2232.  This limitation to a single 
licensor and a single licensee very likely overrules decisions such as E. 
Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902), which 
permitted all the firms making a product to cross-license their patents and 
stipulate the resale price of the product. 
 
8.  Under ordinary antitrust rules, both the pioneer patentee and the generic 
could be held liable in damages for an unlawful pay-for-delay settlement.  
While the antitrust laws offer some relief for "coerced" participants in a 
conspiracy (such as dealers upon whom tying arrangements or unlawful 
resale price maintenance are imposed), the generic company in these cases 
is hardly coerced.  It is a willing participant very likely in a position to earn 
more under the settlement than it could be entering into competitive 
production.  Consumer damages in private actions would ordinarily be 
measured by the overcharge, and under the ordinary antitrust rules of joint 
and several liability, both defendants would individually and together be 
liable for the damage award.  Under federal antitrust law "indirect" 
purchasers could not collect damages, although they could obtain an 
injunction.  Since most pharmaceutical drugs are distributed through 
pharmacies and other health care suppliers, consumers would be indirect 
purchasers.  So in these cases the pharmacies and other direct purchasers 
could sue for damages, but not consumers.  However, the antitrust law of 
many states permits indirect purchasers to claim damages.  See 2A PHILLIP 
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶346, 395 (4th ed. 
2014). 
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PATENT VS. TRADEMARK SETTLEMENTS 
 
In Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997), 
the court approved a settlement agreement in a trademark infringement suit 
involving the brand names “Lysol” and “Pine-Sol.”  Lysol was the senior 
mark, antedating Pine-Sol (at the time called “Pinesol”) by several decades.  
When the owners of Pinesol, who were sellers of household chemicals, 
attempted to register the mark the examiner in the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office denied registration, concluding that there was a similarity 
between the “Pi” sound in Pinesol and the “Ly” sound in Lysol that could 
confuse customers.  When the owners of Pinesol continued to use it without 
registration, the owner of Lysol sued for trademark infringement. 
 
 The parties entered a settlement agreement under which the owners 
of Pinesol agreed to use that name only in chemicals that had pine oil as an 
active ingredient, to use a distinctive picture of an evergreen tree on the 
label, and to change the name of their products to “Pine-Sol,” thus keeping 
the “Pine” and the “Sol” separate.  More than fifteen years later a new 
dispute arose when the owners of the revised Pine-Sol mark began to use it 
on aerosol spray disinfectants, which competed directly with Lysol 
products.  The parties revised their agreement but controversy continued to 
erupt as Pine-Sol added new products to its line. 
 
 Clorox, the subsequent owner of Pine-Sol finally brought an action 
in 1987, alleging that the product agreement in the settlement agreement no 
longer served a useful purpose because the distinctiveness of the two labels 
was clearly established in consumers’ minds.  As a result the settlement 
agreement was nothing more than a naked market division agreement, per 
se unlawful under the antitrust laws. 
 
 The court held that the agreement remained enforceable.  The 
agreement did not restrict either party from making any product but only 
from using a particular name on that product: 
 
The trademark agreement at issue here does no more than 
regulate how the name PINE-SOL may be used; it does not in any 
way restrict Clorox from producing and selling products that 
compete directly with the LYSOL brand, so long as they are 
marketed under a brand name other than PINE-SOL. Accordingly, at 
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first blush it would not appear to restrict Clorox's, much less any 
other competitor's, ability to compete in the markets LYSOL 
products allegedly dominate. 
 
The court rejected Clorox’s “megabrand” theory – namely, that certain 
trademarks are so attractive and well recognized in the eyes of customers 
that they confer significant advantages over those making similar products 
but not having the same market.  Further, 
 
… there is no evidence to support the theory that only Clorox is 
capable of competing against LYSOL products in the alleged 
markets LYSOL dominates. The overall household cleaning 
industry is the battleground of some of the largest corporations in 
the country, wielding numerous megabrands. The industry is made 
up of firms with the resources to develop new products and market 
them, as these companies have repeatedly done. In the past, these 
companies regularly bought and sold trademarks, as this case 
illustrates, as changing economic conditions dictated. See id. at 26. 
Each of these major corporations, like Clorox, has significant 
goodwill attached to its own name, and to the trademarks it owns. 
 
…  Nothing here suggests that the other large companies that 
produce cleaning products are incapable of successfully investing 
their resources, in the form of capital and brand name equity, to 
enter the markets LYSOL products allegedly dominate. Clorox has 
presented no evidence to the contrary. 
 
Note the important differences between a trademark settlement and a 
patent settlement.  First, a trademark settlement with a product division 
agreement excludes only from the brand name, not from the product itself.  
As a result, new product entry by both the settlement party and by others is 
unrestricted.  By contrast, a patent settlement excludes from the technology 
covered by the patent(s) in dispute, which in some cases may involve the 
ability to manufacture the product itself.  For example, in pharmaceutical 
settlements such as the one in the principal case the patents in question may 
cover the “molecule,” or the entire product, and may effectively perpetuate 
a monopoly in the pioneer patentee.  On the other side, the patent settlement 
excludes only for the duration of the patent.  Once it has expired others are 
free to make and market the formerly patented product.  By contrast, a 
trademark is of indefinite duration.  
